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Preface
I want to emphasize here that two chapters of this thesis are in large parts identical
to current versions of two research papers written with co-authors.
A single-authored analysis of minimum wage spillovers in Chapter 2, is followed
by a discussion of the relation between employment protection legislation and the
bullying of workers in Chapter 3. The origin of this latter chapter is a working paper
I wrote with Annette Kirstein, Senior Lecturer at the University Magdeburg, and
Roland Kirstein, Professor at the University Magdeburg. Chapter 4 asks whether
less profitable firms fire unproductive workers more often than profitable firms do.
This analysis is based on joint work with Werner Güth, Director of the Strategic
Interactions Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena.
I am grateful to these co-authors for permitting me to use our joint work as part
of this thesis.
For reasons of consistency, I will use first-person plural personal pronouns in
all subsequent chapters – regardless of whether the respective chapter bases upon
single-authored or co-authored research papers.
1
1 Introduction
Labor markets and the questions whether and how politics should regulate them are
regularly discussed topics in public discourse across the world. In 2009, for example,
changes in minimum wage legislation have been demanded and implemented in the
USA, Europe, and Australia, employment protection laws have been an issue in
Germany prior to the election of the German Bundestag, and (mass) layoffs caused
by the financial crisis have been frequently discussed in many countries (see, e.g.,
The Australian (2009), Washington Post (2009), or Die Zeit (2009a) for details on
minimum wage laws, FAZ (2009), Spiegel (2009), or Die Zeit (2009b) for reports on
employment protection, and Guardian (2009), New York Times (2009a), or Times
(2009) for articles about layoffs).
With our thesis, we want to enrich the knowledge about these three aspects of
labor markets: in Chapters 2 and 3, we theoretically and experimentally analyze
the labor market institutions of minimum wages and employment protection, re-
spectively, before we focus on layoffs in Chapter 4.
We start by giving a short overview of the specific facets of minimum wages, em-
ployment protection, and layoffs investigated in this thesis. Then, we explain where
our work can be positioned in economic literature, before we conclude this chap-
ter by discussing some general questions regarding the experimental and statistical
methods we use.
It has been argued by theoretical and empirical field studies that the introduction
of minimum wages not only increases the wages of the workers who earned less than
this minimum wage before its introduction, but also the wages of workers who were
paid more than the minimum wage already. This effect of minimum wages on wages
of high-income workers is named minimum wage spillover effect or just minimum
wage spillover in literature. In Chapter 2 we evaluate the current status of research
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on minimum wage spillovers and propose a new model relying on relative income
preferences only. The narrow focus of our model gives us the opportunity to design
and implement a laboratory experiment that can distinguish between the various
causes for minimum wage spillovers discussed in literature.
In Chapter 3 we deal with another labor market institution, namely employment
protection. Here, the relationship between employment protection legislation and
the bullying of workers is analyzed. Our starting point is a theoretical and empirical
field study by Wasmer (2006) that has suggested that employers might start bul-
lying their workers when employment protection laws disallow them to use firings
as an alternative disciplinary incentive. We design a laboratory experiment to test
this prediction. In addition, we also briefly investigate probation period effects in
this chapter, i.e., analyze whether workers spend more work effort in the beginning
of their employment where their employers are still allowed to fire them (so-called
probation periods) than afterwards when firings are not admissible anymore.
We pick up probation period effects and minimum wages in Chapter 4 again,
which links this chapter to the preceding ones, but here the focus lies on firms’
firing policies. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the question whether
firms that operate highly profitable will lay off their unproductive employees less
often than firms that are not very profitable.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main results of our thesis and proposes starting
points for future research.
As indicated above, we use a series of three laboratory experiments to derive
insights about labor markets. Therefore, we think this thesis should be seen as a
contribution to experimental economics as well as to labor economics.
Of course, experimental economics does also deduce concrete predictions theo-
retically. However, it varies from study to study whether the emphasis lies on the
theoretical deductions or the experimental parts. The same holds for the chapters
of this thesis. While in Chapter 2 dealing with minimum wages the theoretical
deductions and their experimental implementation are both extensively discussed,
slightly more emphasis is put on the experimental parts in Chapters 3 and 4.
We are confident that the series of three theoretical models and laboratory ex-
periments presented here, offers some new insights and, thereby, contributes sig-
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nificantly to the understanding of labor markets. To the best of our knowledge,
the concrete questions about labor market institutions we try to answer in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, namely whether minimum wage spillovers exist and whether bullying
increases with stricter employment protection, have not been analyzed experimen-
tally before. We are also not aware of another theoretical model focusing solely on
relative income preferences to explain minimum wage spillovers. The question we
want to answer in Chapter 4 of this thesis is also the main focus of the experimental
study by Fischer et al. (2008). However, these authors analyze firms’ firing policies
in a stylized ultimatum game setting, while we theoretically and experimentally
apply a richer principal-agent labor market setting.
Although empirical field studies (henceforth, simply called empirical studies) are
still the tool dominantly used in labor economics, labor market experiments have
attracted more and more interest in economics during the last years. While, for
instance, the standard textbooks on experimental economics like Davis and Holt
(1993) or Kagel and Roth (1995) do not feature own chapters dedicated to labor
markets, more recent surveys and economic dictionaries do (see, e.g., Gächter and
Fehr (2002), Falk and Fehr (2003) or Falk and Gächter (2008)). The trend is also
highlighted by the large amount of articles dealing with labor market experiments
recently published in highly ranked, renowned journals (see, e.g., Brandts and Char-
ness (2004), Charness (2004), Riedl and Tyran (2005), Brandts and Cooper (2006),
Falk et al. (2006), Falk and Huffmann (2007), Fehr and Schmidt (2007), or Healy
(2007)). Since we also apply the experimental method to analyze labor markets,
we think it is appropriate, if not necessary, to present a general overview of the
pros and cons of this approach here already.
1.1 Labor market experiments
The sole purpose of the study by Falk and Fehr (2003) is to deliver a comprehensive
overview of the advantages and most common objections against labor market ex-
periments. Consequentially, our summary relies on similar arguments, but regroups
and occasionally expands them and adds some newer literature. Similar, yet shorter
discussions can be found in Gächter and Fehr (2002) or Falk and Gächter (2008).
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We primarily compare the qualities of laboratory experiments to those of empirical
studies, since the latter are dominantly used in labor economics. Most often the
pros and cons of laboratory experiments, in general, are the same as those of labor
market experiments. Thus, we not always make this distinction below.
In our view, every advantage of experiments in comparison to empirical studies
has its origin in the (comparatively) strong control over the environment. This
not only allows a) to implement institutional changes truly, or at least almost, ce-
teris paribus and b) to focus on a specific class of effects excluding confounding
influences, but also c) to repeat the experiment under (almost) identical settings
to strengthen the results’ robustness, and, finally, d) to compare results between
settings that differ more fundamentally. These latter settings are typically called
treatment conditions in experimental economics. We now shortly discuss each of
these advantages and occasionally use our own minimum wage experiment for ex-
emplification.
Let us start with advantage a). Although, empirical studies can also analyze the
effects of the introduction of a minimum wage, they obviously cannot guarantee that
nothing else changed during the introduction (like the global economic situation,
for example) to the same degree as one can guarantee it in a computer laboratory.
But even if they could, it is still harder for empirical studies to discriminate
between causes for results, since confounding influences or statistical noise might
play a role. We want to exemplify this advantage b). For minimum wage spillovers,
a couple of different effects have been discussed as potential causes in literature, e.g.,
substitution effects. The basic idea for substitution effects in this context is that
if workers of different skills are substitutable from the firms’ point of view and the
minimum wage increases the relative costs of low-skill workers, then the demand
for high-skill workers should increase. This should, consequentially, increase the
wages of high-skilled workers, i.e., a minimum wage spillover should follow. The
empirical finding that minimum wage spillovers, indeed, occur could thus be used
as supporting evidence for substitution effects – but also to support all other causes
discussed in literature. However, by prohibiting firms to substitute one worker by
another, as we did in our laboratory experiment, we are able to de facto exclude
substitution effects as a possible cause for minimum wage spillovers and can focus
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on other causes.
The pure repetition of experiments unter almost identical conditions as described
in advantage c) is done very seldom in experimental economics which is quite un-
fortunate. Exceptions are prominent games as the ultimatum game or the current
punishment literature that, e.g., only changed the cultural background of the sub-
ject pool, but not the basic rules of the played game (see Herrmann et al. (2008)
who rely on Fehr and Gächter (2002)).
Finally, the advantage of treatment conditions is straightforward: while we are
able to compare different settings in our minimum wage experiment (one in which a
minimum wage is eventually introduced and one in which it is not) and other treat-
ments are straightforward extensions (for instance, treatments in which a higher or
a lower minimum wage is introduced), empirical studies can only analyze the one
prevailing setting in the region of the real world they are analyzing. They have
to rely on historical data or data from various regions (that likely differ in several
other aspects) to be able to make comparisons.
The most immediate objection against laboratory experiments is that their re-
sults might only be of limited applicability to real world phenomena. The reasons
therefore are said to be found in a) the biased subject pool, b) the just-for-fun char-
acter of experiments, because stakes are rather low, and c) the artificiality of the
computer laboratory that might question the generalizability of results. Although
we cannot ultimately dismiss these arguments, we want to give a couple of reasons
and studies that suggest that they are probably not very important.
Students were used in this and most other works as subject pool for the exper-
iments. This is frequently criticized. Falk and Fehr (2003) discuss some experi-
mental studies that test for differences between subject pools. One can summarize
the results of these studies by stating that in some cases they suggested that there
might be quantitative differences in behavior between several subject pools, but
qualitative differences did not occur, i.e., effects were sometimes more or less pro-
nounced for students than for other groups, but strictly opposing behavior patterns
were not found. In a recent study, Güth et al. (2007) have also presented evidence
that student participants’ laboratory behavior is quite similar to that in the field.
Basically the same holds for stake levels. Budget constraints alone prohibit that
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student participants earn a fortune in laboratory experiments, but nowadays they
are paid at least as much as they could earn as a student assistant at the university.
In our experiments, e.g., average earnings were about e 10.5 per hour, while the
respective wage was e 8. Furthermore, the studies cited in Falk and Fehr (2003)
find either that higher stake levels do not alter participant behavior at all or only
diminish the variety of responses.
Falk and Fehr (2003) speak of external validity when discussing the objection we
listed as point c). They point out perspicaciously that, on a meta-level, the pre-
dictive power of all scientific deductions – theoretical, experimental and empirical
– to other real world situations depends on the question whether the used settings
are the same as those in the new situation. In particular, this means that the same
objection of external validity can be used against empirical studies, since historical
cause and effect might be accurately described by them, but this alone does not
guarantee predictive power for new, probably different states of the world. While
this is certainly a valid point, it might be criticized that it avoids immediately
tackling the question of external validity of experimental data. Instead, it points
the finger at other methods’ weaknesses.
At first glance, the studies by Karlan (2005), Harrison et al. (2007) and Benz
and Meier (2008) seem to use the more appropriate approach to analyze the ex-
ternal validity of experimental data. These authors test the predictive power of
experimental results of specific games for similar real world settings by comparing
participants’ lab behavior with real world behavior (or behavior in similar field
experiment as in Harrison et al. (2007)). While the results of Karlan (2005) and
Harrison et al. (2007) are mixed, i.e., the behavior of some types of participants
and some games have rather high predictive power and others have not, Benz and
Meier (2008) find more evidence in favor of external validity. However, we want to
stress that using these studies to test for external validity has the characteristics of
a circular argument, since it inevitably leads to a similar problem of external valid-
ity. Even if assuming that the experimental and field settings they compare were,
indeed, identical – what seems problematic enough –, these studies have to com-
pare lab behavior in specific games with behavior in specific field settings. Thus,
the question of applicability of these findings to other games and other settings
arises again. For example, Karlan (2005) analyzes whether behavior in trust and
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public-good games can be used to predict real world loan payments of poor Pe-
ruvian women. An immediate transfer of his results to the question whether our
experimental results can be generalized seems challenging to say the least.
Weighing these pros and cons of labor market experiments, we agree with the
discreet conclusion Falk and Fehr (2003) draw: it seems fruitful to use laboratory
experiments more often and as a complement to the classical method of empirical
field studies, rather than as a substitute. Therefore, we also mention the results
of empirical studies analyzing similar questions than we do in Chapters 2 and 3
of this thesis. As Levitt and List (2007) point out, one should probably not use
laboratory experiment for exact quantitative predictions, but rather to uncover
general behavioral tendencies. We are confident that our experimental insights can
be used in this way.
The general discussion just presented allows us to be as brief as possible when
using similar arguments in the subsequent chapters and prevents redundancies.
For the same reasons, we now shortly explain the framing of our experimental
instructions and summarize the basic features of the performed statistical tests.
1.2 Framing of experimental instructions
Since Tversky and Kahneman (1981) the question how to frame experimental in-
structions, i.e., which words one uses to explain the rules of the experiment, is a
topic in experimental economics. As a cover story, Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
told participants to imagine that the “U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an
unusual Asian Disease” and then asked them to choose between “two alternative
programs to combat the disease”. In one framing, named Problem 1, the two al-
ternative programs were described detailing the probabilities of how many people
“will be saved”. In the other framing, named Problem 2, the survival probabilities
for both programs were the same, but now the numbers were presented differently.
In particular, the fractions of people who “will die” were given. The authors found
that participants’ choices of programs depended on the framing.
Since we are examining problems specific to labor markets, it seems intuitive to
use labor market framing. For labor market experiments, the objections against
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framed instructions referring to “employer”, “employee” and so on, are that they
might overemphasize participants imported views from outside the laboratory. Note
that strictly speaking this is a somewhat different kind of framing effect than that
in Tversky and Kahneman (1981) whose cover story was framed in both problems
as a medical decision of the U.S. (government). Furthermore, in an experiment
similar to ours, Fehr and Schmidt (2007) used labor market framing, but, addi-
tionally, performed a control treatment using expressions like “buyer” and “seller”
to check whether framing effects would alter their results. Since they found almost
no differences between the two treatments, we decided to cautiously frame all our
instructions with standard labor market terminology using “employer”, “employee”
and so on.
However, we are not aware of a study investigating the framing impact of the term
“minimum wage” that might be more likely to exist. Thus, we chose the conservative
way to use “lower bound” instead of “minimum wage” in the experiment discussed
in Chapter 2.
1.3 Statistical tests
If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, we will always use parametric tests for cases
with n ≥ 30 and nonparametric statistics for smaller samples or ordinal data.
The latter is the standard method used in experimental economics and diminishes
the problem that prior normality tests might lower the overall statistical power.
Whenever a significance criterion is necessary, it is α = .05. For nonparametric
tests, we adjust for ties when necessary.
For explorative data analysis in which a distinction between two- and one-sided
tests is possible or in cases in which the respective hypotheses allow two- or one-
sided testing, we will use two-sided tests as default. This is insofar conservative as
it makes it less likely to falsely reject the null hypothesis. We will use one-sided
tests for one-sided alternative hypothesis and then explicitly mention their usage,
while we sometimes omit mentioning the two-sidedness for reasons of readability.
There is some controversy in literature whether to use Fisher’s Exact tests or
χ2-tests with our without Yates-correction when testing for associations in the two
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dimensions of categorical data given in a 2x2-contingency table (see, e.g., Haviland
(1990) for an overview). In the following we will give p-values of all three types of
tests. They never differ qualitatively.
For small samples, we use the Wilcoxon paired sample test (also known as
Wilcoxon signed rank test) as the nonparametric equivalent to the standard one
sample t test (see Randles (2006)). We also use this test for its original purpose:
as a nonparametric dependent sample test.
When comparing the population means of two large samples, we revert to the
Welch-Satterthwaite independent two sample t test without prior variance checks
instead of using the standard t test. This has been proposed by numerous studies
(e.g., Moser et al. (1989), Neuhäuser (2002), Ruxton (2006), or Zimmerman (2004)).
Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test for detecting differences in central ten-
dency between two small samples is criticized when dealing with differently shaped
distributions. In these cases robust rank-order tests were proposed and performed
slightly better in simulations with known sample distributions (see, e.g., Fligner
and Policello (1981), Siegel and Castellan (1988), Feltovich (2003, 2005), or Rux-
ton (2006)). Since for data like ours it is not possible to tell whether distributions
differ or not with certainty, we looked at the occurring distributions and give robust
rank-order tests results in addition to U-test results whenever this visual inspection
gave reason to believe that the underlying distributions might differ. For robust
rank-order tests, we interpolated the p-values delivered by Feltovich (2005) and
used the normal distribution as approximation otherwise. As expected, p-values of
both tests are always qualitatively identical.
For reasons of simplification, we abbreviate the Welch-Satterthwaite test by WS
test. We use the term Mann-Whitney U-test (U-test) when referring to the two
independent sample test and Wilcoxon paired sample test or just Wilcoxon test only
when meaning the one dependent sample test. When performing a robust rank-
order test additionally to the U-test we give the results of the former in brackets.
Then, we abbreviate the usage of both tests with U-test (rro test). In each chapter,
we will mention all these abbreviations one time again.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent legislative decisions in Australia, Ireland, and the USA show that minimum
wages are still a prevailing topic across the world (see, e.g., The Australian (2009),
Irish Times (2009b), or Washington Post (2009)). In this chapter, we theoreti-
cally and experimentally examine so-called minimum wage spillover effects, instead
of focusing on employment effects of minimum wages like the majority of other
economic studies did.
What is a minimum wage spillover effect? For convenience, let us distinguish be-
tween two groups of workers in this chapter: the group of workers whose wages are
above the minimum wage before its introduction (henceforth, high-income workers),
and the group of workers who earn less than the minimum wage before it is intro-
duced (henceforth, low-income workers). Literature speaks of a minimum wage
spillover effect or simply of a minimum wage spillover when not only the wages of
the low-income workers increase after the introduction of the minimum wage, but
also the wages of the high-income workers increase. We follow this convention.
If minimum wage spillovers existed, the consequences for lawmakers and their
scientific counsels would be straightforward: in this case they should not only
consider the direct effects of minimum wages on wages of low-income workers,
but also the indirect effects on wages of high-income workers.1 Since no other
experimental paper known to us concentrates on such minimum wage spillover
effects and since the controlled laboratory environment can diminish confounding
1The paper of Bauer et al. (2008), e.g., is such an empirical study suitable for policy advice
that does not deal with minimum wage spillovers. The authors investigate the employment
and fiscal effects of several hypothetical minimum wages for Germany and explicitly exclude
potential minimum wage spillovers from their analysis.
11
2 Spillover effects of minimum wages
effects, we are confident to enrich the knowledge on minimum wages with our study.
At the end of this section, we will be able to explain that we also contribute to the
literature on relative income with our theoretical model.
Economics textbooks have frequently criticized minimum wages for decades, since
simple partial market analyses suggested that minimum wages are destroying jobs
(or are irrelevant at best). Although some theoretical studies doubted the uni-
versality of this reasoning (see, e.g., Stigler (1946), Drazen (1986), Lang (1987))2,
empirical findings for the USA, Australia, the UK, and Continental Europe have
questioned it more enduringly (see Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger
(1994, 1995), Dolado et al. (1996), Stewart (2004)). However, there have been
methodological controversies about the two studies that can be seen as the extreme
points in answering the question whether minimum wages destroy jobs. While, on
the one hand, Card and Krueger (1994) refuted the standard textbook prediction
that minimum wages increase unemployment, the study of Leigh (2003, 2004a), on
the other hand, largely supported conventional wisdom.3
In addition, Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) also pro-
vided empirical evidence that the introduction of minimum wages in the US fast-
food industry not only raised the wages of low-income workers, but also those of
high-income workers. They observe that such minimum wage spillover effects are
strongest for workers whose wages were only slightly above the minimum wage be-
fore its introduction. The empirical parts of the articles analyzing US data sets by
DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000, 2003) imply similar minimum
wage spillovers4, while Dickens and Manning (2004) find only small minimum wage
spillover effects for the UK.
Minimum wage spillovers are also suggested by non-scientific publications. For
instance, the recent raise in the US minimum wage in July 2009 is said to have an
2The monograph of Manning (2003) solely deals with monopsonistic labor markets, the most
prominent counterexample against conventional wisdom. Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) combine
monopsonies with efficiency wage considerations.
3Neumark and Wascher (2000) criticized Card and Krueger (1994) for using telephone surveys
and got other results for payroll records. Card and Krueger (2000), in turn, confirmed their
initial results when broadening their data set. The findings of Leigh (2003, 2004a) were doubted
by Watson (2004) and later defended by Leigh (2004b).
4A short overview over these studies can be found in Manning (2003).
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impact on wages of high-income workers (New York Times (2009b)).
Several causes for minimum wage spillovers have been discussed in theoretical
literature. We want to categorize this literature into four classes: a) models with
(partial market) substitution effects, b) relative income models, c) general equilib-
rium models, and d) search and bargaining models.
The basic idea of models with substitution effects for a firm with heterogeneously
qualified workers is straightforward. For simplification, let us assume that only two
skill groups exist that also differ in income: high-skilled, high-income workers and
low-skilled, low-income workers. If workers of different skills are substitutable, then
a minimum wage increases the relative costs of low-skill, low-income labor. Thus
firms may want to substitute low-skilled with high-skilled workers. This raises the
demand for, and eventually the wages of, high-skilled workers, i.e., substitution
effects cause minimum wage spillovers.
Relative income models rely on the idea that the employees’ work effort depends
on their relative position in the wage hierarchy. Grossman (1983) was the first
author focusing on minimum wage spillovers. He explained them in a theoretical
model incorporating substitution effects and relative income considerations.5
Teulings (2000, 2003) broadens substitution effects to a whole economy in his
general equilibrium framework to analyze minimum wage spillovers.
The bottom line of the search models of Flinn (2006, 2008) is, roughly spoken,
that by introducing minimum wages, the disagreement outcomes of the Nash bar-
gaining solution increase for all different-skilled workers. This not only increases
the wages for low-income, but also for high-income workers, i.e., minimum wage
spillovers follow.6
We will present a relative income model with heterogeneously qualified workers
who also differ in income to analyze minimum wage spillover effects. This means
that we will solely focus on one of the several causes for minimum wage spillovers
discussed in economic theory. This narrow focus not only allows us to limit our
theoretical model to the cause for minimum wage spillovers we perceive best estab-
lished evaluating the literature, but also to design an according experiment capable
5Summers (1988) relies on relative and efficiency wages to analyze unemployment and briefly
touches minimum wages.
6Some other search models can be found in literature (see, e.g., van den Berg (2003)).
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of testing this specific cause. Furthermore, by relying on a relative income model
we inevitably also add to the large body of work on relative income. Since Gross-
man (1983) also uses a relative income model, we will discuss where his approach
fundamentally differs from ours when describing our model.
To the best of our knowledge, the works of Brandts and Charness (2004) and
Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) are the only experimental studies on minimum
wages. Contrary to our study, both studies do not investigate minimum wage
spillovers between heterogeneously qualified workers differing in income. Note that
Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) confirm the hypothetical value of our research topic
by shortly discussing it in their concluding remarks.
Our main research questions are: 1) Does a relative income model predict min-
imum wage spillovers?, 2) Do minimum wage spillovers occur in an experiment?,
and 3) If minimum wage spillovers are found experimentally: are they caused by
the relative income considerations discussed in our model?
Our main results are that a) in a theoretic model minimum wage spillovers fol-
low from a rather general set of relative income assumptions, b) minimum wage
spillovers also occur in an experiment designed accordingly to our theoretical model,
and c) there is evidence that these minimum wage spillovers are mainly caused by
the relative income effects discussed in our model.
We proceed as follows: We start by summarizing the experimental studies on
minimum wages and the relative income literature most important for our analysis.
In Section 2.3, we discuss our four-person minimum wage game and its solution
based on a simple relative income model. We give our experimental design of the
minimum wage game in Section 2.4 and the hypotheses in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
presents the experimental results, before Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 Minimum wage experiments
We are aware of two other experimental studies analyzing minimum wages: the
study by Brandts and Charness (2004) and the study by Falk, Fehr and Zehnder
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(2006) (henceforth, FFZ2006).
Insights on minimum wages have not been the sole purpose of Brandts and Char-
ness (2004) who analyzed influences of market conditions in gift exchange games. In
an one-sided auction, employers offered wage contracts consisting of a fixed wage
to homogeneously skilled employees. Employers could hire one worker at most.
This excluded investigating minimum wage spillovers. In a second stage, employ-
ees chose effort levels and thereby determined final outcomes. In the treatments
with minimum wages, employers were forced to post offers larger than (or equal to)
this minimum wage. Amongst other things, Brandts and Charness (2004) found
that effort reactions to the same accepted wage were smaller when minimum wages
prohibit lower offers. This suggested that workers might have perceived a wage
offer only slightly above the minimum wage as rather unfair and thus reacted by
spending less effort.7
The fairness perceptions caused by minimum wages are the main focus of the
study by FFZ2006 whose experiment is more similar to ours. Six firms and 18
homogeneously qualified workers participated in each period of their experiment.
Firms’ revenues from employing a specific worker did not depend on this worker’s
effort choice, but were predetermined. All participants knew that each firm could
hire up to 3 employees (with decreasing marginal revenues) and that firms were
free to offer jobs to 0, 1, 2, or 3 workers, but were limited to unitary wage offers,
w ≥ 0. Due to the unitary wage offers, minimum wage spillovers were impossible
by definition. The wages the employers offered were take-it-or-leave-it offers, such
that for each single pair of employer and employee the game has the characteristics
of an ultimatum game.8
The authors used the strategy method, i.e., they asked each worker to give a
reservation wage (or threshold wage) below which he or she was not willing to
work. The workers had to give their reservation wages before they learned the
7This is in line with findings in experimental studies on other topics: the set of alternatives for
player A seems to be crucial for the perceived kindness and thus the reaction of player B (see,
e.g., McCabe et al. (2003) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006) or the more extensive discussion in
Section 2.6.2).
8In an ultimatum game, a proposer offers a fraction of an amount of money to a responder. If
the responder accepts this offer, he and the proposer receive their respective fractions. If the
responder rejects, both receive nothing (see, Güth et al. (1982)).
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actually offered wages. The reservation wages were insofar a commitment for the
workers as they determined their later choices: wage offers below this threshold
were automatically rejected. Thereby the strategy method gave FFZ2006 the whole
strategy profile of each participant, since it determined his or her decision for each
possible wage – for hypothetical ones as well as for the one eventually offered. We
will employ a similar method in our experiment.
After eliciting the threshold wages via the strategy method, FFZ2006 distin-
guished workers into three groups: a group with low, a group with medium and
a group with high reservation wages. In each period, the random matching guar-
anteed that firms were matched with one worker from each group. The employers
then could offer contracts to these workers or not. This was common knowledge.
FFZ2006 used this procedure to fasten adjustment processes.
In the first 15 periods of sequence I the game was played as described above
(unrestricted phase (u phase)), before a minimum wage, m – restricting offers to
w ≥ m – was introduced and another 15 periods followed (minimum wage phase
(mw phase)). The authors checked for sequence effects. In particular, sequence II
reversed the order of phases with and without minimum wage, i.e., it started with
a minimum wage and then removed it. This means that each sequence consisted of
the same two phases, but in different order.
For sequence I the authors found that paid wages in all periods were larger than
the game-theoretical prediction of w = 0. Wages in the u phase were smaller
than the minimum wage and smaller than those in the mw phase. Moreover, the
introduction of the minimum wage led to an increase in paid wages above this new
boundary m in most cases. The paid wages were about 8 percent higher than the
minimum wage. This was in concordance to reservation wages that in many cases
also exceeded 0 before and m after the introduction of the minimum wage.9
While paid wages in the phases with minimum wage were quite similar in se-
quences I and II, the sequencing largely changes the picture for the u phases. In
sequence II, reservation wages and paid wages after the removal of the minimum
wage were significantly higher than in sequence I that started with the u phase.
They were now closer to the level of the removed minimum wage.
9Note that FFZ2006 use the term spillover effect to describe their finding that wages are in-
creased above the minimum wage, while we use it alternatively.
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Overall, these results suggest that minimum wages affect reservation wages and
paid wages by a kind of fairness perception effect that increases wages a little above
the minimum wage.
2.2.2 Relative income studies
Essentially, studies on relative income are studies on relative utility. The common
basis of relative income studies is the assumption that an individual’s utility not
only depends on the absolute income of this individual, but also on this absolute
income in comparison to other individuals’ absolute incomes. In literature the terms
relative income (utility function) and income comparison (utility function) are thus
often used synonymously.
This relativity is also assumed to exist for many other goods, but income is usually
used as a leading example. In the broadest sense, i.e., with relative utility for any
kind of good, studies are numerous in many sciences. In the following paragraphs
we cannot give a complete overview over all relative income studies, but try to
present a rather brief, in parts chronological summary of what we perceive to be
the main trends. We primarily focus on economic studies on income (see Diener
et al. (1999), Frank and Sunstein (2001), Falk and Knell (2004), Clark, Frijters and
Shields (2008) or Senik (2009) for more copious summaries of studies in economics,
psychology and sociology).
Early empiricists interested in relative utility at least implicitly equated people’s
answers to survey questions about life satisfaction (or happiness) with people’s util-
ity. Recently, this assumption is criticized, but there are some hints indicating that
the connection between happiness scores and true utility is not totally random.10
The most prominent early works on relative income are those of Duesenberry (1949)
and Easterlin (1974). The former intended a reformulation of the theory of saving,
the latter observed two seemingly contradictory facts nowadays known as Easterlin
Paradox : 1) within-country empirical findings suggested that absolute income was
a good predictor of a person’s happiness (and thus utility), and 2) comparisons
10An extensive discussion would go beyond the scope of this study. The equation of happiness and
utility is commonly dated back to Jeremy Bentham’s definition of utility. Critical discussions
can be found in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Kahneman
and Thaler (2006), Kimball and Willis (2006) or Weinzierl (2006).
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between countries or within a specific country at different times refuted this clear
pattern: in particular, happiness remained relatively stable in several countries
during the middle of the 20th century, although absolute income largely increased.
Easterlin (1974, pg. 118) concluded that relative income considerations might solve
this puzzle and claimed that “people tend to compare their actual situation with a
reference standard or norm, derived from their prior and ongoing social experience”.
The comparison norm that stems from own prior experience is named adaptation
in literature (see Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas (2008) for an introduction).
We will not further discuss this concept here, but we will briefly pick it up below
when interpreting our experimental results.
The main working hypothesis derived from Easterlin’s original findings was that
a person’s utility decreases (increases) for increasing (decreasing) incomes of other
individuals. This relationship between own and others’ incomes is called relative
income effect. With this effect, it is easy to construct a situation in which absolute
income gains might not (proportionally) increase an individual’s utility, as long
as the relative income position remains unchanged or even deteriorates. Many
theoretical works have assumed that the relative income effect exists.11
Since the mid of the 90s a lot of economic studies using happiness surveys as a
proxy for utility again were published that empirically tested the relative income
effect. One can summarize that the vast majority of these studies confirmed the
relative income effect (see, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1996), Neumark and Postle-
waite (1998), McBride (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2005), Luttmer (2005), Weinzierl (2006) or Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008)).12
In recent years things have become a little more complicated: While results stayed
the same for "Old Europe" and for economies as a whole, a number of studies
suggested that for transition economies, the USA and within a specific firm an
opposite effect might occur, i.e., own happiness/utility might increase when wages
11Frank (1984a,b, 1985) is often cited for revitalizing the idea in economic theory, although
Hammermesh (1975), Pollak (1976), and Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) earlier relied on similar
ideas. Later examples are works on unemployment (Summers (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1990)) or on evolutionary games and agency theory (Rayo and Becker (2007)).
12Some empirical works by psychologists doubted the relative income effect or at least its mag-
nitude (see, e.g., Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. (1993, 1999)). Medical studies suggested
that workers earning (much) less than others are unhealthier due to mental distress induced
by the lower relative wage rank (Marmot and Bobak (2000), Deaton (2003)).
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of co-workers increase (see, e.g., Galizzi and Lang (1998), Alesina et al. (2004),
Senik (2004, 2008), or Clark et al. (2009)). This effect is named future earnings
effect in literature. The intuition is that, especially in the cases described above,
increasing wages among peers might be interpreted as a signal or promise that own
earnings are likely to increase in the future, rather than as a threat to one’s own
relative income position.13 When discussing our model we will explain why this
effect should be only of limited importance in our context.
The number of experimental studies (and related theoretical attempts) on relative
income depends on how broad one’s view on this topic is. Of course, all experi-
mental work on other-regarding preferences, in particular on inequality aversion, is
inevitably connected to relative income.14 The same is true for the theory of rela-
tive deprivation originating in sociology (see Clark and Oswald (1998) for a short
discussion). When narrowing the view, the quasi-experimental studies on relative
income of Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and
Alpizar et al. (2005) are comparable. These studies used surveys in which partici-
pants had to decide between two hypothetical societies: one in which their (or their
grandchildren’s) absolute income was larger, but their relative position was worse,
and one with opposite characteristics. They all found evidence in support of the
relative income effect.15 While Charness and Grosskopf (2001) found rather little
concern for relative income when maximizing social welfare was another option for
experiment participants, Zizzo et al. (2001) and Brown et al. (2008) reported that
their experimental subjects were, indeed, interested in (ordinal ranks of) relative
income.
The results of a neuroeconomical study by Fliessbach et al. (2007) also support
13Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) earlier discussed comparable ideas on a much more general
level dealing with economically developing societies. They argued that future earnings effects
might only outweigh relative income effects in the beginning of an economic development when
others’ gains still are perceived as own welfare promises, but eventually disappear when those
promises fail to fulfill.
14Fehr and Schmidt (2006) summarize theory and experiments in economics. Walster et al.
(1978) present psychological experiments based on the seminal equity theory paper by Adams
(1965).
15Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Alpizar et al. (2005) additionally distinguished between
different goods and found relative position to be more important for some goods (e.g. cars)
than for others (e.g. vacation time) with income somewhere in between.
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the relative income effect. The authors found that during the (laboratory) exper-
iment they performed, the activity in participants’ brain regions associated with
positive feelings such as rewards increased with higher relative reward payments.
Falk and Knell (2004) and Senik (2009) investigate theoretically and empirically
which groups of other individuals are chosen for income comparisons, a question
analyzed in many fields of research since the seminal paper on social comparisons by
Festinger (1954). Roughly spoken, the results imply that people tend to compare
themselves more to similar others than to more divergent ones.16
Let us briefly summarize the most important points of this overview of relative
income studies: 1) there is reason to believe that peoples’ utility from income
to some extent depends on relative income, 2) peoples’ utility decreases if others’
incomes increase and these increases are not interpreted as own future prospects and
3) such considerations might be of greater importance for people more comparable
to each other. We will refer to these findings in the following sections.
2.3 The relative income model
In this section, we first introduce the basic rules of our minimum wage game (Sec-
tion 2.3.1). It is the blueprint for our experimental design and is constructed such
that models relying on substitution effects, general equilibrium models and search
and bargaining models are not applicable to derive its solution. We outline our
alternative solution design in Section 2.3.2. There, we also introduce the relative
income utility functions used in literature. In Section 2.3.3, we discuss our set of
rather general assumptions, before we derive the equilibria before and after the in-
troduction of a minimum wage, and compare them in a comparative statics analysis
in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5.
From now, we will use the terms employer, firm, and principal, on the one hand,
and employee, worker, and agent, on the other hand, synonymously in all following
chapters and sections of this thesis for reasons of variation. We will also use the
feminine (masculine) form for the principal (agents).
16Psychology studies of social comparisons often analyze comparisons of abilities, rather than
incomes. A nice overview can be found in Wood (1996).
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2.3.1 The minimum wage game
In our minimum wage game, workers differ in their production skills, i.e., their
skill levels determine productivity. In such a setup, it is intuitive to expect that
more productive workers earn more than less productive ones. An existing wage
hierarchy is, obviously, the prerequisite for analyzing wage spillovers. As will be
shown below, the results of our theoretical model do not critically depend on the
existence of the specific wage hierarchy in which high-productive workers earn more
than low-productive workers, but also hold for other wage orders, as long as there
exists any wage hierarchy at all.
The minimum wage game is basically designed as follows. One principal (P)
interacts with three workers (agents) who differ in productivity. We define pro-
ductivity as the value of the good produced by the worker. Just like FFZ2006, we
assume productivity to be exogenously given to keep things simple. An interpre-
tation could be that effort choices, indeed, determine output, but firms are able to
force each worker to spend his specific maximum effort (through perfect monitor-
ing) when hiring them. One of the agents possesses high productivity (agent H),
one medium productivity (agent M) and one low productivity (agent L). The worth
of the good produced by agent i is denoted by Ri. It is assumed to be immediately
sold. We demand the revenues Ri to fulfill RL < RM < RH .
The game is played for l1 + l2 periods. In the first l1 periods without a mini-
mum wage the principal proposes a wage tuple (wL, wM , wH) (with 0 < wi ≤ Ri)
that applies to all agents, i.e., the principal is allowed to offer different wages wi,
but is restricted to one specific wage tuple per period. There are no other restric-
tions or capacity barriers; principals can hire all three workers. We assume that
each agent knows all three wage offers.17 We think that at least when interpreting
the employment decision at the end of each period of our game as the decision a
worker reaches after a sum of a few real life working periods this assumption is not
far-fetched: eventually, every worker in a real world firm is most likely able to accu-
rately approximate others’ earnings and to compare these with his own wage. The
additional contract rules are those of three unrestricted simultaneous ultimatum
17With the aim of receiving more information, we used a kind of contingent strategy method in
the experiment, see Section 2.4. This is irrelevant for our model and its solution.
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games between the principal and each of the three responding agents. Specifically,
for our game this means that each agent is confronted separately with the take-it-
or-leave-it offer implicitly given by the wage tuple (wL, wM , wH): If agent i chooses
to accept the offer wi, he earns wi, irrespective of whether the other agents accept
their offers. The principal then earns Ri − wi from employing i. In case agent i
declines the offer, he and the principal earn nothing in this relationship. Each agent
decides before knowing whether the other agents accept or decline, i.e, decisions
are made simultaneously. A principal’s overall payoff is the sum of the payoffs from
all his workers. We try to keep things simple by disallowing firms to compete for
workers. There are also no other similar productive workers competing for the same
job. Also, the firm composition does not change which will allow us to analyze wage
spillovers within firms.18
The introduction of the minimum wage, denoted m, is assumed to happen sur-
prisingly before the last l2 periods, i.e., these periods are played with a minimum
wage. This minimum wage is assumed to lie above the lowest of the wages in the
last of the first l1 periods and below the second lowest.19 The minimum wage
applies to all workers. All of these rules are common knowledge, except for the
introduction and the deduction rule of the minimum wage.
2.3.2 Solution design and income comparison utility
functions
For the minimum wage game outlined in the preceding section, game-theoretical
predictions for players whose utility solely depends on (and increases in) their own
payoff are straightforward: Irrespective whether players’ utilities and payoffs are
mapped by an identity function what is often used to generate benchmark predic-
tions in literature or by more elaborate relationships, principals should offer the
smallest possible amount to all workers before the minimum wage applies (i.e., ei-
ther 1 if w ∈ N as in our experimental setting or the smallest feasible other offer),
and m afterwards. The workers should always accept. However, numerous exper-
18This is a major difference to FFZ2006 where firm composition randomly changes each period.
19For the case of equal lowest and second lowest wages the minimum wage is assumed to be
equally high than both wages.
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imental studies since Güth et al. (1982) refuted this (see, e.g., Kagel and Roth
(1995) for a survey).
The simple set-up of the minimum wage game outlined before prohibits several
of the other approaches discussed in literature from being useful: substitution ef-
fects and general equilibrium models are not helpful, since firms cannot substitute
low-skilled workers by employing additional high-skilled workers, and search and
bargaining models can be ruled out, since there is no wage bargaining in our min-
imum wage game. Instead, relying solely on a relative income model to derive
theoretical deductions seems a plausible approach, since workers in the minimum
wage game can compare their incomes with that of their co-workers and the theo-
retical and empirical studies discussed above suggested the importance of relative
income. In summary, the construction of the minimum wage game allows us to fo-
cus on relative income preferences to theoretically answer whether minimum wage
spillovers occur, and this limitation on relative income will, later on, enable us to
exclude confounding effects when experimentally testing our theoretical predictions.
Since Grossman (1983) also used relative income considerations to analyze min-
imum wage spillovers, we want to emphasize that our minimum wage game funda-
mentally differs from his setting in several aspects. First of all, we concentrate on
one firm and exclude substitution effects that largely drive his theoretical results.
Furthermore, unlike Grossman (1983) we do not use the simplifying assumption
that the low-skilled workers possess no relative income preferences and are always
willing to work for the minimum wage, i.e., in our minimum wage game, labor sup-
ply of the low-skilled workers is not infinitely elastic. Finally, in Grossman’s model
workers choose their effort level, while in our setting they only decide whether to
work (with a fixed effort and revenue level) or not.
Before introducing the basic assumptions of our model, let us shortly discuss the
concrete income comparison utility functions used in literature and their parameter
estimates given by empirical studies, since these insights will be helpful later on.
There are basically two classes of functions used to model relative income in
economic literature. Suppose worker i’s utility ui depends on his own wage, wi,
and the average wage of workers in his reference group, w−i.20
20We will discuss the exact definitions of reference groups in Section 2.3.3.
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In ratio comparison utility (RCU) functions, utility depends on the own income
and the ratio of own versus others’ earnings. A concrete example is:
(RCU) ui = w1−αi ·
(
wi
w−i
)α
=
wi
(w−i)α
(2.1)
In additive comparison utility (ACU) functions, utility depends on absolute dif-
ferences between own and others’ incomes. An example is:
(ACU) ui = (1− α)wi + α(wi − w−i) = wi − αw−i . (2.2)
Both types of functions capture the same idea: α is a measure of an individual’s
concern for relative income with α = 0 representing the standard neo-classical
model, in which only absolute wage matters and utility and wages are mapped by
an identity function. For 0 < α < 1, an individual’s utility is increasing if the own
wage increases, but decreases for average wages rising.21
Comparable RCU and ACU functions are used by, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002), Alpizar et al. (2005) or Weinzierl (2006) to estimate α. Parameter estimates
range from α ≈ .3 to α ≈ .7, which suggests that relative standing is rather im-
portant. Clark and Oswald (1998) discuss theoretical differences of both functions.
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005) find only minor empirical
differences when comparing parameter estimates and prediction accuracy of RCU
and ACU functions.
2.3.3 Basic assumptions
We try to derive main insights without committing to specific utility functions which
allows us to derive more general results. Thus, the set of basic assumptions (A.1)–
(A.3) discussed in this section is held as general as possible. However, occassionally
it will be helpful to use ACU and RCU functions as an illustrative guide. In the
following sections, we will add further tie-breaking standard assumptions (A.4)–
(A.7) that guarantee the existence of an interior solution equilibrium.
The principal and each worker i are assumed to be utility maximizers.
21Note that ACU functions also resemble the functions used in experimental literature on inequity
aversion or fairness (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Charness and Rabin (2002)).
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What else do we assume for workers’ utility functions? First of all, note that for
his empirical parameter estimations of RCU and ACU functions Weinzierl (2006)
defined the reference group for worker i by workers of the same gender, same
birth year interval and similar education and in their experimental instructions
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005) simply speak of “your
grandchild’s income” and the “average income in society”. The empirical works
on relative income mentioned in Section 2.2.2 use similar approaches (see Ferrer-
i-Carbonell (2005) for an overview). Although these definitions of reference group
(wages) are not extremely narrow, we think that the heterogenous qualification of
workers and the fact that there are only three workers in our minimum wage game
has to been taken into consideration. We thus assume worker i’s utility, ui, to de-
pend on his wage, and on each of his two co-workers’ wages instead of on an wage
average only. While workers are likely to compare wages with those of other workers
who only differ in productivity, the studies mentioned in Section 2.2 suggest that
workers probably do not compare their income with that of the principal who plays
a fundamentally different role in the firm. Formally, we introduce ui(wi, wj, wk)
with i, j, k ∈ {L,M,H} and i 6= j 6= k.22
The principal’s utility, which we call profit for reasons of distinguishability from
now on, shall depend on the wages paid to the three workers (Π(wi, wj, wk)).
We also introduce reservation utilities ri and, for technical reasons only, a binary
variable zi that takes the value of 1, if worker i accepts a contract offer and 0
otherwise. The workers utility and principal’s profit functions are assumed to be
twice continuously differentiable. We additionally demand (for all workers i):
(A.1) ∃ ri with 0 ≤ ri ≤ Ri; zi = 1, iff ui(wi, wj, wk) ≥ ri
(A.2)
∂Π
∂wi
< 0;
∂2Π
∂w2i
≤ 0
(A.3) ∀i 6= j : ∂ui
∂wi
> 0;
∂2ui
∂w2i
≤ 0; ∂ui
∂wj
< 0;
∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂wi
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂wj
∣∣∣∣
The reservation utility assumptions (A.1) demand that each worker has some
reservation utility that must be reached for him to accept a contract offer. From
22Below, we will also introduce modified versions of the standard RCU and ACU functions that
incorporate this broader definition of reference group wages.
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now on, we will assume this reservation utility to be exogenous and fixed, i.e, it
will never alter. We think that this is reasonable within the limits of a firm. When
thinking of concrete ACU or RCU functions, e.g., reservation utility can be thought
of as representing the threshold level the firm’s payment scheme must imply for
worker i to accept a job offer. It is apparent that ri > 0 is a technical necessity
for RCU functions, since they are by definition always larger than zero for positive
wages.
The profit assumptions (A.2) are standard and imply that the principal wants
to set wages as low as possible and that the profit function is concave (or linear).
The last assumptions, (A.3), deal with marginal utilities. The first two of them
are the standard assumptions of non-increasing positive marginal utilities of own
income. In accordance with the empirical and experimental findings discussed
in Section 2.2, the third assumption states that own utility will, c.p., decrease
(increase), if others’ incomes increase (decrease). This is exactly the definition of
the relative income effect.
Although, we cannot definitely exclude the future earnings effect in our model
(and experiment), we perceive its occurrence to be unrealistic or at least its magni-
tude to be negligible. Since participants are heterogeneously qualified and we give
them no reason to expect this to change (see also the experimental design below),
there is little reason for them to perceive other participants’ wages as an proper
indicator of own future earnings. Additionally, Clark et al. (2009) found evidence
that the importance of the future earnings effect diminishes for workers soon to
be retired. Although the players in our model (and experiment), of course, do not
necessarily retire afterwards, they know that the game will end after the l1 + l2
periods. This should further decrease a future earnings effect, if occurring at all.
Overall, we think that we can assume that co-workers’ earnings are “uninformative
about the individual’s own future income prospects” which according to Clark et al.
(2009) is the exact prerequisite for ∂ui/∂wj being negative.
Finally, (A.3) also demands that worker i prefers an own wage increase over an
equal sized wage decrease for worker j. This assumption not only seems intuitive,
but is also fruitful for equilibrium characterizations as will be shown below.23
23The reader may argue that while ACU functions obviously always fulfill this assumption, RCU
functions do not necessarily have to. However, as will be shown in footnote 26 below, this
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2.3.4 Equilibria without minimum wage
The principal’s maximization problem without minimum wage is:
max
wL, wM , wH
Π(wL, wM , wH) (P1)
s.t. ∀i : ui(wL, wM , wH) ≥ ri .
With two further assumptions, the solution of (P1) describes a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
Firstly, we assume that (P1) has an interior solution (assumption (A.4)). This
means that we assume a) the positivity constraints (wi ≥ 0) for the wages to be
not binding and thus irrelevant in the following, i.e., we refrain from discussing
the unlikely extreme case of border solutions, and b), consequentially, also demand
agents’ aspirations to be below their respective revenues. Then, it immediately
follows that all three constraints of (P1) must be binding in equilibrium. If, e.g.,
only the constraint for worker M was not binding, the principal wants to lower wM
which would make both other constraints non-binding which disqualifies this case
as an equilibrium. Analog logic prohibits all other cases than the case with three
binding constraints from describing the equilibrium.
We assume that an equilibrium exists. Obviously, all following considerations
would be meaningless if no equilibrium existed. Additionally to existence, unique-
ness of the equilibrium can be guaranteed by a variety of settings: the most immedi-
ate approach, for example, would be to demand the sufficient conditions that either
the principal’s profit function is strictly concave and the constraint set is convex or
the opposite case with concavity and strict convexity. However, we will stick to our
approach to be as general as possible and simply assume the equilibrium without
the minimum wage, w∗ := (w∗L, w∗M , w∗H), to be the unique maximum of (P1). The
assumption of an existing, unique equilibrium is denoted assumption (A.5).
The equilibrium w∗ is then defined implicitly by the first order conditions of
the corresponding standard Lagrange function L(wL, wM , wH , λL, λM , λH) where λi
represents the multiplier for the utility constraint of worker i. It is subgame-perfect
in all l1 periods due to its uniqueness.
special case hurting the last assumption of (A.3) does not limit the results to be derived at all.
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With our set of general assumptions, we cannot characterize the resulting wage
order. Since it will become apparent in the remainder that it does not matter
what specific wage order occurs, but only that there are preferences establishing
similar wage orders before and after the introduction of a minimum wage, we limit
ourselves here to assume the intuitive wage ordering, namely the one mirroring the
revenue differences:
(A.6.1) w∗L < w
∗
M < w
∗
H . (2.3)
Appendix B.1 discusses under which assumptions (2.3) holds.
2.3.5 Equilibria with minimum wage
Following our earlier description of the minimum wage game, now a minimum wage
is introduced that lies somewhere between the lowest and the second lowest wage:
w∗L < m < w
∗
M < w
∗
H .
We, again, assume the existence of an unique equilibrium (w∗∗L , w∗∗M , w∗∗H ) fulfilling:
(A.6.2) w∗∗L < w
∗∗
M < w
∗∗
H . (2.4)
This seems only consequent considering the wage profile we assumed in (A.6.1)
before. As long as the minimum wage lies below w∗M assuming the wage hierarchy
to change seems far-fetched. However, we want to stress again that although we
will proceed with (2.3) and (2.4) holding, all subsequent results are also valid for
any other wage profile, as long as the wage ordering stays the same.
The principal’s maximization problem now becomes:
max
wL, wM , wH
Π(wL, wM , wH) (P2a)
s.t. ∀i : ui(wL, wM , wH) ≥ ri
∀i : wi ≥ m .
Finally, let us ex ante assume for the time-being that the low productive worker’s
utility, uL, after introducing a minimum wage m fulfilling m > w∗L, increases,
which allows us to drop his participation constraint (assumption (A.7)). This
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simplification is not only necessary for deriving any comparative static results at all,
but is justified in so far as it will be shown below that worker L’s utility certainly
increases for all meaningful parameters of the two classes of income comparison
utility functions discussed in literature. We are now able to state:
Proposition 1:
With assumptions (A.1) – (A.7) unique equilibria w∗ and w∗∗ exist. Positive min-
imum wage spillovers occur, i.e., workers M and H earn higher wages in w∗∗ than
in w∗.
Proof: The first part of Proposition 1 is fulfilled by assumption. With, (A.1),
(A.2), (A.6.2), and (A.7), we can simplify (P2a) in four ways. Firstly, by noticing
that the principal will set w∗∗L = m, since there cannot be a local optimum with
w∗∗L > m due to the uniqueness of w∗ and the non-convexity of Π. Secondly, by
deducing from (A.6.2) that the minimum wage constraints for workers M and H
are non-binding, thirdly, by detecting that in optimum the utility constraints of
(P2a) for M and H must be binding (due to analog reasons as in the previous
section), and, fourthly, by dropping the constraint for worker L.
Overall, the principal then solves this maximization problem:
max
wM , wH
Π(wM , wH ;m) (P2b)
s.t. uM(wM , wH ;m) = rM
uH(wM , wH ;m) = rH .
Thus, by introducing a minimum wage, m, fulfilling w∗L < m < w∗M < w∗H we
inevitably end up in the cases for which it is possible to do comparative statics (the
cases with uL > rL, uM = rM , and uH = rH).
In the corresponding Lagrangian function of (P2b), L(wM , wH , λM , λH ;m),
the multiplier λi again captures worker i’s utility constraint. The four first-order
conditions of the Lagrangian function implicitly define a set of four equations F (wM ,
wH , λ1, λ2; m). Amongst other things, this gives us w∗∗M and w∗∗H as functions of m,
f(m). By using total differentials, Cramer’s Rule and some simplifications24, the
two interesting comparative static results follow as:
24See Appendix B.2 for details.
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dw∗∗M
dm
=
∂uH
∂wH
∂uM
∂m
− ∂uH
∂m
∂uM
∂wH
∂uH
∂wM
∂uM
∂wH
− ∂uH
∂wH
∂uM
∂wM
(2.5)
dw∗∗H
dm
=
∂uM
∂wM
∂uH
∂m
− ∂uM
∂m
∂uH
∂wM
∂uH
∂wM
∂uM
∂wH
− ∂uH
∂wH
∂uM
∂wM
(2.6)
The numerators of (2.5) and (2.6) are both smaller than zero, since a positive term
is subtracted from a negative one. Furthermore, both denominators are exactly
the same which implies that either both comparative static derivatives are positive
or both are negative. Less technically, this means that either the wages of both
high-income workers increase and we have the classical, “positive” minimum wage
spillover effect or both wages decrease and we have the opposite result of decreasing
wages, which one could call a “negative” minimum wage spillover.25 This also
means that the relative income effect alone does not necessarily lead to positive
minimum wage spillovers. However, the last assumption of (A.3) is a sufficient,
but not necessary condition for the spillover to be strictly positive. It implies that
both parts in the second term on the right side of the denominators are larger
than their respective counterparts in the first term on the left side. Since the
second term is subtracted from the first and all other signs vanish, this makes the
denominator negative and thus the derivatives dw∗∗M/dm and dw∗∗H /dm positive.26
This means that the wages of the medium and the high productive worker increase,
although they do not have to, since the minimum wage is smaller than w∗M and w∗H ,
respectively, have been. q.e.d.
25As mentioned in the introduction, the economic literature uses the term ’minimum wage
spillover’ only for positive effects.
26In footnote 23 we mentioned unlikely cases in which RCU functions do not fulfill the last
assumption of (A.3) – with functions defined like the following equation (2.8) and w∗∗L < w
∗∗
M <
w∗∗H , e.g., this is the case if either wL ≤ αMwM , wL ≤ βHwH or wM ≤ αMwH . Then, the
denominators of (2.5) and (2.6) are nevertheless always smaller than zero for wHwM (αHβM −
1) < 0 which is obviously true as long as either αH or βM is smaller unity.
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We ex ante demanded uL to increase. What is still left is to give some justification
for this assumption. With the total differential of uL(m, w∗∗M(m), w∗∗H (m)) or simply
the chain rule, asking for uL to increase formally means:
duL
dm
=
∂uL
∂m
+
∂uL
∂w∗∗M
· dw
∗∗
M
dm
+
∂uL
∂w∗∗H
· dw
∗∗
H
dm
> 0 . (2.7)
Let us now use illustrative functions to determine in which cases (2.7) holds. As
mentioned earlier it seems appropriate to slightly modify the standard RCU and
ACU functions for our minimum wage game, since we have only three, heteroge-
neously qualified workers. We propose the RCU function
ui = w
1−αi−βi
i ·
(
wi
wj
)αi
·
(
wi
wk
)βi
(2.8)
and the ACU function
ui = (1− αi − βi)wi + αi(wi − wj) + βi(wi − wk) (2.9)
with i ∈ {L,M,H}, i 6= j 6= k, α, β ≥ 0 and α+β ≤ 1, where α is the parameter
measuring the relativity preference for the more similar worker (for worker M this
worker shall be the low productive worker L). Then, it can be easily shown27 that
(2.7) is larger than zero for all parameter sets with (1 − αi − βi) > 0 holding for
at least one subject i. This means that the low productive worker’s utility will,
indeed, increase after introducing a minimum wage if there is one individual who is
at least slightly interested in absolute income. The empirical findings of Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002), Alpizar et al. (2005) and Weinzierl (2006) suggested that the
parameter measuring a worker’s preference for absolute income – denoted (1 − α)
there – should lie somewhere between .3 and .7. Thus, it seems reasonable to
expect that our parameter measuring similar preferences, (1 − αi − βi), should be
larger than 0 as well. We then immediately derive that uL should increase after
introducing the minimum wage.28
27See Appendix B.3 for details.
28A possible further step could be, for example, to add factors into the brackets of the RCU
function (2.8) that do not demand for equal wages, but, e.g., demand wages to mirror revenue
differences. However, this does not change results. See Appendix B.3 for details.
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Most of the empirical and theoretical results discussed above argued that mini-
mum wage spillovers are larger for worker M than for worker H. For our model,
deductions about the magnitude of wage spillovers have to be rather speculative
due to our set of general assumptions. Comparing (2.5) and (2.6), we derive that
the medium productive worker’s wage change is larger than the high productive
one’s, iff ∣∣∣∣∂uM∂m
∣∣∣∣
∂uM
∂wM
+
∂uM
∂wH
>
∣∣∣∣∂uH∂m
∣∣∣∣
∂uH
∂wH
+
∂uH
∂wM
. (2.10)
By (A.3), the denominators in (2.10) are both positive. The numerators represent
the absolute utility loss for worker M and H, respectively, from a wage increase
for the low productive worker. The studies discussed in Section 2.2 suggest the
medium productive worker to be more affected, since comparisons to others are
likely to be more important the more similar the other worker is to oneself. This
means that |∂uM/∂m| > |∂uH/∂m| should hold – at least for a wage profile mir-
roring the revenue differences which we will assume for the next paragraphs. But
even when abstracting from the fact that the simplifying equalization of ∂uM/∂wM
and ∂uH/∂wH might not hold for sufficiently large wage differences, one would ad-
ditionally need to require the net utility loss |∂uM/∂wH | to be larger than (or equal
to) |∂uH/∂wM | to come to a definitive conclusion. This requirement means that the
absolute utility loss workerM experiences, if worker H leaps one unit further away,
outweighs (or equals) worker H’s loss, if M comes closer. Then, the denominator
on the left side of (2.10) would be smaller than the one on the right side. General
studies on upward and downward comparisons do not give an unambiguous answer
to the question whether |∂uM/∂wH | is larger than |∂uH/∂wM | or not, especially
when considering that we deal with heterogeneously qualified workers (see, e.g.,
Major et al. (1991) or Falk and Knell (2004) for (short) summaries), but the empir-
ical study by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds some evidence for a trend for upward
comparisons in Germany.
We thus limit ourselves here to state that if the net utility gain from equal
marginal wage changes for both workers has the same effect on both of them, i.e.,
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if the denominators in 2.10 are equal, then wage spillovers should indeed be larger
for worker M than for worker H.
Let us now quickly discuss if our model can incorporate the findings of FFZ2006
who argue that minimum wages might change fairness perceptions and thus increase
wages of workers immediately affected by the minimum wage. An extension of
our model that incorporates this idea is straightforward: If the minimum wage
establishes a kind of psychological barrier that the new wage wL must significantly
lie above, this could be caught by substituting m with m + δm (δm > 0), i.e., by
demanding the new wage to be a little larger than the minimum. The main results
are obviously qualitatively unaltered from this modification as long asm+δm < w∗M
holds. As we will discuss in greater detail during our experimental results, there is
little reason to expect a similar fairness perceptions effect influencing the wages of
workers M and H, since they are likely to earn a lot more than the minimum wage
before its introduction. This also means that m+ δm < w∗M is not a very restrictive
assumption.
In our setting the minimum wage is newly introduced, i.e., it is introduced in
a labor market in which previously no minimum wage existed. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that the effects we discuss would also apply for the alternative case in
which lawmakers raise an existing minimum wage to a new level as long as the
minimum wage change fulfills our assumptions. We thus think our results are also
important for such changes in existing minimum wage legislation.
2.4 Experimental design
Our experiment basically followed the model, i.e., groups of four participants inter-
acted during the experiment: one principal (P-participant), and the three workers
(participants L, M, and H). The roles were assigned randomly before the start of
the experiment and stayed the same throughout. Up to five groups of four formed
a session with 20 participants.29 Anonymity was guaranteed by seating players
arbitrarily into two laboratories.
29Due to a larger number of no-shows than expected from prior experiments, we had to run a
couple of sessions with less than 5 groups. Since each group of four did not interact with other
groups, this should not be important.
33
2 Spillover effects of minimum wages
We set the revenues to RL = 100, RM = 200, and RH = 300. Each group inter-
acted for 10 periods. In each period, the principal had to offer a contract consisting
only of a fixed wage to each agent, i.e., to propose a tuple (wL, wM , wH). We re-
stricted the offers to positive integers smaller than or equal to the corresponding
revenue. As in the model, workers decided whether to accept their offer or not
before they knew the other workers’ decisions.
In the minimum wage treatment (treatment MW), the first 5 periods (MW1-
5) were played as follows: First, principals offered a wage tuple (wL, wM , wH), then
each agent i was informed about the offers to the two other agents and was asked
to name the threshold wage ti (≤ Ri) above or equal to which he was willing to
accept the principal’s offer.
This means we apply a modified strategy method in our experiment. The standard
strategy method is frequently used in experimental economics. It demands from
participants to make their decision for all hypothetically occurring cases of the
played game (e.g., for all possible wage offers), before the one case that really
applies (e.g., the one concrete wage offer) is revealed to them. This gives researches
the whole strategy profiles of players, while the decision method in which players
only decide for the one factual case that applies does not offer these insights.30
Asking workers to name their threshold wage knowing the wage offers to the other
worker means that we deviate from the standard strategy method and introduce a
kind of contingent strategy method. It gives us the worker’s decision for each of his
(up to 300) possible wage offers, but limits this insight to the wages actually offered
to the other workers. We think that this is the logical step in a case like ours in
which the standard strategy method is theoretically possible, but not practicable:
for worker L, for example, the standard strategy method would require to ask his
threshold wage for each wage combination (wM , wH) – in our setting 60,000 (200 ·
300) of these combinations exist.
We admit that using the contingent strategy method might have accentuated
participants’ genuine disposition for income comparisons (as well as the standard
30The advantage of the decision method is that it represents the more natural way of decision
making. However, most studies found no (see, e.g., Brandts and Charness (2000), Seale and
Rapoport (2000), Oxoby and McLeish (2004), Solnick (2007)) or only negligible behavioral
differences (Casari and Vason (2009)) between strategy and decisions methods, while Brosig
et al. (2003) report some differences.
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strategy method would have), but perceived this a minor sacrifice compared to
the broader insights to participants’ decision behavior. Moreover, even using the
decision method, i.e., giving participants the whole wage profile (wL, wM , wH) be-
fore their decisions, should have a similar effect, since wage comparisons were still
possible. This strengthens the comparative advantage of the contingent strategy
method in our situation.
We are not aware of any other study that applies a similar contingent strategy
method. Our approach is thus a novelty.
If an agent’s threshold was lower or equal than the offer, he earned wi and the
principal Ri − wi, else both earned 0. A principal’s overall payoff was the sum of
the earnings in all three simultaneous ultimatum games. After periods 1 to 5 (p1-5)
there was a short break in which participants got the instructions for the “second
part” of the experiment.
In the last 5 periods (MW6-10) contract offers were further restricted by mini-
mum wages. Instead of pre-committing to a specific minimum wage, the minimum
wage was deduced by the contract offers of period 5. Since we are interested in
relative changes in wage hierarchies, we feared that ex ante defining a specific
minimum wage for all groups would question their comparability, since then the
minimum wage could lie above, below or between the existing wage profiles. We
chose period 5, because wages were likely to increase during p1-5 (see Section 2.5).
Let us denote the lowest wage in a specific period with wlow and the second lowest
wage with ws−low. We set the minimum wage, m, to the integer nearest to the point
defined by wlow + .25(ws−low − wlow), i.e., the minimum wage was set between the
lowest and the second-lowest wage paid in p5.31 We additionally restricted it to be
not larger than 99 to guarantee meaningful offers to worker L. Participants did not
learn this deduction rule, and were only told the specific minimum wage applying
to their group. Although we are not aware of other experimental studies that use a
similar method of a group-specific treatment condition, we want to stress again that
we perceive it as crucial to guarantee comparability of observations in an experi-
ment like ours. Workers’ wage thresholds additionally had to fulfill ti ≥ m, i.e., we
allowed only meaningful threshold wages which is another difference to FFZ2006.
31Or at least equal to both in case of equal wages.
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We ran a control treatment (treatment CTR) to check whether wage increases
in p6-10 would also occur when no minimum wage was introduced. If this was the
case, one would have to consider that possible wage spillovers detected in treatment
MW were maybe not originating in relative income motives. In treatment CTR
periods 1 to 5 (CTR1-5) were played exactly as MW1-5, but after the break 5
identical periods followed (CTR6-10).
At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly assigned to the
roles of employers and employees. We gave participants no reason to believe that
their productivity might change after MW1-5. On the one hand, stating something
like “your productivities will not change” would have diminished possible, but any-
how improbable, future earnings effects, but, on the other hand, we feared that
with this information participants might have started to ask themselves what else
would change. Participants did know however, that there was going to be “another
part of the experiment”. To the best of our knowledge, no study exists that ex-
plicitly analyzes the framing effect of the term “minimum wage”. We thus chose
the conservative way to describe the minimum wage as “lower bound” additional
to the standard labor market terminology used in our instructions. Representative
instructions are given in Appendix A.1.
In our experimental session, 35 groups altogether played MW, 30 played CTR.
Before the experiment started, participants had to answer some control questions
(at their computer terminal) that checked their proper understanding of the in-
structions. All sessions were conducted at the experimental computer laboratory
in Karlsruhe, in May and June 2009. Participants were students from the Uni-
versität Karlsruhe (TU), mainly in business engineering. Average earnings were e
13.25 for about 65 minutes (about e 12.50 per hour).
2.5 Hypotheses
Our main research question is whether minimum wage-spillovers occur or not.
For treatment MW, it makes sense to contrast between three kinds of hypotheses
to tackle this question: a) the benchmark hypothesis with standard rational,
payoff-maximizing subjects, b) the fairness hypothesis that loosely interprets
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findings from ultimate game experiments and other behavioral literature, and c)
the relative income hypothesis based on our relative income model.
The benchmark predictions based on the subgame-perfect equilibria with payoff-
maximizing players and common knowledge are straightforward.
Benchmark hypothesis (hypothesis I): Employers offer the smallest possible
wage to all three workers in p1-5 and the minimum wage in p6-10; employees al-
ways accept these contracts. Full employment results. No minimum wage spillovers
occur.
Results of ultimatum games doubt these predictions, although most often ulti-
mate game experiments focused on only one game and not three simultaneous ones.
In ultimatum game experiments, proposers frequently offered more equal propor-
tions of the pie and responders regularly denied unequal offers (see Kagel and Roth
(1995) or Camerer (2003) for comprehensive summaries). The equal split often
was the modal observation. Motives like altruism, or fairness preferences (see, e.g.,
Rabin (1993)) were used to explain these results.
FFZ2006 use the heuristic of about 30 to 40 percent of the total pie size to
predict firms’ offers in their experiment which is comparable to ours. Offers be-
low this should usually be rejected. Similar approximate estimations are given in
meta-studies like Fehr and Gächter (2000b) or Camerer (2003). The rejected offers
suggest to expect less than full employment. When focusing on the findings of as-
pired pie shares, these results do not indicate that minimum wage spillovers should
be expected.
Fairness hypothesis (hypothesis IIa): In p1-5, employers offer on average
about 30 - 40 percent of the revenue Ri to worker i. In p6-10, employers either
offer about the same as before or the minimum wage (depending on which value is
larger). Less than full employment results and no minimum wage spillovers occur.
The findings of Brandts and Charness (2004) and FFZ2006 suggest to modify
hypothesis IIa a little. They both emphasize that a minimum wage might be per-
ceived as a new wage threshold the principals have to overbid to induce acceptance
of contract offers. FFZ2006 find in their setting that wages lie about 8 percent
above the minimum wage.
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Fairness hypothesis (hypothesis IIb): In p6-10, employers either offer about
the same as before or more than the minimum wage (depending on which of these
two values is larger).
Due to the rather large productivity differences, intuitive reasoning lets us expect
a wage profile mirroring the productivity differences, i.e., wL ≤ wM ≤ wH should
hold, probably with strict inequality. Positive minimum wage spillovers should
occur if our assumptions hold and relative income matters.
In every experiment testing a model with common knowledge, one has to con-
sider that it should take a while for employers to accurately predict their workers’
reservation wages (and the underlying utility functions).32 Thus, denials of offers
should occur and wage offers should follow an increasing trial-and-error path.
When discussing the experimental results below, we will argue that focusing
attention to the wage offers that actually led to employment is most important.
These wage offers are the wages that have to be paid in the end. Therefore, the
paid wages describe the contracts actually applying and exclude the extreme (trial
balloon) offers that were not accepted. We thus formulate the following hypothesis
for these paid wages already, although the differences are almost only semantical
here. We will extensively discuss whether the experimental results differ between
all wage offers (those that led to employment and those that did not) on the one
hand, and paid wages only on the other hand.
With regard to paid wages, we feel tempted to predict them to be a little higher
than 30 - 40 percent of revenues, because these are the wages that are accepted. We
thus use the upper bound of the wage interval proposed by FFZ2006 as benchmark
prediction. As discussed before, our basic model does not directly predict wages
for worker L to exceed the minimum wage.
Relative income hypothesis (hypothesis III): In p1-5, paid wages amount to
about 40 percent of the revenues Ri. In p6-10, worker L is paid the minimum wage.
The wages of workers M and H increase compared to their wages in p1-5, i.e.,
there are positive minimum wage spillovers. Less than full employment results.
Treatment CTR was performed to provide a check whether wages increase in
32This is not only true for our work and fairness models, but also for the standard game-theoretic
model underlying the benchmark hypothesis if taking the theory to its logical conclusion.
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p6-10 anyhow and whether the wage increases in MW6-10, if occurring, are larger
than those in CTR6-10. Since CTR6-10 was played with the same rules as CTR1-5,
only the parts of the hypotheses dealing with p1-5 apply to treatment CTR.
2.6 Experimental results
In treatment MW the tie-breaking wage of 99 applies in one group, i.e., we have
34 of 35 groups that are identical in so far, as the minimum wage is set equal to
wlow + .25(ws−low−wlow). Consequentially, the group violating this rule is excluded
from the following analysis.33 Furthermore, the averages of all wage offers for all
workers increase during MW1-5 and, quite surprisingly, during MW6-10. This is
illustrated in the following Figure 2.1 whose vertical axis is limited to a reasonable
interval.34 The figure visually confirms that using the wages of p5 to determine the
minimum wage was the right decision.
As expected, the condition wL ≤ wM ≤ wH holds in all 34 groups of treatment
MW for period 5, and the two averages MW1-5 and MW6-10. In MW1-5 and
MW6-10 it does so with strict inequality in 33 out of 34 cases; in period 5 of MW
this is true in 31 cases. In treatment CTR things are even more unambiguous: In
period 5 of MW and in MW6-10 the condition wL ≤ wM ≤ wH holds with strict
inequality in all 30 cases. The same is true for 29 groups in MW1-5, and only one
group violates even the weaker equality restriction. In this particular group, the
principal offers worker M much more than worker H in the first two periods, but
then switches to the expected wage profile with strict inequality after noticing that
worker H never accepts. Overall, the wage profiles are as expected which shows
that the earlier assumptions were not far-fetched.
2.6.1 The minimum wage treatment: General results
For each group of four (the principal P and the three workers L, M , and H) we
calculate two averages: the average of, e.g., wage offers before the introduction of
33Apart from the quite high wage offers, results for this group do not differ from the other groups.
Data on request.
34We will do this in all following figures of this thesis for reasons of presentability.
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Figure 2.1: Treatment MW, average wage offers
the minimum wage (MW1-5), and the one after its introduction (MW6-10). The
averages over all groups in MW1-5 are treated as mutually independent observa-
tions, the same holds for MW6-10. The observations after the introduction of the
minimum wage (MW6-10) are dependent on the ones before (MW1-5). In Table
2.1 averages of totally hired workers (hrd), the resulting payoffs (Payi) and the
welfare defined as payoff sum (WF ) are given. This information is already also
summarized for treatment CTR for later discussions (Section 2.6.4).
As mentioned earlier, less than full employment should occur, since workers prob-
ably got reservation wages that employers have to guess first. In our experiment,
employers hire 2.34 workers during MW1-10 on average. This is significantly dif-
ferent from full employment (one sample t test, p < .001). However, there are two
hints that employers get some experience in aspired wages: The average of hired
workers not only increases from 2.11 to 2.58 from MW1-5 to MW6-10 (dependent
sample t test, p < .001) which might be attributed to wage increases because of
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treat. MW (34 obs.) treat. CTR (30 obs.)
MW1-5 MW6-10 CTR1-5 CTR6-10
hrd 2.11 2.58 2.07 2.50
PayP 201.16 209.87 198.32 234.32
PayL 39.36 66.42 39.63 47.61
PayM 79.45 98.12 72.92 85.93
PayH 93.56 128.53 103.80 139.47
WF 413.53 502.94 414.67 507.33
Table 2.1: Hiring frequencies and payoffs
the minimum wage m, but also during the 5 periods before and after introduc-
ing m. While in period 1, e.g., 1.56 workers are employed, this average increases
monotonically to 2.76 in period 5, before it drops to 2.09 in the first period with m
and then again increases monotonically to 2.79 in the last period. These findings
contradict the full employment prediction of hypothesis I, while confirming the al-
ternative hypotheses II and III. Payoff results are not that interesting, since they
include payoffs of both groups: employed and unemployed workers. However, it
is interesting that payoffs not only significantly increase for all workers, but also
modestly for the employer, obviously due to the increase in average hiring. Welfare
is also much higher in MW6-10.35 Overall, we conclude that hiring behavior rejects
the benchmark hypothesis I, but confirms hypotheses IIa, IIb and III.
Result 1: In treatment MW, full employment does not occur on average, but hir-
ing averages rise after the introduction of the minimum wage and during MW1-5
and MW6-10. Payoffs of all workers largely increase after the introduction of the
minimum wage.
2.6.2 The minimum wage treatment: Wages
In the experiment, contract offers do not always lead to employment and we expect
them to follow a trial-and-error-path, since principals have to learn their workers’
35Resulting p-values of dependent sample t tests for these five variables are: p = .399 for PayP ,
p = .001 for PayM and PayH , and p < .001 for PayL and WF .
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preferences. We will thus start by limiting our analysis to those offers that are
accepted. These observations seem most appropriate to characterize results, since
they represent factual contracted wages and exclude (extreme) trial balloon wage
offers rejected by workers. Let us, from now on, synonymously use the terms
successful wage offers or simply paid wages when referring to the wage offers that
are accepted by workers and thus actually apply. We will discuss the negligible
differences between paid wages and all wage offers at the end of this section.
To guarantee comparability between groups, we did not introduce one concrete
minimum wage for all groups, but rather used a group-specific value depending
on the wage offers in MW5. Therefore, the absolute paid wages alone are still
only of limited explanatory power and we additionally compute the relative change
(in percent), named chg, between the paid wage offers in MW1-5 and those of
MW6-10 for each group. Table 2.2 gives averages of paid wages (and successful
wage thresholds already) for all three workers in MW1-5 and MW6-10 as well as
the average minimum wage. In the fifth column the average of relative changes is
given. The last column gives the number of observations for MW1-5, MW6-10 and
chg.36
MW1-5 m MW6-10 chg # of obs.
wL 57.20 69.03 73.35 29.37 % 34, 34, 34
wM 99.65 – 111.40 14.44 % 34, 34, 34
wH 149.71 – 161.75 10.93 % 33, 33, 32
tL 43.08 69.03 70.34 104.65 % 34, 34, 34
tM 83.84 – 100.12 28.96 % 34, 34, 34
tH 136.50 – 150.34 15.11 % 33, 33, 32
Table 2.2: Treatment MW, paid wages and successful wage thresholds
Averages of paid wages in MW1-5 are 57.20 for workers L, 99.65 for workers
M and 149.71 for workers H, which obviously rejects the benchmark hypothesis,
but also all other hypotheses, since it is significantly more than 40 percent of the
36In one group, worker H was never hired in MW1-5 and in another group, H was never hired in
MW6-10. Thus, we have 33 observations there and can compute relative changes in 32 cases.
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respective pies.37 Instead, paid wages amount to about 50 percent of the respective
pies for workers M and H and to a little larger fraction for workers L.
Result 2: In the first five periods of MW, workers earn more than 40 percent of
the respective revenues Ri.
Paid wage averages increase from MW1-5 to MW6-10 to 73.35 for L, 111.40 for
M and 161.75 for H. The average relative wage change is highest for workers L who
are the only ones immediately affected by the minimum wage. Their wages increase
by 29.37 percent on average.
Our main research hypothesis predicted that minimum wage spillovers occur, i.e.,
that wages of the medium and the high productive worker also increase in MW6-
10, although these workers already earned more than the minimum wage in p5
(and MW1-5). Since wL ≤ m ≤ wM ≤ wH always holds (see the sections before),
the wages of workers M and H, indeed, do not have to increase, but the relative
wage changes for these groups suggest that they nevertheless do, i.e., they suggest
that minimum wage spillovers exist. The relative increase for workers M is 14.44
percent and thus still half as high as the increase for workers L. The increase for
high productive workers is a little lower with 10.93 percent. We can test whether the
increases are statistically significant by performing dependent sample t tests that
use the averages of MW1-5 and MW6-10 for each group. Since we hypothesized
wage increases for all workers, we perform the tests one-sided. All tests deliver
significant results (p < .001 for workers L and M and p = .010 for workers H).
Before summarizing results, let us further analyze the relation of minimum wages
and worker’s wages. The average minimum wage is m = 69.03 and the average of
paid wages to workers L in MW6-10 is only a little, yet significantly higher than
this minimum wage (wL = 73.35). This means that there is some reason to believe
that a fairness perception effect, as FFZ2006 found it, exists. We calculated the
relative change between the wages L in MW6-10 and the minimum wage for each
group. On average, paid wages are about 6.5 percent higher than the minimum
wage38 which is only a little less than the about 8 percent FFZ2006 found. To put
37One sample t tests against 40 (worker L), 80 (worker M) and 120 (worker H), respectively.
Resulting p-values are: p < .001 in all three cases.
38Dependent sample t test, two-sided: p < .001.
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it another way: the difference between the successful wage offers to workers L in
MW1-5 and the minimum wage amounts to about 23 % and is thus responsible for
three fourths of the 29.5%- wage increase we observe.
The question that now arises is: Is it likely that similar effects are accountable for
the wage increases we observed for workersM and H, i.e., is there reason to believe
that the minimum wage spillovers should be attributed to fairness perception effects
instead of relative income effects?
The wages paid in MW1-5 to workers M and H are on average already about
45.5 percent and 119 percent, respectively, higher than the minimum wage, i.e., the
minimum wage cuts off a part of the interval of feasible wages much below the wages
paid to M and H. Considering these large differences, the intuitive intermediate
conclusion should be that there is little reason, if any at all, to believe that fairness
perception effects similar to that for workers L should be of importance.
Although there is no one-to-one experimental evidence for this intuitive reason-
ing, the study of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) gives some justification. In their
experiment, recipients had to evaluate the kindness of hypothetical splits of 10
Swiss Francs offered by a proposer. The kindness had to be rated on a scale rang-
ing between 0 (very unkind) and 100 (very kind). In scenario (i), participants were
told that every integer split was possible, i.e., 10 for the proposer and 0 for them
((10, 0)), or one unit for them ((9, 1)), or (8, 2) and so on until (0, 10). On the other
hand, in scenario (vii), only the offers (2, 8), (1, 9), and (0, 10) were feasible, i.e.,
the lowest offers of the original scenario were disallowed. We think that comparing
these two scenarios resembles our experimental setting quite well: scenario (i) is
similar to the first five periods without the minimum wage (MW1-5) and scenario
(vii) for the later five periods (MW6-10) in which the minimum wage restricts the
feasible offers.
Unsurprisingly, the kindness evaluations of the offer (2, 8) in scenarios (i) and (vii)
largely differed according to Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Responders evaluated
kindness of (2, 8) with +62.0 in (i) and only with +40.8 in (vii) where (2, 8) was
the lowest feasible offer. Evaluations were still differing a little for (1, 9) with +68.0
in (i) and +62.0 in (vii). Note that the value for (2, 8) in (i) is exactly equal to
the value for (1, 9) in (vii) which means that a larger amount had to be offered to
achieve the same level of perceived kindness. Roughly transferred to our setting
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this can be used to explain the fairness perception effect for workers L: the new
lower bound of (2, 8), resembling our minimum wage, is obviously perceived as
being unkind and might thus be avoided by mindful principals.
However, our observations for M and H are much different: Their wages are
much larger than the minimum wage in MW1-5 and MW6-10 and are thus much
more comparable to the extreme offer of (0, 10) in scenarios (i) and (vii). In fact, the
kindness evaluations of (0, 10) the authors reported were almost identical. Average
kindness amounted to +72.3 in (i) and was even a little higher with +73.4 in (vii).
These results strengthen our intuitive argument that fairness perception effects for
workers M and H should be quite modest, if existing at all.
After all, the considerations just presented do, at least, not disqualify the relative
income effect as the main source of the positive minimum wage spillovers we observe.
However, it will not be until the discussion of the control treatment, before we can
give a more definitive answer. For now, we limit ourselves to summarize that the
predictions of hypothesis III are essentially confirmed.
Result 3: Paid wages in MW1-5 and MW6-10 are highest for workers H, followed
by paid wages for workers M and L. In MW6-10, paid wages are higher than in
MW1-5 for all workers, i.e., there are positive minimum wage spillovers for workers
M and H.
We now want to visualize and deepen the preceding analysis by discussing relative
wage changes in all 10 periods. For this purpose, we introduce reli,p as a measure of
relative wage change for worker i in period p. We define it as the fraction between
the wage in period p (wp) and the average of paid wages in MW1-5 (w1−5) times
100 minus 100, i.e., this variable gives the relative change in percent between the
wage paid in a period compared to the average wage before the introduction of the
minimum wage. Figure 2.2 depicts all ten periods on the horizontal axis and gives
the averages of reli,p on the vertical axis.
The relative changes before the introduction of the minimum wage are quite
moderate for all workers and lie mainly between -5 % and +5 %. As discussed
before, wages increase during MW1-5 which is reflected in Figure 2.2 by the positive
slopes of the hypothetical lines connecting reli,1 and reli,5. The minimum wage
forces wages for L to largely increase in MW6-10. Consequentially, from period 6
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Figure 2.2: Treatment MW, relative changes in paid wages
on the relative change for workers L lies between +27 % and +33 % and is thus
much higher than during periods 1 and 5. Except for a little bump from periods
7 to 8, relative changes increase for later periods again, i.e., the average of paid
wages is higher at the end of the experiment than shortly after introducing the
minimum wage. This trend for what is called seniority wages in literature was
already visible on the more aggregate level in Figure 2.1. It could be a result of
the higher hiring figures discussed in Section 2.6.1 or adaptation effects could play
a role, i.e., workers’ aspired wages might have continually increased (see Section
2.2.2) and employers might have anticipated this. We will pick up this thought
when discussing threshold wages below.
Relative wage changes for the medium productive workers M are higher in each
of the periods 6 to 10 (between about +8 and +17 %) than in each of the periods
1 to 5. There is a small jump from the last period without minimum wage to the
first afterwards, i.e., the minimum wage spillover is clearly visible. Again, there is
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an increase in wage offers from period 6 to 10 (with a bump at period 8).
There are two minor differences for workers H: a) the wage increases in MW6-10
are a little lower than for workersM and range between +4 and +13 % and b) paid
wages, and thus relative changes, are almost equal in periods 5 and 6, before they
quite sharply increase in period 7 and afterwards.
Now, to conclude this subsection let us quickly broaden the view to all wage
offers (those that were accepted and those that were rejected) instead of focusing
on paid wages as before. Table 2.3 gives these data (again for thresholds as well).
MW1-5 m MW6-10 chg # of obs.
wL 53.35 69.03 72.94 38.46 % 34, 34, 34
wM 93.86 – 109.88 19.93 % 34, 34, 34
wH 137.79 – 158.91 19.56 % 34, 34, 34
tL 47.31 69.03 70.54 88.43 % 34, 34, 34
tM 86.96 – 102.20 22.98 % 34, 34, 34
tH 147.32 – 154.31 8.07 % 34, 34, 34
Table 2.3: Treatment MW, all wage offers and wage thresholds
There are only minor differences to paid wages given in Table 2.2: The average
over all wage offers is, of course, a little lower than in the subgroup of eventually
successful wage offers in MW1-5 (about 6 to 9 percent), but this difference almost
completely vanishes in MW6-10, which is not surprising given the increased hiring
figures mentioned before. Consequentially, the percentages of the relative changes
are a little higher this time. The increase for workers L is about 38.5 percent and
again twice as high as for workers M (about 20 percent). However, the increase for
workers H is only marginally lower now with about 19.5 percent. Performing the
same tests as above for paid wages, i.e., checking benchmark levels, wage spillovers
and the increase above the minimum wage, gives qualitatively identical results.39
39Tests results for the one sample t tests again the 40 %-prediction are: worker L: p < .001;
worker M : p < .001; worker H: p = .009. One-sided dependent sample t tests comparing the
wage average in MW1-5 with that in MW6-10 give us p < .001 for all workers. The p-value of
the dependent sample t test comparing the wage of worker L in MW6-10 with the minimum
is p < .001.
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2.6.3 The minimum wage treatment: Threshold wages
Averages for workers wage thresholds were already given in the tables before. Since
thresholds do not directly determine the contracted wages when they are lower than
offers, we think it is more interesting to focus on all wage thresholds (Table 2.3),
rather than limiting the view to those that lead to employment. Again qualitative
differences between these two data sets are negligible and will be given in footnotes
occasionally.
First of all, notice that thresholds in MW1-5 follow the same order as wages.
According to Table 2.3 they are lowest for the low productive worker with tl = 47.31,
followed by those for the medium productive worker, tM = 86.96, and are highest
for the most productive one, tH = 147.32. The fractions of the respective pies
demanded thus lie between 40 and 50 percent. Just like for wages, the average
minimum wage lies between the thresholds for L and M . After the introduction of
the minimum wage in MW6-10 the thresholds increase to tl = 70.54, tM = 102.20
and tH = 154.31, respectively. One-sided dependent sample t tests tell us that the
increases for L and M are highly significant (p < .001) and the increase for workers
H is significant on the 5%-level (p ≈ .050).40 This suggests that the minimum wage
spillovers we observe are an echo of workers’ rising wage demands and are not just
founded in wrong assessments of workers’ behavior by principals.41
We also calculated averages of relative changes again. The thresholds increase
by 88.43 percent for workers L, 22.98 percent for M and 8.07 percent for H, i.e.,
the order is qualitatively the same, yet more pronounced than for (paid) wages.
We visually present these findings in Figure 2.3 that is constructed analogically to
Figure 2.2.
Except for a peak in period 2 and modest decreases in periods 5 and 10, thresholds
are rather stable during MW1-5 and MW6-10. The spillover effects are clearly
visible. Since thresholds do not increase during MW1-5 and MW6-10, respectively,
adaptation effects on behalf of the workers as a cause for the seniority wage structure
observed for wages are unlikely.
As for paid wages before, the figure suggests that relative changes for workers
40The more exact p-value is p = .0502.
41The results are similar for the sub-sample of thresholds that lead to employment. Here, p-values
are p < .001 for L and M and p = .002 for workers H (same tests as before).
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Figure 2.3: Treatment MW, relative changes in wage thresholds
M are larger than for workers H. Due to the dependencies in our data, there is
no statistically sound method to test this last difference. However, we think it
is fair enough to summarize that the comparisons of relative wage and threshold
changes give some support to our own and other authors’ theoretical and empirical
conjectures that the relative income effect is more important for those workers
whose earnings are (comparatively) nearer to the minimum wage (workersM) than
for workers whose wages are higher (workers H).
Comparing the average wage thresholds for workers L to the minimum wage
is also interesting. The minimum wage is on overage 85.45 percent higher than
the threshold wages during MW1-5. Additionally, we calculate the relative change
between the minimum wage and the threshold wages in MW6-10 for all 34 groups.
On average wage thresholds are only about 2 percent higher than the minimum
wage, which is also reflected in the averages given in Table 2.3 (m = 69.03 and
tL = 70.54). This is even more interesting when keeping in mind that we explicitly
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disallowed thresholds to be lower than the minimum wage to prevent them from
being meaningless. Since FFZ2006 did allow workers to name threshold wages
lower than the minimum wage, the authors did not compute the relative change
and we cannot compare our results to theirs. Even the small differences between
reservation and minimum wages we find are significant using a dependent sample
t test (p < .001). Nonetheless, larger differences between demanded and minimum
wages could have been expected considering the experimental results of McCabe
et al. (2003) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006) discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.6.2.
In summary, the fairness perception effect exists for thresholds, but is of little
magnitude only. Apart from this, Hypothesis III is confirmed again.
Result 4: Wage thresholds in MW1-5 and MW6-10 are highest for workers H,
followed by those for workers M and L. In MW6-10, thresholds increase for all
workers, and workers L demand only a little more than the minimum wage.
We now want to finish discussing treatment MW by comparing the wage thresh-
olds with the revenue relations. Let us define
tpi,j =
ti/wj
Ri/Rj
and tpi,−i =
ti/w−i
Ri/R−i
with i, j ∈ {L,M,H}, i 6= j, and w−i (R−i) giving the average of wages (revenues)
of all workers except worker i. For tpi,j (or tpi,−i) values larger than 1 indicate that
worker i’s threshold wage in comparison to worker j’s wage (or all other workers’
wages) is larger than the respective revenue difference, i.e., values larger 1 mean
that worker i demands "more than he deserves" in comparison to the revenue
differences. Values smaller 1 indicate the opposite. In economic and psychology
literature (see Frank (1984a) for a brief introduction) it is often argued that people
tend to demand more for themselves than objective criteria would allow. Table 2.4
gives all averages tpi,j and tpi,−i for all workers i. The second row defines for which
reference worker (group) the value tp is calculated.
Before the introduction of the minimum wage, workers L and H, indeed, demand
more than their revenue fractions. For workers L, for example, the divergence is
tpL,H = 1.17, i.e., his wage threshold in relation to the standing offer to H is 17
percent larger than the revenue relation. A two-sided one sample t test shows that
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MW1-5 MW6-10
worker (group) j L M H −i L M H −i
tpL,j – 1.08 1.17 1.12 – 1.31 1.40 1.35
tpM,j .89 – 1.09 .99 .71 – 1.00 .89
tpH,j 1.27 1.38 – 1.32 .72 .94 – .85
Table 2.4: Treatment MW, wage thresholds and revenue relations
this is significantly different from 1 (p = .044), while the modestly lower value for his
demands in comparisons to both other workers, tpL,−i = 1.12, becomes insignificant
(p = .086, same test).
The values for workers H are a little misleading, since they are heavily influenced
by one extreme outlier with tpH > 10 that was more than six times larger than the
second-highest value. Without this group the values are only a little different from
1: tpH,L = .99, tpH,M = 1.11, and tpH,−i = 1.05. But even when not excluding the
outlier, the differences between all tpH and 1 given in Table 2.4 are statistically
insignificant due to the large variances.42
Workers M almost exactly demand what they deserve in comparison to both
other workers in MW1-5: for them tpM,−i = .99 is, of course, insignificantly different
from 1 (two-sided one sample t test: p = .856). It is interesting, however, to
note that this aggregate result conveys the rather large differences between their
demands with respect to the wages of workers L and H. While medium productive
workers demand more than they deserve in comparison to workers H, tpM,H = 1.09
(not differing from 1, same test, p = .282), they want less than they deserve with
regard to worker L, tpM,L = .89 (almost significantly different from 1, same test,
p = .061). This suggests that for workers M the wage of worker L is insofar less
important as he is willing to get underpaid in comparison to him as long as he is
overpaid with regard to worker H.
In MW6-10 the observations for workers L are not that meaningful due to the
minimum wage. But here, a similar effect as for workers M now occurs for M and
H. For workers M , the wage relation to worker H, tpM,H = 1.00 is much larger
42One sample t test as before, p-values are: for tH,L: p = .334; for tH,M : p = .175; for tH,−i:
p = .252.
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than that to worker L, tpM,L = .71 and the high productive workers are now much
more willing to accept an underpayment with regard to worker L than to workerM
(tpH,L = .72 and tpH,M = .94) which could have been expected since the medium
productive worker is most similar to him.
2.6.4 The control treatment
We reported minimum wage spillovers for workers M and H. However, for these
workers we did not only find that the wage averages of MW6-10 were larger than
that of MW1-5, but we also presented visual evidence – in Figures 2.1 and 2.2
– that wages increased during MW1-5 and MW6-10. This might leave the reader
with the question whether the wage spillovers may not originate in the introduction
of the minimum wage that triggers relative income effects as our theoretical model
argued, but are rather an artefact due to a general tendency for increasing wages in
experiments like ours. Similar trends did not occur for wage thresholds. Neverthe-
less, we did a control treatment CTR in which the first five periods (CTR1-5) were
played exactly as in treatment MW, but then no minimum wage was introduced
and the same five periods were played again (CTR6-10).
If the minimum wage is not triggering relative income effects that cause the min-
imum wage spillovers, we should observe equally high wage increases from CTR1-5
to CTR6-10 as we did before for MW1-5 and MW6-10. On the contrary, if wage
spillovers are due to the minimum wage, the increases should be higher in MW
than in CTR. We thus hypothesize in this section that wage increases in treatment
CTR are lower than those in treatment MW.
The hiring and payoff averages previously given in Table 2.1 confirm the expec-
tation that the first five periods of MW and CTR do not differ that much. For
example, hiring averages are 2.11 in treatment MW and 2.07 in treatment CTR.
When additionally splitting the hiring averages to all three workers, we find that a
little more workers M are hired in MW than in CTR (.79 in MW and .71 in CTR),
but less of type H (.62 in MW and .69 in CTR). Repercussions of this are visible in
payoffs, but none of this slight differences is significant according to two-sided two
sample Welch-Satterthwaite t tests (WS tests).43 The same holds for paid wages:
43The p-values for all variables in Table 2.1 range from p = .404 for PayH up to p = .968 for
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in CTR1-5 they are wL = 58.89, wM = 103.36, and wH = 154.35, in MW1-5 they
are wL = 57.20, wM = 99.65, and wH = 149.71. These differences are statistically
insignificant.44
Let us now briefly describe results for CTR6-10 and their differences to those in
CTR1-5. Table 2.5 presents the same data for paid wages in CTR as Table 2.2 did
before for MW with the exception that the minimum wage column is, of course,
left out. Instead a last column is added that gives the relative changes for MW,
again.
CTR MW
CTR1-5 CTR6-10 chg # of obs. chg
wL 58.89 57.92 9.64 % 29, 29, 29 29.37 %
wM 103.36 106.54 7.91 % 28, 29, 28 14.44 %
wH 154.35 162.24 3.08 % 28, 30, 28 10.93 %
Table 2.5: Treatment CTR, paid wages
First of all, notice that although the paid wages for workers L slightly decrease
from wL = 58.89 in CTR1-5 to wL = 57.92 in CTR6-10 the relative wage change is
positive with 9.64 percent. This is due to one extreme outlier with an increase of
more than 300 percent. Since differences between CTR and MW are large anyhow
and not in our main interest, we do not bother detailing what would change if
we excluded this outlier. Furthermore, a one-sided Wilcoxon paired sample test
refutes the hypothesis that wages increase for workers L from CTR1-5 to CTR6-10
(p = .467).45
The medium productive workers’ average wages are 103.36 in CTR1-5 and in-
crease to 106.54 in CTR6-10. This increase is significant according to a one-sided
Wilcoxon paired sample test (p = .025). For workers H the increase from 154.35 in
CTR1-5 to 162.24 in CTR6-10 is slightly insignificant using the same test (p = .068).
These intermediate results suggest that wages for M and H are also increasing in
CTR.
WF . Data on request.
44Mann-Whitney U-tests, p-values are: p = .829 for wL, p = .409 for wM , and p = .694 for wH .
Results are similar when looking at all wage offers instead. Data on request.
45We choose the one-sided hypothesis here and below, since we did so for MW before.
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Are these wage increases in CTR at least smaller than in MW? For answering
the question, we start by discussing differences for workers L that are, of course,
rather extreme due to the influence of the minimum wage in treatment MW. It thus
suffices to look at the aggregate averages of relative wage changes given in Table
2.5 that are 29.37% for MW and only 9.64% for CTR. The hypothesis that both
changes are equal is refuted in favor of the alternative that wage increases are larger
in MW using a one-sided two sample Mann-Whitney U-test (U-test) (p < .001).
Visually depicting the relative changes in paid wages in treatments CTR and MW
for workers M and H is helpful. This is done in the upper half of the following
Figure 2.4. The lower half of Figure 2.4 deals with wage thresholds and will be
discussed a few paragraphs later.
Relative wage changes in MW and CTR for workers M and H are nearly in-
distinguishable in periods 1 to 5, i.e., they vary between -5 % and +5 % and are
increasing over time, although the latter trend is less pronounced for workers M in
CTR than in MW. However, for both workers the differences between treatments
MW and CTR are clearly visible in periods 6 to 10.
In each of the periods 6 to 10, the relative wage change for workersM in treatment
MW is more than twice as high as in treatment CTR. Furthermore, the wage
increase during CTR6-10 from about +4 % to +7.5 % is a little less pronounced
than that during MW6-10 from about +8 % to about +17 %. On aggregate level
the wages of workers M increase by 14.44 % in treatment MW, but only for 7.91
% in the control treatment. This difference is significant according to a one-sided
U-test (p = .012).
In period 6, relative wage changes for workers H are only a little higher in MW
(+3.70 %) than in CTR (+2.03 %). Afterwards wages and thus relative changes
largely increase in MW, but eventually decrease a little in CTR so that changes
are at least 3 times as high in MW in each of the periods from 7 to 10. Since
visual inspection suggested differing variances we perform a Mann-Whitney U-test
and, additionally, a robust rank-order test (U-test (rro test)). They tell us that the
difference between relative wage change averages in MW (10.93 %) and CTR (3.08
%) is only slightly insignificant with a p-value of p = .055 (.054).
Overall, these results suggest that the wage spillovers are larger in the minimum
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wage treatment MW than in treatment CTR. This implies that the wage spillovers
in treatment MW originate in the introduction of the minimum wage that triggers
relative income effects, and are not just an artefact caused by a tendency for wages
to increase over time. The results do not differ much when broadening the view to
all wage offers.46
Let us conclude this section by comparing differences in threshold wages in CTR
and MW. Table 2.6 gives averages for the whole group of all wage thresholds for
CTR just as Table 2.3 did for MW. Additionally, changes for MW are given in the
last column.
CTR MW
CTR1-5 CTR6-10 chg # of obs. chg
tL 52.77 52.86 1.76 % 30, 30, 30 88.43 %
tM 95.75 101.05 7.80 % 30, 30, 30 22.98 %
tH 140.83 137.50 -4.27 % 30, 30, 30 8.07 %
Table 2.6: Treatment CTR, wage thresholds
Trends are even clearer than for paid wages: Threshold wages for workers L are
almost identical in CTR1-5 and CTR6-10 with an average increase of only 1.76 %,
while due to the minimum wage they inevitably largely increase in MW (88.43 %).
The moderate increase of 7.80 % for thresholds of workers M in CTR is much
smaller than the 22.98 %-increase in MW. This difference is significant according to
a one-sided WS test (p = .003). Threshold wage averages for workers H decrease
from CTR1-5 to CTR6-10 for -4.27 % and are thus lower than the already only
modest increase of 8.07 % in treatment MW. This difference is also significant
using the same test again (p = .016).
46Relative wage changes for workers L (M) are 38.46 % (19.93 %) in MW, but only 9.99 % (11.20
%) in CTR; one-sided WS test: p < .001 (p = .064). At first glance, the difference for workers
H is rather small with 19.56 % in MW and 16.13 % in CTR. However, the high relative wage
change for CTR is mainly due to an extreme outlier case in which the principal offers only 42,
on average, to his worker H in CTR1-5 and thus never employs him, but offers 148 in CTR6-10.
The relative wage change in this group is almost 6 times as high as the second highest relative
change, while the analog factor is only 1.6 in MW. When excluding the outlier, the average
relative change drops from 16.13 % to 7.98 % and the difference to the 19.56 %-increase in
MW is significant (one-sided U-test: p = .024).
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These results suggest that not only wage spillovers in MW are due to the mini-
mum wage and relative income effects, but this minimum wage also changes workers
threshold wages much more lasting than time does.
Figure 2.4 visualizes these insights for workers M and H and since results are
qualitatively unchanged when restricting attention to successful wage thresholds
only47, we conclude:
Result 5: In p1-5, results for CTR and MW are almost identical. Increases in
wages and threshold wages are larger in MW than in CTR.
2.7 Conclusion
Minimum wages are a labor market institution regularly discussed and implemented
across the world. While the public debate often centers around questions of the
proportionateness of a society’s wage distribution and dangers of financial and
social exclusion of people with low wages (see, e.g, The Australian (2009), Irish
Times (2009a), or Washington Post (2009)), scientific studies, both theoretical and
empirical, predominantly focus on direct fiscal and employment effects of minimum
wages. Our study does not investigate these fiscal and employment effects. Instead,
it analyzes the indirect effects of minimum wages, particularly the repercussions
of minimum wages on the wages of workers who earned more than this minimum
wage before its introduction. In cases in which wages of those workers increase after
introducing a minimum wage, literature speaks of a minimum wage spillover. The
question whether such minimum wage spillovers exist or not should be important
for lawmakers and their advisors, not only when considering introducing a minimum
wage, but also when raising an existing minimum wage.
We are confident that we enriched the knowledge about minimum wages by a)
theoretically analyzing minimum wage spillovers in a model that focuses on relative
income preferences and heterogeneously qualified workers, and by b) experimentally
testing our theoretical predictions.
We started by evaluating the existing literature and singled out the best es-
47The p-values of one-sided U-tests (and rro tests for workers L and H) are p < .001(< .001) for
L, p = .004 for M , and p = .043(.042) for H.
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tablished cause for minimum wage spillovers, namely peoples’ preferences for a
favorable relative income position. Two concrete classes of utility functions that
capture relative income preferences were proposed in literature. In our relative in-
come model, we derived main results without committing to one of these specific
classes of functions and were able to show that a set of rather general assumptions
about relative income preferences suffices to qualitatively analyze minimum wage
spillovers. The model predicted that minimum wage spillovers occur and suggested
that they originate in workers’ relative income preferences.
Our experimental design followed the relative income model and thereby excluded
some of the other causes for minimum wage spillovers discussed in theoretical and
empirical literature like substitution effects, for example. The experiment is thus,
on principle, not only capable of testing for minimum wage spillovers, but also of
attributing them with high certainty to one specific cause, namely relative income
preferences.
Our experimental results essentially confirmed the theoretical predictions: min-
imum wage spillovers occurred and we presented evidence that they originated in
relative income preferences.
We are aware that by concentrating on relative income preferences only, one
might overemphasize the magnitude of minimum wage spillovers in comparison to
a real world environment in which other effects also might play a role. However,
our findings do not suggest that minimum wage spillovers are only statistically
significant, but of no practical relevance. On the contrary, we observe that the
increases in wages of workers who earned more than the minimum wage before
its introduction, i.e, the minimum wage spillovers, are almost half as high as the
increases for workers whose wages have to rise, since they earned less than the min-
imum wage before its introduction. This clearly indicates rather strong minimum
wage spillovers and we conclude that they should be considered by lawmakers when
introducing or modifying minimum wage laws.
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3 Employment protection and
bullying
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we experimentally examine the relation between employment ter-
mination laws and sanctions in the workplace (“bullying”). The idea that under
strict termination laws, bullying might be used by employers to provoke unpro-
ductive workers to quit voluntarily, has been introduced by Wasmer (2006) in a
theoretical and empirical study. Even if bullying is costly, it can be a part of the
employers’ equilibrium strategy according to his model. In the empirical part of his
work, Wasmer finds supporting evidence for the hypothesis that firms bully workers
under strict employment protection laws (EPL). In particular, he reports positive
correlations between several dimensions of workers’ stress (as a proxy for bullying)
and employment protection: stress levels increase with stricter EPL, i.e., workers
are more stressed when EPL makes it harder for firms to fire their workers. In
addition, the consumption of anti-depressants also increases with stricter EPL.
Instead of using field data as a proxy for bullying, we run a laboratory experiment
in which we allow the employers to sanction their workers. We interpret sanctions
as bullying and investigate whether or not an institutional change in the degree of
employment protection has an impact on the usage of such sanctions.
In one group of treatments, the employers are allowed to issue sanctions while in
the other group sanctions are not available. In both groups, we distinguish between
three stylized legal rules that represent different degrees of employment protection:
In the treatments without EPL, the employer can terminate the contract at will.
In the treatments with strict EPL, the employer must never terminate the labor
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contract. In the treatments with weak EPL, the employer may only terminate a
contract if the employment relation lasts for just one period, i.e., the employer can
fire an employee only during the first period.
We assume the sanctions to be costly for both the employer and the worker. This
rather general approach allows us to interpret sanctions or bullying as a variety of
actions, starting from casual meanness up to open hostility. Moreover, we assume
the employees’ effort choices to be unobservable (and, thus, non-verifiable). We
introduce this uncertainty since we perceive it as crucial for EPL to be meaningful
at all: Under perfect monitoring, there is little room for opportunistic behavior on
either side.
By examining the relation between EPL and sanctions in a laboratory experi-
ment, we link the work of Wasmer (2006) and the numerous works on sanctions
(not necessarily at the workplace) in experimental economics. Fehr and Gächter
(2000a, 2002) have examined sanctions in the context of public-good experiments.
Closer to the workplace context are the papers by Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vester-
lund (2003), subsequently denoted as AHW2003, who have looked at a proposer-
responder game, and Kirstein (2008), who examined a principal-agent setting with
real effort. All these papers presented evidence that people are willing to sanction
others perceived as defectors even if such sanctions are costly and the interaction
is anonymous and finite.1 The authors also have found evidence that cooperation
levels are significantly larger than predicted by models assuming perfect rational-
ity.2
Various attempts have been made to theoretically explain these and similar find-
ings. For example, social-preference models have incorporated aspects of inequality
aversion, fairness, and reciprocity.3 In a neuroeconomical experiment, de Quervain
et al. (2004) found supporting evidence for the use of these models (see Fehr et al.
(2005) for an overview). We lean on social preference models when establishing our
1A short overview dealing with several aspects of human altruism and sanctioning behavior is
given by Fehr and Rockenbach (2004). The terms “sanction” and “punishment” are often used
synonymously in this literature.
2Gürerk et al. (2006) even found that sanctioning institutions are preferred over non-sanctioning
institutions by a vast majority of participants.
3The seminal paper here is Rabin (1993). Many modifications have been proposed, see, e.g.,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fischbacher
(2006).
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behavioral hypotheses.
Employment protection legislation is a widely discussed topic, both in economic
research and in the public discourse. Many of the numerous economic papers focus
on the effect of EPL on employment.4 Even though experimental analysis of labor
market legislation would allow for the implementation of institutional changes in a
controlled environment, this strand of literature is still in its infancy. Falk, Huffman
and MacLeod (2008), henceforth FHM2008, have analyzed the relation between
EPL and rewards. Their experiment is based on four treatments: no EPL vs. weak
EPL is matched with availability vs. non-availability of reward.5 Thus, the authors
disregarded the relation between employment protection and sanctions (or bullying)
which is the main focus of our work. Moreover, they assume that employers can
perfectly monitor their workers’ effort choices. As we will draw on their findings
when deriving our hypotheses, a more detailed discussion of their main results is
presented in Section 3.4.
In the light of the findings by Wasmer (2006), we would expect that costly sanc-
tions (bullying) are used less often when employers can use costless firing as an
alternative incentive device to discipline their workers. Transferred to our exper-
imental setting this means that in the treatments in which firings and sanctions
are admissible, we should observe that firings are used instead of costly sanctions,
i.e, sanctions should decrease in comparison to treatments in which firings are not
allowed. From now on, we will speak of firings and sanctions as substitutes in this
chapter when referring to the idea that firings are used instead of sanctions when
both are available.
In contrast, Rockenbach and Milinski (2006) reported a different result for an
experiment in which two mechanisms to overcome social dilemma problems were
available: sanctions and indirect reciprocity. They found that costly sanctions in
a public-good game did not completely disappear in treatments in which it was
also possible to indirectly sanction the non-cooperators of the public-good game by
4The net effect of EPL on employment is controversial, see, e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Garibaldi (1998). EPL has also been credited
for sheltering the quasi-rents from specific investments and thus fostering the accumulation of
human capital (see, e.g., Schellhaaß and Nolte (1999) or Kirstein et al. (2000)). Belot et al.
(2007) try to combine these models.
5The same experiment is also part of the paper by Falk and Huffmann (2007).
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sending less money to them in a indirect reciprocity game that was also played. If
the relation between firings and sanctions in our setting were similar to that between
sanctions and indirect reciprocity found by Rockenbach and Milinski (2006), then
we should observe that sanctions are still used when firings are also admissible, i.e.,
that firings and sanctions are used as complements.
In summary, the three most important questions our study wants to answer are:
1) Do employers use costly sanctions (“bullying”) more often or more severely, the
stricter the employment protection is?, 2) Do employees react to higher sanctions by
voluntarily quitting their job?, and 3) Are firings and sanctions used as substitutes?
Our main results are that effort levels are higher in the treatments with sanc-
tions compared to treatments in which sanctions are not available, but sanctions
do not continually increase the tighter the employment protection becomes. We
also find that sanctions and firings are often used as complements, rather than as
substitutes, and thus induce workers to quit not only in treatments in which firings
are prohibited, but also in treatments in which firings are allowed.
In Section 3.2, we present the model and its solution. Sections 3.3 and 3.4
contain the experimental design and the hypotheses, respectively, while the results
are discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Model
Our model is also the blueprint for the experimental design. Here, we only set
up the generalized model (and point out the differences between our design and
the one in FHM2008). The specific parameter settings that have been used in the
experiment will be presented in Section 3.3.
We are examining a labor market with m firms (the principals) and n potential
workers (the agents), where each principal can employ one agent at most. There
are more agents than principals (n > m), which implies equilibrium unemployment.
The following game is played for a finite number of T periods.
The fixed component of the workers’ compensation, denoted F > 0, is exoge-
nously given. This is a difference to FHM2008 who set up their model with en-
dogenous wages.
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In the first out of the T periods, the interaction starts in Stage 1. Each principal
is endowed with a budget B and decides whether she wants to employ an agent or
not. All agents decide whether they want to be employed or not.
In Stage 2, those employers and workers who are willing to form a labor rela-
tionship are randomly matched.6 If the number of agents who want a job exceeded
the number of principals who want to hire, then some agents are involuntarily un-
employed. As an outside option the unemployed agents receive an unemployment
benefit, denoted U > 0. The payment U is assumed to be smaller than the fixed
wage, F . For unemployed agents, the period ends after Stage 2.
In Stage 3, each employed agent privately chooses his effort level from a discrete
set {e1, e2, ...., eK} consisting of effort levels ek (k ∈ {1, ...., K}) with e1 < e2 <
... < eK . We assume the costs of effort, C(e), to increase in the effort level, with
C(e1) ≥ 0.
Let Q be the set of possible output quantities q produced in the firm. A higher
effort chosen by the agent shall increase the respective principal’s expected output.
Therefore, we assume that each effort level ei induces a random variable Xi with a
distribution function Fi. A principal’s output q ∈ Q when employing an agent who
chooses effort level ei equals the realization of the random variable Xi.
We assume that the distribution functions of the variables Xi reflect first-order
stochastic dominance such that F1(x) ≥ F2(x) ≥ ... ≥ FK(x) holds for all admissible
values x, and Fk1(x) > Fk2(x) holds for at least one x for each pair k1, k2 with
k1 > k2 and k1, k2 ∈ {1, ...., K}. This implies E[X1] < E[X2] < ... < E[Xk],
i.e, the expected output strictly increases in the chosen effort level. Each random
variable realizes once every period and applies to all matches of this period, i.e.,
each worker who spends effort ei in a specific period will produce the same amount
of output in this period. The distribution functions are common knowledge.
Furthermore, we assume that for each output quantity q the probability that q
results is larger than zero for at least two different effort levels. Thus, the principal
cannot infer the effort choices of her worker from the observed output level with
certainty. This is another difference from the setup of FHM2008, who did not
introduce uncertainty on the part of the principal.
6See Section 3.3 for details of our experimental matching. The matching in FHM2008 is not
random, but is the result of a kind of oral auction.
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In Stage 4, the random variable realizes. All players of a match learn the
actual output, which is then sold. We assume each principal to be a price taker
in a competitive environment with a given market price, denoted p. Finally, all
principals receive information about the average output q.
In Stage 5, we distinguish between two different situations: in one situation,
the principals are not allowed to mete out sanctions; in the other, sanctions are
available. If available, one unit of sanction, denoted with s ≥ 0, decreases a worker’s
payoff times a factor f > 0. Principals do not have the option to threaten with
future sanctions. This is another difference to the setup of FHM2008, who allowed
their principals to promise rewards.7
A principal’s budget, B, is no smaller than the sum of the constant labor market
fixed wage F and the maximum sanction s. We furthermore make the assump-
tion that E[X1] · p > F , i.e., we restrict attention to situations in which hiring is
profitable, even if the worker is spending minimum effort.
In the period under scrutiny, the principal’s expected profit, E[pi], thus amounts
to B if she is not hiring a worker, and to B − F + p · E[Xi]− s, if she employs an
agent who chooses effort level ei and sanctions him with s. The worker’s payoff,
denoted ω, is either U if he is not employed, F −C(ei) if spending effort ei and not
being sanctioned, or else F − C(ei)− f · s.
We also assume the difference between the fixed wage and the costs from spending
minimum effort to be significantly larger than the unemployment benefit, i.e., each
agent has a incentive to seek employment – at least if he anticipates not to be
sanctioned.
In Stage 6 we distinguish between three different versions of employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL):
• Under no EPL, a principal can fire his current agent at will. Then, if still
necessary, the agent decides whether to quit or not. If a contract is not
terminated by either the employer or the worker, the next period starts for
this principal and this agent with Stage 3 (the effort decision of the agent).
7This obviously is not important for the model, but may be relevant for the experiment. One
might argue that using such "cheap talk"–announcements as FHM2008 did might bias the
experimental results by inducing endowment effects, see Kahneman et al. (1991).
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If a contract is terminated, the next period starts for both of them with the
matching in Stage 1.
• With strict EPL, a principal cannot fire his employed agent in Stage 6. If
an agent quits, however, he and his principal start in Stage 1. If the agent
does not quit, the players resume in Stage 3 of the next period.
• If, under weak EPL, a contract between a principal and his worker lasts for
just one period, then the principal can terminate it. In this case, or if the
agent quits, the players continue in Stage 1 of the next period. If the relation
between a principal and the agent already lasts for more than one round,
then the principal is not allowed to terminate the contract. In that case, the
players continue in Stage 3 of the next period (unless the agent quits, which
puts the players into Stage 1 of the next period).
The subsequent periods are played according to the same pattern. The last period
T ends automatically after Stage 5.
Depending on whether sanctions are available (S) or not (NS), and the prevailing
EPL regime (noEPL, weakEPL, strictEPL), six different scenarios are possible.
The subgame-perfect equilibria under the assumption of perfectly rational, payoff-
maximizing players lead to identical results. As an example, we now verbally derive
the equilibrium for the scenario without EPL and without sanctions.
At the end of the last period T , each principal who employs a worker never uses
costly sanctions. Agents anticipate this and, thus, choose the minimum effort level
(e1). Since we assumed the fixed wage to be larger than the outside option, the
agents want to be employed. In Stage 1, this means he is seeking employment,
whereas in Stage 6 this means he does not want to quit. The expected revenues
are larger than the fixed wage by assumption, implying that risk-neutral principals
want to hire at the beginning of period T and would not fire their current agent
in Stage 6 of period T − 1, since every agent should spend minimum effort in the
last period. They never sanction in period T − 1, which induces the agent to spend
minimum effort. The same argument applies to periods T − 2 and so on.
Thus, standard game theory predicts that sanctions never occur and they are
also invariant with regard to EPL. Agents always want to be employed and spend
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minimum effort if hired; employers always hire.
3.3 Experimental design
The experimental treatments reflect the six scenarios of the model. We distinguish
between three different kinds of employment protection – no EPL (nEPL), weak
EPL (wEPL), strict EPL (sEPL) – and two sanction regimes (sanctions available
(S), no sanctions available (NS)). The six treatments are numbered treatment I,
II, ..., VI, see Table 3.1. Our treatments IV and V are basically comparable to
treatments of the experiment conducted by FHM2008, although the stages in each
period of our model differ from their model.
no EPL weak EPL strict EPL
S nEPL+S (tI) wEPL+S (tII) sEPL+S (tIII)
NS nEPL+NS (tIV) wEPL+NS (tV) sEPL+NS (tVI)
Table 3.1: Treatment overview
Each treatment was played for 10 periods that consisted of the six stages de-
scribed above. We ran two sessions of each treatment and pooled the data from
both sessions. In each session, 8 principals and 12 agents were active.8
At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly assigned to the
two different roles: principal (“employer”) or agent (“employee”), which they kept
throughout the experiment. We used the term “punishment” in the instructions.
Payoffs were calculated in GE (Experimental Currency Units) during the experi-
ment. They were exchanged into e at a rate of 1 GE = e .1 after the experiment.
Workers received an additional fixed payment of 50 GE. Representative instructions
are given in Appendix A.2.
8In the second session of treatment IV, we had too few participants and decided to run the
session with 6 principals and 9 agents (the same ratio as before). We checked whether this
session was different from the session with 20 participants and found no significant differences:
a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U-test on differences in effort levels between these two sessions is
insignificant on the 5%-level (p = .426). The same holds for output, average output, payoffs
and output deviations with p-values between .082 and .609. Data on request.
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We choose the following parameter values: B = 12 GE for the budget, F = 12
GE for the fixed wage, U = 7 GE for the unemployment benefit and p = 5 GE for
the market price. Employed agents had to choose their effort level from the discrete
set {e1, e2, e3, e2, e5}. Their effort costs were set to: C(e1) = 0 GE, C(e2) = 0.25
GE, C(e3) = 0.75 GE, C(e4) = 1.5 GE, and C(e5) = 2.5 GE.
The random variables X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5 that determined the output level
probabilities (in stage 4) are given by Table 3.2.
q1 = 2 q2 = 3 q3 = 4 q4 = 5
e1 .50 .30 .15 .05
e2 .40 .30 .20 .10
e3 .25 .25 .25 .25
e4 .10 .20 .30 .40
e5 .05 .15 .30 .50
Table 3.2: Probability functions X1, X2, X3, X4, X5
The average output q was revealed to the principals after Stage 4 in each period.9
If allowed by the treatment, each principal could use up to 2 GE to invest them
into sanctions s. The respective sanction investment was multiplied by a factor
f = 3 to compute the decrease of the respective workers payoff.
If labor relationships ended, it was excluded that the same principal and agent
were matched in the next period again.
Participants’ period earnings were accumulated and paid anonymously at the
end of the experiment. Prior to the first period, participants were asked to fill in a
computerized questionnaire that checked their proper understanding of the instruc-
tions. A total of 235 students, mostly in business engineering at the Universität
Karlsruhe (TU), participated in the experimental sessions which were conducted at
the experimental computer laboratory in Karlsruhe, in June 2008. Average earnings
amounted to e 15.42 for about 100 minutes (about e 9.25 per hour).
9We limited this information to one position after the decimal point.
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3.4 Hypotheses
The subgame-perfect equilibria derived in Section 3.2 allow us to state our bench-
mark hypotheses. Sanctions should be s = 0. Effort levels should be minimal
(e1) resulting in output and average output equalling approximately 2.75. Princi-
pals should always hire and earn about 13.75 GE; agents should always want to
work and earn 12 GE if hired, and 7 GE otherwise.
The experimental findings on sanctioning behavior and on labor market interac-
tions provide evidence that the benchmark hypotheses are only of limited predictive
value. In those experiments, the subjects show a tendency to spend positive effort,
and they are willing to issue costly sanctions, even if the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium predicts zero levels. Thus, the experimental literature invites us to conjecture
behavioral hypotheses. We mainly focus on hypotheses about effort and sanc-
tions and draw on the studies by FHM2008 and AHW2003 as the main sources for
our hypotheses.
FHM2008 studied an experiment (running for 18 periods) in which in the begin-
ning of each period, employers could offer contracts consisting of fixed wage and
a desired effort level to either one specific or all workers. As soon as a worker
accepted a contract offer, he and the employer were matched and the employer’s
offer was removed, i.e., the employer could not hire more than one worker. Workers
then chose their effort levels.
Subjects played in four treatments which differed in the EPL regime (no EPL
or weak EPL) and with regard to whether or not rewards were available to the
principals. Strictly speaking the principals in the experiment of FHM2008 could
not fire their agents, but only opt to not offer a new contract. In particular, in the
no EPL treatments, employers could decide at the end of each period if they wanted
to make a private offer to the same worker again or not. FHM2008 interpret the
cases in which the employer did not make such private offers as firings. Although
this is a difference to our setting in which employers directly choose to fire or not, we
will talk of firings when describing the experiment of FHM2008, since the authors
also did this and it simplifies the following descriptions. The treatments with weak
EPL are loosely comparable to ours with weak EPL, i.e., firings were only possible
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in the first firing period. Afterwards the dismissal barrier in the experiment of
FHM2008 forced employers to offer a contract to the same worker again consisting
of a fixed wage at least as high as in the previous period.
FHM2008 found that average effort levels were larger than the minimum in all
treatments. Effort levels were smaller in the treatment with weak EPL and no
rewards than in all other treatments.
The availability of reward instruments increased the average effort levels for both,
no EPL and weak EPL. Rewards were frequently used, although they were costly.
The first employment periods in treatments with weak EPL are called probation
periods in literature and empirical works suggested that workers might spend rather
much work effort during probation periods and (much) less afterwards, since em-
ployers are only able to fire during probation periods.10 This is named a probation
period effect.
FHM2008 found that if rewards were not available, overall efforts were much lower
for weak EPL than for no EPL, with the exception of probation periods of weak EPL
where efforts were slightly higher than in the no EPL treatments. If the principals
were allowed to use rewards, then this effort effect almost completely vanished. In
the treatment with weak EPL and without rewards, efforts in probation periods
were much higher than afterwards, i.e., a probation period effect occurred.
AHW2003 studied a proposer-responder game that started with a proposer of-
fering some amount of money to a responder under one restriction: The offers had
to amount to at least a sixth of the total amount of money.
In one treatment, the responder could only accept this offer (as in a dictator
game), whereas in three other treatments he could either sanction, reward, or sanc-
tion and reward the proposer.11 This resembles our experiment when interpreting
the proposer’s offer in AHW2003 as our agent’s effort choices. Amongst other
things, AHW2003 found that proposers offered more than the minimum amount
even if no sanctions were admissible. The availability of sanctions increased the
offers. This increase came at a cost, however, since sanctions were frequently used.
Rewards were more successful in increasing effort levels on an aggregate level.
10Ichino and Riphahn (2005) use absenteeism time as a proxy for effort in an empirical study
and find similar results.
11AHW2003 named these options “stick”, “carrot” and “carrot/stick”.
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According to the experimental work on sanctions and rewards,12 we should expect
effort levels to be above the minimum in our experiment, even in the treatment
without sanctions. The proposed explanations include intrinsic motivation, social
welfare preferences, or fairness considerations (see Andreoni (1995), Charness and
Rabin (2002), Frey and Osterloh (2002)).
Hypothesis 1: In all treatments, agents spend more than the minimum effort.
According to FHM2008, rewards have a positive impact on effort levels in their
EPL game, especially for the treatments with weak EPL. We combine this with the
results of AHW2003 who found that the availability of sanctions also increases co-
operation. Thus, we expect effort levels to be higher if principals may use sanctions,
compared to the treatments without sanctions with the same degree of EPL.
According to FHM2008, introducing weak EPL instead of no EPL without access
to rewards leads to decreased effort levels in their experiment, while this effect
almost completely disappears in treatments with rewards. The same holds for the
probation period effect: It is strong in the treatment with weak EPL and without
rewards, but is offset in the treatment with rewards. When transferring this to our
setting, the gradual weakening of the principal’s strategic position from no EPL
over weak EPL to strict EPL can be expected to decrease effort levels, while this
effect may be weaker in treatments tI - tIII in which sanctions are possible.
Hypothesis 2: a) Effort levels are higher if principals may use sanctions, compared
to the treatments without sanctions with the same degree of EPL.
b) In treatments without sanctions, the average effort levels are lower, the tighter
the EPL. The availability of sanctions lowers this effect.
c) Probation period effects occur in treatments with weak EPL. The availability
of sanctions lowers this effect.
AHW2003 and FHM2008 find that rewards or sanctions are used quite frequently,
even though they are costly. Other experimental evidence supports this (see, e.g.,
Fehr and Gächter (2002), Kirstein (2008)). Fairness and reciprocity preferences can
be the rationale for such behavior (see, e.g., Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). Within a treatment, principals should
12See Fehr and Schmidt (2007) or Kirstein (2008).
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use more severe sanctions when suspecting that the effort spent by their agent was
rather low. This would be in line with AHW2003 and FHM2008 (however, in their
experiments effort is observable). In our model and experiment, the principals can-
not observe effort, but output and average output. Thus, it is likely that they use
output deviation, defined as the own output minus the average output, as basis for
their decisions.
Hypothesis 3: Costly sanctions are frequently used by principals. Within a treat-
ment, the smaller the output deviation, the more severe the sanctions.
The empirical findings of Wasmer (2006) suggest that sanctions are used more
frequently (or more severely) the tighter the employment protection legislation is,
whereas FHM2008 only analyzed rewards and AHW2003 did not analyze employ-
ment protection.
On the question whether firings and sanctions in our experiments are used as
substitutes or complements, we hypothesize them to be substitutes. This means
that employers should use (costless) firings as a disciplinary device instead of costly
sanctions when both are available. Therefore, sanctions should be lower in those
treatments that in the treatments in which firings are not admissible. This seems
an intuitive interpretation of the findings by Wasmer (2006).
Hypothesis 4: Sanctions occur more often (or are higher) the tighter the EPL is.
Firings are used instead of sanctions when both are admissible.
3.5 Experimental results
At first, we will give some general results dealing with hiring behavior, match
lengths and the benchmark predictions (Section 3.5.1) and then discuss effort lev-
els (Section 3.5.2). This is necessary to fully understand the results on sanctions,
extensively presented in Section 3.5.3. Finally, Section 3.5.4 briefly discusses re-
sulting payoffs.
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3.5.1 General results
Agents virtually always try to be hired. In each treatment, up to 240 agents have
to decide if they want to be employed or not.13 The relative frequencies of applying
agents ranges between 99.2 % and 100 %. The vast majority of employers also
wants to employ, but they are a little more reluctant to hire for tighter EPL. With
sanctions available, the concrete relative frequencies are 99.4 % with no EPL (tI),
96.3 % with weak EPL (tII), and 94.4 % with strict EPL (tIII). Values are almost
equal without sanctions: 99.3 % in tIV, 98.1 % in tV, and 93.8 % in tVI. Overall
these results largely confirm that our setting almost induced maximum employment
as expected.
Let us now describe labor fluctuation. For this reason we first count the cases
in which an employer does not hire the same worker in period t+ 1 as in t (either
because she fires the worker, she switches from hiring to non-hiring or vice versa,
or the worker quits). Then, we relate the number of this cases to the hypothetical
maximum, i.e, the situation in which all employers never hire the same worker in
two consecutive periods. This gives us a measure of labor fluctuation. It tells us
that labor fluctuation is higher in treatments with weak EPL (31.9 % in tII and
49.3 % in tV, respectively) than in those with no EPL (16.0 % in tI and 27.0 %
in tIV). Since principals cannot fire in weak EPL when re-hiring the same worker
only once, this is not surprising. Of course, in treatments with strict EPL labor
fluctuation is very low (6.9 % in tIII and 4.2 % in tVI).
From now on, we will count each match between an employer and a worker
as one independent observation regardless of the total duration of this match, if
not explicitly mentioned otherwise. This means we use, for example, the average
effort spent in a match as one independent observation. Table 3.3 summarizes
the number of independent matches and average match lengths, i.e., the average
number of periods a match lasted, for all treatments. In the last columns of Table
3.3, we additionally distinguish between short- and long-term matches. We speak
of a short-term match, if the match lasts for exactly one period and of a long-term
match else. Each match is either short- or long-term. The distinction between
13In treatment IV, we have a fewer number of subjects (see Section 3.3). Thus, agents have to
decide only 210 times. We will not always indicate similar cases in footnotes below.
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short- and long-term matches is important since it divides matches in the weak
EPL treatments into those with similar overall restrictions as in no EPL (short),
and those where firing after the first matching period is not allowed anymore (long),
i.e., that are comparable to strict EPL. It also allows us to investigate probation
period effects and sanctioning behavior more thoroughly.
numb. Avg. mat. Short, freq. Long, freq.
treatm. of obs. length abs. rel. abs. rel.
I 38 4.18 15 39.5 % 23 60.5 %
II 59 2.61 43 72.9 % 16 27.1 %
III 22 6.86 2 9.1 % 20 90.9 %
IV 47 2.96 26 55.3 % 21 44.7 %
V 85 1.85 76 89.4 % 9 10.6 %
VI 17 8.82 0 .0 % 17 100.0 %
Table 3.3: Match lengths, all treatments
Due to the high labor fluctuation, match length is lowest for treatments with
weak EPL and highest for strict EPL. Sanctions increase match length for no EPL
and weak EPL, but not for strict EPL.14 In treatments with strict EPL, natu-
rally almost all matches are long-term, with and without sanctions available. The
fact that more matches are long-term in no EPL than in weak EPL suggests that
principals are more reluctant to enter long-term matches in weak EPL due to the
weakening of their strategic position (see also Section 3.5.2). For both of the latter
degrees of EPL, the availability of sanctions increases the frequency of long-term
matches, which is the intuitive result. We performed Fisher’s Exact tests and χ2-
tests to check whether the differences in frequencies of long- and short-term matches
between the treatments with the same degree of EPL are significant. The results
show that only the difference between tII and tV is significant.15
As described above, workers always want to be employed and employers most
14This is mainly due to the fact that 6 out of 22 matches in tIII are ended by a quitting agent,
while only 1 agent does this in tVI (see the following Subsection 3.5.3.2).
15As discussed before, it is still controversial whether to use a) Fisher’s Exact tests, b) standard
χ2-tests or c) χ2-tests with Yates-correction. In the following we give p-values for all of them in
the form ’a)/b)/c)’. Treatments tI vs. tIV: p = .191/.191/.217; tII vs. tV: p = .014/.014/.019;
tIII vs. tVI: p = .495/.495/.586.
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often want to hire which largely confirms these parts of the benchmark hypotheses.
This is not true for effort, output, sanctions, principals’ earnings, and agents’ pay-
offs. Using each match as one independent observation again, all relevant tests
against the benchmark predictions, except one, are significantly different with
p < .010.16 In particular, effort and output are always higher than predicted in
all treatments and average sanctions exceed the prediction of 0 in tI, tII, and tIII.
This consequentially lets principals always earn more than predicted and agents
less. The effort levels already confirm Hypothesis 1 of our behavioral hypotheses
that demands the exact opposite as the benchmark hypothesis.
Result 1: Except for principals’ hiring behavior and agents’ employment behavior,
the benchmark predictions are refuted.
3.5.2 Effort levels
In each period of our experiment, groups are inevitably in different matching pe-
riods, i.e., they have just started their contract, are already matched for 3 or 4
periods, for example, or are in the last matching periods. Simply giving period av-
erages would thus only be of limited importance, since results for different matching
periods (i.e., different stages of a labor relationship) would be mixed. To avoid this
problem, we distinguish between matching periods in the following instead, and
thereby tolerate that the number of observations becomes lower for higher match-
ing periods. For tI, e.g., there are 38 obs. for matching period 1 (mp1), 14 for mp5,
and only 5 for mp10. This means we sometimes have only a few observations in
mp10, but at least 17 in mp1, and at least 67 in the broad category subsuming
matching periods 2 to 9 (mp2-9).17 We thus mainly concentrate on mp1 and mp2-9
when discussing descriptive results below.
Table 3.4 gives the averages of efforts in total and for mp1, mp2-9, and mp10,
and the averages for sanctions already.
We will first focus on effort averages on aggregate level given in the second column
of Table 3.4. For both cases (sanctions available or not) efforts decrease the tighter
16The minor exception is in tII where principals’ earnings are only slightly non-significantly
higher than predicted (one sample t test p = .051). All other data on request.
17With the exception of tII (in which there are 10 observations in mp8, but only 4 in mp9 and
3 in mp10), we have at least 5 observations in mp10 in all treatments.
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Avg. effort in Avg. sanction in
matching period(s) matching period(s)
treatm. 1-10 1 2-9 10 1-10 1 2-9 10
I 3.37 3.26 3.41 3.20 .25 .49 .18 .00
II 2.92 2.93 2.90 3.00 .38 .40 .37 .40
III 2.80 3.00 2.87 1.50 .29 .28 .30 .24
IV 3.30 3.21 3.44 2.00 – – – –
V 2.02 2.51 1.48 1.00 – – – –
VI 1.70 2.47 1.58 1.83 – – – –
Table 3.4: Average efforts and sanctions, matching periods
the EPL becomes, which is not surprising considering the gradual weakening of the
principals’ strategic position. However, the decrease from weak EPL to strict EPL
is rather small in both cases and the difference between average efforts in sanction
treatments tI and tIII (3.37 - 2.80 = .57) is much smaller than the difference in tIV
and tVI in which sanctions are not admissible (3.30 - 1.70 = 1.60). This means
that the negative effect on effort levels from tighter EPL is less pronounced when
sanctions as an additional disciplining option are available.
When comparing treatments with the same EPL regime, it is apparent that
adding sanctions increases efforts. This effect is rather large when firing is not
allowed at all (efforts in treatments with strict EPL are 2.80 and 1.70, respectively)
or with weak EPL (averages are 2.92 and 2.02), but only marginal when firing is
another option, i.e., in treatments with no EPL (averages are 3.37 and 3.30).
Since visual inspection gives reason to believe that the data is not normally dis-
tributed, we perform a two-way ANOVA on ranks for effort averages distinguishing
between the degree of EPL on the one hand, and sanction availability on the other
hand (using each match as one independent observation, again). It confirms our re-
sults summarized above: There is no interaction effect between EPL and sanctions,
but both main effects are significant18, i.e, sanctions and the degree of employment
protection can be regarded as two separate factors that both significantly affect
effort levels. Standard multiple comparison algorithms then tell us that, indeed, no
18The p-values for the two-way ANOVA on ranks are: interaction effect: p = .366; main effect
of EPL: p = .002; main effect of sanctions: p = .004
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EPL as a separate factor differs from weak EPL and strict EPL, but weak EPL and
strict EPL do not.19 Since the two-way ANOVA on ranks is sometimes criticized
(see, e.g., Toothaker and Newman (1994)), we additionally perform two one-way
non-parametric equivalents of the ANOVA, this means two Kruskal-Wallis tests
with the multiple comparison algorithm introduced by Steel, Dwass, Critchlow,
and Fligner (see, e.g., Critchlow and Fligner (1991)). They tell us that efforts are
not statistically different in tI-III, but do differ in tIV-VI in the same way as before:
efforts in tIV are higher than those in tV and tVI.20
Finally, we perform one-sided two sample tests between the treatments with the
same degree of EPL.21 We use Welch-Satterthwaite t tests (WS tests) for samples
large enough, and Mann-Whitney U-tests and robust rank-order tests (U-tests (rro
tests)) for treatments tIII and tVI in which visual inspection indicates that distri-
butions are skewed differently. The test results confirm the descriptive impressions:
efforts in tI and tIV do not differ significantly, while those in tII and tV as well as
in tIII and tVI, respectively, do.22
In summary, all these results strongly confirm Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Result 2: With and without sanctions, efforts decrease the tighter the EPL is.
This trend is stronger when sanctions are not available. Sanctions largely increase
effort when comparing the two treatments with weak EPL or the two treatments
with strict EPL. There is almost no increasing effect of sanctions when firings are
allowed (no EPL-treatments).
Figure 3.1 further details the results for all six treatments. In this figure, treat-
ments are visually distinguishable by two factors: the sanction availability is indi-
cated by lines (solid lines for tI-III, dashed lines for tIV-tVI), while the degree of
EPL is depicted by filled and unfilled symbols (diamonds for tI and tIV with no
EPL, triangles for tII and tV with weak EPL and circles for tIII and tVI).
19Results for Bonferroni (Tamhane) are: no EPL vs. weak EPL: p = .011(.008); no EPL vs.
strict EPL: p = .006(.001); weak EPL vs. strict EPL: p = .807(.514)
20Kruskal-Wallis for tI-tIII: p = .240 – Kruskal Wallis for tIV-VI: p = .002; multiple
comparisons with Steel, Dwass, Critchlow, Fligner: tIV vs. tV: p ≈ .025; tIV vs. tVI:
p < .001; tV vs. tVI: p > .200.
21The respective hypothesis is also explicitly one-sided
22WS tests : tI vs. tIV: p = .233; tII vs. tV, p = .014; U-test (rro test): tIII vs. tVI,
p = .006(< .001).
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Figure 3.1: Effort choices, matching periods
First of all, notice that Figure 3.1 again confirms that efforts are larger than
the minimum, except for mp9 and mp10 in tV. In the first matching period, a)
efforts are similar in tI and tIV (3.26 and 3.21), b) a little higher in those two
than in tII and tIII, which are also quite similar (2.93 and 3.00), and c) somewhat
lower in tV and tVI than in all other treatments (2.51 and 2.47). This ordering
stays the same during mp2-9, but while efforts hardly change in tI-IV, they quite
sharply decrease in tV and tVI (see also Table 3.4). Endgame effects in mp10
only occur for tII, tIV and tV, which might be of less importance due to the small
number of observations.23 Overall, when mainly focusing on mp1-9, these findings
confirm the results discussed above and, additionally, give reason to believe that the
expected probation period effect as formulated in Hypothesis 2c exists for tV. We
will elaborate on this in the following paragraphs. They also indicate a surprisingly
23In fact, when analyzing periods instead, large endgame effects are clearly visible for all treat-
ments, except tVI where efforts are lowest already. Figures on request.
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sharp decrease in effort levels after mp1 for tVI, which kind of puzzles us. Maybe
participants feel a little honored by being (randomly) chosen to work, while others
have to be unemployed and thus spend more effort in mp1, but quickly forget this
gratitude when realizing their strong strategic position.
Let us now distinguish between short- and long-term matches. In Figure 3.2 long-
term average efforts are represented by lines as before, but only for mp1, mp10 and
the broad category of mp2-9, since this suffices here. We additionally give the
averages in short-term matches, i.e., in matches that ended after one matching
period, by short horizontal lines in this figure, but restrict this information to tI,
tII, tIV, and tV, since in the two treatments with strict EPL almost all (tIII) or
all matches (tVI) are long-term. The specific short-term averages are e = 3.00 for
tI, e = 2.86 for tII, e = 2.58 for tIV, and e = 2.42 for tV.
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Figure 3.2: Effort choices, long- and short-term matches
When disregarding mp10 due to the few number of cases, there are mainly two
insights delivered by Figure 3.2. Firstly, for the sanctions treatments tI-III, average
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efforts in long-term matches do not change that much and are (a little) higher
than those in their short-term counterparts, but, there are quite sharp decreases
in average efforts in the treatments tIV-VI in which sanctions are not available.
Secondly, as expected, the decrease is highest for tV (from about 3.2 to about 1.4),
where the long-term average effort in mp1, indeed, lies above the short-term average
(of about 2.4), but this order changes in mp2-9, although now we are comparing
different matching periods. On the contrary, efforts in tII decrease only a little
from about 3.15 to about 2.90. We perform dependent sample tests comparing the
averages in mp1 to those in mp2-x, where x stands for the last matching period
of the long-term match, for all treatments, mainly to test whether the probation
period effect for tV just reported is significant. Indeed, all (modest) decreases are
significant, except for the one in tII.24 This partly confirms Hypothesis 2c. We
conclude:
Result 3: Efforts decrease in long-term matches after the first matching period,
but with sanctions available the magnitudes of these effects are negligible. There is
a strong probation period effect in tV.
3.5.3 Sanctions
Table 3.5 details sanction frequencies, distinguishing between those matches in
which principals sanction at least once and those in which they do not.
How often do principals sanction?
Never At least once
treatm. abs. freq. rel. freq. abs. freq. rel. frq. sum
I 9 23.7 % 29 76.3 % 38
II 21 35.6 % 38 64.4 % 59
III 2 9.1 % 20 90.9 % 22
Table 3.5: Sanction frequencies
In all three sanction treatments, we observe many more principals who sanction
24We generally performed two-sided Wilcoxon paired sample tests, since we did not expect pro-
bation period effects for all treatments. Results are: tI: p = .029; tII: p = .196; tIII: p = .048;
tIV: p < .001; tV: p = .016; tVI: p = .005.
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at least once than principals who never sanction. Most never-sanctioning principals
can be found in tII (35.6 %), followed by tI (23.7 %) and tIII (9.1 %). Obviously,
sanctions are used by more principals than the zero prediction of the benchmark
model, even though they are costly. Consequentially, binomial tests refute the
hypothesis that no principal sanctions at least once for all three treatments with
p < .001. The first part of Hypothesis 3 is thus confirmed.
Result 4: Sanctions are frequently used by principals in tI, tII and tIII.
Furthermore, Fisher’s Exact tests and χ2-tests comparing each of the two treat-
ments with sanctions with regard to their frequency of never-sanctioning principals,
tell us that the differences between tI and tII as well as tI and tIII, respectively, are
not significant, but those for tII and tIII are.25 This means that the frequency of
principals who sanction does not continually increase the tighter the EPL becomes,
which partly rejects Hypothesis 4.
Figure 3.3 and the previously-introduced Table 3.4 give sanction averages for
treatments I-III, distinguishing between mp1, mp2-9 and mp10. In this figure,
lines are differently dashed than before for reasons of visual differentiation.
The most immediate result suggested by Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 is that on
aggregate level, i.e., for all matching periods, average sanctions are indeed larger
in tII with weak EPL (s = .38) than in tI with less tight EPL (s = .25), but
this trend does not continue to strict EPL. In particular, average sanctions there
decrease again to s = .29. Overall, sanction differences are not very large and
the Kruskal-Wallis test for differences in sanction averages in tI-III is insignificant
with p = .915. These aggregate results do not suggest that sanctions consistently
increase the tighter the EPL becomes.
However, distinguishing between matching periods reveals several interesting de-
tails. The sanction ordering in the first matching period follows the exact opposite
pattern than expected: Average sanctions in mp1 are highest in tI (s = .49) and
(a little) lower in tII (s = .40) and tIII (s = .28). Differences are not significant
again.26 The order changes in later matching periods, almost exclusively because
sanctions sharply decrease in tI to s = .18 in mp2-9 and s = .00 in mp10. Changes
25The p-values are given in the same form as in footnote 15. Treatments tI vs. tII: p =
.264/.264/.311; tI vs. tIII: p = .189/.189/.288; tII vs. tIII: p = .025/.025/.038.
26The p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test restricted to mp1 is p = .549.
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Figure 3.3: Sanctions, matching periods
are negligible for tII and tIII, which means that sanction averages in mp2-10 are
highest in tII, followed by tIII and tI. Since we have only 3 observations in mp10
of tII, we limit ourselves to discuss mp1-9 from now on.
Let us take a deeper look at the crucial role the weak EPL treatment tII plays in
understanding what happens during our experiment. In the first matching period,
no EPL and weak EPL factually induce the same degree of employment protection.
By contrast, in mp2-9 the EPL rules in weak EPL are the same as those in strict
EPL. We denote the sanction s in matching period(s) mp of treatment t with st,mp
now. When detailing our aggregate hypothesis that average sanctions increase the
tighter the EPL becomes, to single matching periods, it thus seems intuitive to
expect (O1) stIII,m1 > stII,m1 ≈ stI,m1 to hold in mp1, while in mp2-9 we should
expect (O2) stIII,m2−9 ≈ stII,m2−9 > stI,m2−9. In fact, our results for (O2) at
least follow the expected order, since we observe similar sanctions for tII and tIII
(stII,m2−9 = .37 and stIII,m2−9 = .30) that are a little higher than those in tI
(stI,m2−9 = .18). However, (O1) is clearly violated since, indeed, average sanctions
are quite similar in tI and tII (stI,m1 = .49 and stII,m1 = .40) as expected, but
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instead of being lower than those in strict EPL, they are higher (stIII,m1 = .28).
We will now present further analyses investigating this puzzle, but for the time
being let us shortly summarize the refusal of Hypothesis 4.
Result 5: Differences in average sanctions are rather small. Average sanctions are
largest in tII with weak EPL, followed by tIII with strict EPL and tI with no EPL.
Sanctions are frequently used in all treatments. Sanction frequencies are largest in
tIII, but do hardly differ between tI and tII.
Distinguishing between averages for short- and long-term matches gives an im-
portant hint why sanctions in mp1 might be higher for tI and tII than expected.
Figure 3.4 is constructed analog to the previous Figure 3.2 that detailed average
efforts in short- and long-term matches. Short-term averages are again given af-
ter short horizontal lines and tIII is left out, since there almost all matches are
long-term. The short-term averages are s = .69 for tI and s = .51 for tII.
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Figure 3.4: Sanctions, long- and short-term matches
Long-term match averages are almost the same as on aggregate level (i.e., for the
sum of all matches, short or long-term), with the exception that in mp1 sanctions
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in tII are quite low. Wilcoxon paired sample tests comparing the sanction average
in mp1 with that of mp2-x tell us that only the increase in average sanctions in tII
is significant, which probably is the reason for the relatively mild probation period
effect in tII discussed above.27
Much more illuminative are the differences between long-term and short-term
sanctions in mp1: Here, sanctions in long-term matches of tI are only about half as
high as in their short-term counterparts (s = .37 and s = .69), while this trend is
even more pronounced for tII (s = .09 and s = .51). Mann-Whitney U-tests tell us
that the difference in tI is insignificant on the 10%-level (p = .135), but significant
for tII (p = .006). By definition short-term averages are those of matches that end
after the first period. As will be shown below, most of these endings are caused
by the principal firing his employer. Knowing this, our interpretation of the results
given by Wasmer (2006) that firings and sanctions serve as substitutes is refuted by
our findings. Instead, it seems as if the principals who fire their agents (short-term
matches) additionally sanction them, i.e., there is reason to believe that sanctions
and firings are used as complements.
A loosely comparable result has been discussed in experimental literature: In
a setting in which costly sanctions and indirect reciprocity could have been used
concurrently, Rockenbach and Milinski (2006), to their own surprise, found them
both to be used simultaneously.
Now, we further investigate the relation between firings and sanctions in our
experiment by moving our attention to firing behavior.
3.5.3.1 Firing behavior
Note that in tIII and tVI there cannot be firings by definition, in p10 of all treat-
ments, firings are meaningless and thus not allowed by our software, and in tII and
tV, principals are only allowed to fire during the first matching period. Thus, the
following Table 3.6 gives matching period averages only for observations from peri-
ods 1-9 in which firings are de facto allowed, divided into those without firing and
with firing. This Table treats each matching period as one observation (henceforth,
’mp-rule’ ) which has the disadvantage that these observations are not independent
27The p-values are: tI: p = .852; tII: p = .002; tIII: p = .092.
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from each other. This means that we can give descriptive statistics, but cannot al-
ways perform tests. This leaves the question why we do not stick to the ’one match
= one observation’-rule (’one match-rule’ ) we used before that does not have this
disadvantage.
Let us answer this with an example: Suppose a principal in tI fires her worker in
matching period 7 of a match and thus decided against firing in mp1-6. When using
the ’one match-rule’, we would nevertheless count all these 7 single observations –
that are likely to differ a lot in effort decisions etc. – as one observation with firing.
Instead, we categorize each matching period either as one with firing or without,
implicitly assuming that this last matching period in which the principal fires is the
principal’s most important stimulus for the firing decision. If one instead thinks
that the average of efforts, outputs etc. is relevant for the firing decision, one should
use the ’one match-rule’. We will also give results for the ’one match-rule’ below.
They do not qualitatively differ from those with the ’mp-rule’.
treatm. I treatm. II treatm. IV treatm. V
P fires? no yes no yes no yes no yes
# of obs. 129 14 16 40 92 34 9 69
Effort 3.50 3.07 3.12 2.85 3.70 2.91 3.22 2.55
Output 3.71 2.79 4.06 2.95 4.27 2.82 3.11 3.36
Sanctions .24 .61 .09 .48 – – – –
Earnings (P) 18.32 13.31 20.21 14.28 21.36 14.12 15.56 16.81
Payoffs (A) 10.03 9.25 10.67 9.69 10.67 11.15 10.92 11.17
Outp. dev. .05 -.42 .48 -.35 .26 -.70 .06 .20
Table 3.6: Efforts, Outputs, Sanctions, and Earnings, with and without firing
The high labor fluctuation in treatments with weak EPL described above imme-
diately follows from the number of observations given in the third row of Table 3.6.
While in tI and tIV principals most often hire the same agent in consecutive periods
(tI: 129 out of 143 times, i.e., in 90.2 % of cases, treatIV: 73.0 %), principals in
tII and tV most often fire (frequencies, calculated as before, are: tII: 28.6 %, tV:
11.5 %). As expected, efforts are lower in matching periods in which the principals
eventually fired their agents.28
28Except for sanctions the other results of this table are discussed in later sections.
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Averages for sanctions confirm our intermediate findings that sanctions are rather
used as complements than as substitutes. In periods of tI in which the principal
fires his agent, average sanctions are s = .61, compared to only s = .24 where she
hires him again. For tII the difference is even more striking: s = .48 for firing and
s = .09 for re-hiring principals. Overall, principals sanction agents more severely
in the periods they also fire them. As discussed above using the ’mp-rule’ not
always allows for statistical testing, since for tI, for example, the sanction averages
in matching periods in which the principals fire, are not independent from those in
which they do not fire. For weak EPL, this problem does not occur; here, principals
have to fire in the first matching period and we can compare averages in this first
matching period with the averages in the first matching period of matches in which
principals do not fire. The difference in average sanctions is highly significant
between firing and non-firing matching periods of tII (U-test: p = .008).
The sanction averages just discussed give reason to believe that sanction severe-
ness is lower in matching periods in which the principal fires when using the ’mp-
rule’. From now on, we use the ’one match-rule’ again, if not explicitly mentioned
otherwise. Table 3.7 categorize each match in either one that ends with the princi-
pal firing the agent or not. It also further distinguishes the fractions of principals
who never sanction and those sanctioning at least once initially given in Table 3.5
to matches with and without firing.29
How often do principals sanction?
Never At least once
treatm./fired? abs. freq. rel. freq. abs. freq. rel. frq. sum
I yes 5 35.7 % 9 64.3 % 14
I no 3 13.6 % 19 86.4 % 22
II yes 19 47.5 % 21 52.5 % 40
II no 3 18.8 % 13 81.2 % 16
Table 3.7: Sanction frequency, with and without firing
In most of the matches without firing, principals choose to sanction at least once
29We exclude the two (tI) respectively three matches (tII) that start in period 10, since these
are the only ones in which the principals could never fire.
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(86.4 % in tI and 81.2 % in tII), but the majority also does this in matches that
end with a firing, although the relative frequencies are a little lower this time (64.3
% in tI and 52.5 % in tII). The high percentages of principals that sanction and
fire, again, suggest that sanctions and firings are both used simultaneously. With
Table 3.7 alone, one might argue that maybe principals in tI first used sanctions as
a disciplinary device and then, in the last matching period, completely substituted
them by firings, but the data presented in Table 3.6 doubted this possibility. Further
confirmation comes from looking at the descriptive data of the long-term matches
in tI that end with firings. In those 6 long-term matches the sanction average in all
matching periods except for the last one is s = .49, while it even increases in the
last matching period to s = .75, i.e., principals in long-term matches sanctioned
their agents even harder in the last matching period in which they also fired them.
This clearly does not indicate the substitutive use of sanctions and firings, even
though the difference is insignificant.30
Similar conclusions follow for sanction averages on match level within the same
treatment: In tI (tII) the average sanction of the 22 (16) matches without firing is
s = .48 (s = .39), but even higher instead of lower with firing: s = .53 (s = .48).
Finally, Table 3.8 allows us to discuss yet another aspect of the relationship
of firings and sanctions. Here, it is distinguished between four average sanction
categories (no sanctions (zero), small, medium and high sanctions) and firings.
Average sanctions, s
zero small medium high
treatm./fired? s = 0 0 < s < .5 .5 ≤ s < 1 1 ≤ s ≤ 2 sum
I yes 5
(35.7%)
1
(7.1%)
3
(21.4%)
5
(35.7%)
14
I no 2
(9.1%)
12
(54.5%)
4
(18.2%)
4
(18.2%)
22
II yes 19
(47.5%)
6
(15.0%)
4
(10.0%)
11
(27.5%)
40
II no 1
(6.3%)
8
(50.0%)
5
(31.3%)
2
(12.5%)
16
Table 3.8: Sanction severeness categories, with and without firing
30Two-sided Wilcoxon paired sample test: p = .875.
86
3 Employment protection and bullying
While for firing principals, sanctions are rather bi-modal in the extreme categories
(s = 0 and 1 ≤ s ≤ 2), i.e., principals either sanction hard or not at all, they
roughly resemble right-skewed normal distributions for non-firing principals. Here,
the large majorities sanction moderately. There is some evidence that frequencies
differ significantly.31 This may be seen as a hint that some principals use firings
and sanctions as substitutes, but others as complements.
Possible reasons for such behavior can, of course, only be speculative. In a neu-
roeconomical study de Quervain et al. (2004), analyzed whether activations in the
dorsal striatum are an indicator of sanctioning behavior in a trust game. Sanc-
tioning other participants incurred factual costs for the sanctioner and thus likely
negative utility. Nevertheless, de Quervain et al. (2004) found that participants
used sanctions. The authors also reported that participants with stronger acti-
vations sanctioned harder. They argued that the activation levels reflected antici-
pated positive utility from sanctioning that might outweigh the costs of sanctioning.
Transferred to our case this might be interpreted in a way that some of our partici-
pants are satisfied with the costless firing while others needed the additional costly
sanctioning.
Result 6: There is evidence that at least a large fraction of principals uses sanctions
as a complement to firings, rather than as substitutes.
3.5.3.2 Quitting agents
Due to the labor supply excess and the fact that at first principals decide whether
to fire or not, we do not expect that as many matches are ended by workers who
quit as by employers who fire – except for treatment tIII in which firings are not
allowed. Hereafter, we use “to quit” and “to resign” synonymously.
Since agents cannot quit in the last period of the experiment, the following figures
and tables exclude these data.32 Table 3.9 gives absolute (and relative) frequencies
of matches that end with firings by principals, and matches that end after the agent
31According to Cramér’s V (or standard contingency coefficients) sanction frequencies for firing
and non-firing principals differ in both treatments: tI: p = .022(.022); tII: p = .001(.001).
However, expected cell frequencies are smaller than 5 in 3 out of 8 cells, which is often cited
as an heuristic for the applicability of the above-mentioned tests.
32To resign from the job would be meaningless here, because the experiment ends after p10.
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quits. In the last two rows, the sanctions averages for matches the agent ended by
quitting and all other matches are given. Consequentially, we limit ourselves here
to the sanction treatments.
Treatment
I II III
tot. numb. o. matches 36 56 22
tot. numb. o. firings (f) 14
(38.9%)
40
(71.4%)
0
(.0%)
tot. numb. o. quitting agents (q) 8
(22.2%)
3
(5.4%)
6
(27.3%)
avg. sanc., not ended by q .34 .44 .27
avg. sanc., ended by q 1.04 .58 .74
Table 3.9: Frequencies of firing employers and quitting agents
As expected, agents do not quit as regularly as they are fired in tI (38.9 % matches
end with a firing, but only 22.2 % with a resignation) and especially in tII (71.4 %
and 5.4 %), but quite often in tIII (27.3 % resignations). Following the arguments
introduced by Wasmer (2006), we should observe the largest differences in average
sanctions between matches in which the agent does not quit eventually, and matches
in which he quits in tIII – or at least a much larger fraction of voluntary resigning
agents in tIII than in all other treatments. In fact, the differences are rather large
in tIII: agents who do not quit are only sanctioned with s = .27 on average, while
the others are sanctioned (bullied) more severely with s = .74. This difference is
significant despite the small sample sizes (U-test: p = .046). However, the difference
in average sanctions between matches in which the agents quit and those in which
they do not, is even larger for tI (s = .34 and s = 1.04, respectively) and again
significant (same test: p = .009). We additionally computed Cramér’s V for the
2x2-table that distinguishes between tI and tIII on the one hand, and matches that
end by an agent’s resignation and those without resignation on the other hand.
The differences are not significant according to this test (p = .756). This refutes
the hypothesis that sanctions are used differently in treatments tI and tIII (without
and with firing restrictions). Probably due to the small sample size, the sanction
differences in tII (s = .44 and s = .58) are not significant.
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Finally, we want to give the averages when again using each matching period as
one observation (’mp-rule’), since the reason why these descriptive results are inter-
esting is intuitively even more appealing this time: the most important sanctions
from the agent’s point of view are likely those in the matching period he quits. For
tI we have got 121 matching periods in which the agent does not resign and an
average sanction of s = .19 and 8 resignations with an average sanction of s = 1.09.
For tII and tIII, respectively, we observe s = .29 (95 obs.) and s = 1.17 (3 obs.) as
well as s = .26 (129 obs.) and s = 1.17 (6 obs.). Overall, these differences are larger
than those on match level, but tell a similar story: in tI (, tII) and tIII sanctions
are triggering voluntary resignations.
Result 7: Agents quit regularly in tI and tIII and not very often in tII. Agents who
quit are sanctioned more severely than those who do not quit.
3.5.3.3 Output, output deviations and correlations
We introduced uncertainty on behalf of the principal concerning the effort choices.
We did this because we think it makes EPL meaningful. Under perfect monitoring,
there would be little room for opportunistic behavior: for example, contracts could
be contingent on work effort and underachieving workers would probably not be
protected by employment protection laws.
In our model, higher effort induced higher expected output. In Table 3.6, using
the ’mp-rule’, we already gave output averages and output deviations, defined as
the difference between own and average output, for the treatments with firing op-
portunity using each matching period as one observation. It seems likely that both
variables are most important for the principal in the immediate period she fired.
The output averages mirror the effort choices in tI, II and IV, but are a little higher
in tV for the principals who do fire. This is probably due to the small sample size
of non-firing principals. The same holds for output deviations. They are positive
for non-firing principals, but negative for non-firing ones, except for treatment tV
in which they are about equal.
We now want to check the correlations between these results just presented for
outputs and the sanctioning by principals using the ’one match-rule’. We predicted
the sanctions to be more severe for smaller output deviations (Hypothesis 3 ). In
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fact, for tI and tII Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for the relationship of
sanctions and output deviation are negative (ρ = −.611 and ρ = −.421) and highly
significant (p < .001 and p = .001). This means that principals sanction the harder
the lower the own output in comparison to the average output is.
Similar results hold when using output or principals’ earnings instead.33 For tIII,
however, the correlation between output deviation and sanctions still has the same
sign, but is much lower (ρ = −.021) and becomes insignificant (p = .926). Again
this tendency holds for output and earnings.34
Result 8: Sanctions and output deviations are negatively correlated in tI and tII,
but not in tIII.
3.5.4 Payoffs
For the sake of completeness, let us finally just summarize the main results for
principals’ earnings, pi, and agents’ payoffs, ω. We will mainly limit ourselves to
the descriptive data for mp1-9 given in Table 3.10, and will just highlight the
important findings for the sub-groups of firing and non-firing principals (see Table
3.6).
Avg. earnings Avg. payoff
Principals Agents
matching period(s) matching period(s)
treatm. 1 2-9 10 1 2-9 10
I 16.61 18.78 22.00 9.46 10.25 10.80
II 15.87 17.29 12.93 9.87 10.04 9.97
III 17.90 17.43 19.26 10.24 10.26 11.11
IV 17.13 20.35 18.33 10.94 10.82 11.46
V 16.41 12.69 12.00 11.21 11.79 12.00
VI 16.47 15.95 15.42 11.31 11.77 11.63
Table 3.10: Average payoffs, matching periods
33Output: tI (tIV): ρ = −.795(−.497), p < .001(< .001); Principals’ earnings: tI (tIV):
ρ = −.844(−.656), p < .001(< .001)
34Output: ρ = −.185, p = .410; Earnings: ρ = −.284, p = .200
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Columns 2-4 of Table 3.10 detail the average of principals’ earnings in the first
matching period, in mp2-9, and mp10. While principals earned about the same in
mp1 in all six treatments, their earnings increase in the treatments with no EPL (tI
and tIV), stay about the same in the remaining treatments with sanctions (tII and
tIII) and (moderately) decrease else in mp2-9. As could be expected, earnings are
highest in the four treatments with firing and/or sanction opportunity now. Since
sanctions are used and costly, principals earn most in tIV with pi = 20.35, followed
by the only treatment with allowed firing (namely tI with pi = 18.78), and the two
other sanction treatments tII (pi = 17.29) and tIII (pi = 17.43). Earnings are a
little lower in tVI (pi = 15.95) and the large decrease in tV to pi = 12.69 is due to
the probation period effect that cannot be offset by sanctions here.
The distinction between firing and non-firing principals done in Table 3.6, using
the ’mp-rule’, shows us that firing principals in tI, tII, and tIV earn much less than
those that do not fire, while this is not the case in tV (probably since principals
most often fired here). For tII we can test this difference directly when restricting
attention to mp1, and it is significant.35 We again choose the indirect way with
dependent sample tests for long-term matches for tI and tIV using the ’one-match
rule’. Due to the small sample size, the large difference in tI (pi = 17.12 in the
periods before firing and only pi = 9.25 in the firing period) is slightly insignificant
unlike the even larger difference in tIV (pi = 22.82 and pi = 12.78).36
For agent payoffs, it suffices to summarize that a) on average, they are about the
same in the sanction treatments, a little higher in tIV and, of course, highest in
tV and VI (see Table 3.10); b) fired agents in tI and tII earn less than those not
fired (see Table 3.6) which, again, indicates that they are fired and sanctioned at
the same time (especially since fired agents save costs by spending less effort); and
c) this is not the case for fired agents in tIV and tV who, in fact, earn more in the
firing period than the non-fired ones.
35U-test (rro test): p = .001(< .001)
36Two-sided Wilcoxon paired sample tests: tI (6 obs.): p = .063; tIV (9 obs.): p = .004.
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3.6 Conclusion
The employment effects of employment protection legislation are the main focus
of most scientific works on this topic (see, e.g, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Garibaldi (1998)). Wasmer (2006) shifted atten-
tion to another interesting aspect of employment protection: the question whether
firms that are not allowed to fire due to a stricter degree of EPL react by replacing
the missing firing incentives by bullying their workers. In a theoretical model and
in an empirical analysis, using, amongst other things, the number of prescribed
anti-depressants as a proxy for bullying at the workplace, Wasmer (2006) found
such a relation between firings and bullying.
In our study, we tried to establish a more direct test of the interplay between em-
ployment protection legislation and bullying by designing a laboratory experiment
in which employers could costly sanction their employees. We interpreted the costly
sanctions as bullying and thereby connected the work of Wasmer (2006) with the
experimental study on the relation between employment protection and rewards by
Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2008), and the existing literature on sanctions and
rewards (see, e.g., Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003)).
We found that 1) the possibility to sanction, ceteris paribus, increased effort levels
when comparing treatments with the same degree of EPL and 2) effort averages
were larger in treatments in which firings were not prohibited. This could have
been expected, since it is in accordance with the literature on sanctions and the
results of Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2008).
Surprisingly, we also found that 3) sanctions did not continually increase the
tighter the employment protection became and that, on the contrary, 4) average
sanctions were almost equally high in both extreme treatments: the treatments in
which firings were always allowed and always prohibited, respectively.
We presented evidence suggesting that this was probably due to the fact that
sanctions and firings were used as complements, rather than as substitutes in our
experiment – at least by a considerable fraction of principals. This result refuted
the hypothesis that bullying was primarily used to replace firing incentives, but
loosely resembled an insight discussed by Rockenbach and Milinski (2006).
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4.1 Introduction
Downsizing is often understood as laying off a large group of workers and has be-
come a synonym for, allegedly unfair, firing decisions in popular (science) literature.
More broadly, downsizing could refer to all situations where a subgroup of interact-
ing parties within an organization would have better success or survival prospects
than the whole group. Dramatic examples of lifeboats with too little water or food
for all can be found in novels and are hopefully more often fictional than factual.
One reaction to such challenges could be volunteers offering to be excluded. But
such hero volunteers are probably a rare species. What one realistically has to
expect are attempts of some parties to exclude others against their will. This does
not only invoke material aspects but also raises moral and emotional concerns not
only of those who suffer, e.g., by being excluded, but also of those who exclude
others.
One can hope to capture crucial aspects of firms’ downsizing decisions by em-
ploying rather abstract scenarios like ultimatum games, e.g., with one proposer and
several responders of whom some can be excluded (Fischer et al. (2008)). But then
questions like “Why can the proposer and some responders exclude other respon-
ders?” or “Why can the remaining players share more, and how is that related to
what all would receive?” naturally arise. These are less troublesome when consid-
ering situations of which downsizing is typical, namely a firm which tries to reduce
its labor force, although it is prospering.
This suggests a principal-agent setting and that the initiative for downsizing
naturally rests on the owners, respectively their delegates, e.g., CEOs. What can
be gained by downsizing is then implied by the economic, technological, and legal
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environment. A smaller labor force may avoid bankruptcy, resembling the example
of a lifeboat whose supplies do not suffice for all. Investigating such situations in
which either all suffer or some survive may yield important insights. But here we
focus on situations in which downsizing is not a matter of immediate necessity but
one of profitability. Such downsizing announcements regularly alert the public all
over the world (New York Times (2008)), e.g., in Germany in the recent past. In
January 2008, the mobile phone producer Nokia announced to shut down a factory
in Bochum, Germany, and lay off 4,300 full-time employees and temporary workers,
although internal accounting showed a profit of e 134 million.1 In February 2008,
the household products company Henkel and the automobile manufacturer BMW
announced layoffs of 3,000 and 8,100 workers, respectively, although their profits
had increased (to about e 1 billion and more than e 3.75 billion, respectively).
These firms justified downsizing by future risks due to the Global Economy (Henkel)
or simply by higher rentability aspirations (BMW).2
We want to study downsizing experimentally, although the external validity of
such experiments for life-altering payoffs might be criticized. We admit that real
layoffs might induce dramatic consequences that cannot be perfectly reproduced in
the lab, but are confident that behavioral aspects of layoffs can at least be revealed
in its main tendencies. More specifically, we experimentally examine the occurrence
and the behavioral effects of downsizing in a principal-agent setting where workers
chose effort levels. Our setting thus fundamentally differs from the ultimatum game
environment Fischer et al. (2008) use. We pick up the labor market institution of
minimum wages again that serves as a labor market rigidity to allow for profitable
downsizing. In a treatment in which a principal’s profit gain from downsizing his
labor force is positive, but rather small, we expect layoffs less often than in another
treatment in which this gain is rather large.
Other research questions we are going to answer are: Do game theoretic bench-
mark solutions predict contract offers and agents’ behavior?, Are there probation
period effects like in the employment protection experiment in Chapter 3?, and,
1Nokia executives stated that these internal numbers are due to accounting regularities and do
not represent the factual profitability of the factory at all (see FAZ (2008b)).
2See, e.g., FAZ (2008a), Handelsblatt (2008) or Frankfurter Rundschau (2008) for detailed
information concerning the downsizing announcements, profits, and reactions.
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Will there be differences between anticipated and unanticipated downsizing and, if
so, will they question the predicted profitability of downsizing?
The major finding we will report is that downsizing does not occur more regularly
in the treatments with larger theoretical and factual gains from firing than in the
other treatments. We are going to report some findings suggesting that this might
be caused by the fact that workers (intuitively) spend comparatively more effort
when firing incentives are high, especially when they know that employers are
allowed to fire them later on and during probation periods. Within a specific
treatment, the employer participants who downsize their labor force are those with
the lowest profits. Benchmark predictions deduced from a model with pure payoff-
maximizing players are shown to be rather useless. In particular, piece rate offers
are surprisingly low.
The specific firm model, which we analyze theoretically and have implemented
experimentally, is introduced in Section 4.2 together with its solution. Section 4.3
describes the experimental protocol and Section 4.4 discusses the hypotheses. After
analyzing the data in Section 4.5, the conclusion follows in Section 4.6.
4.2 The principal-agent model
 Model description: Principal P currently employs both, a highly productive
agent (agent h) with cost function, Ch(eh), of effort eh and a less productive one
(l) with cost function Cl(el). Both produce the same kind of output. The highly
productive agent has lower costs of effort, i.e., Ch(e) is smaller than Cl(e) for all
positive effort levels e. More specifically, we rely on quadratic effort cost functions
Ch(eh) =
k
2
e2h and Cl(el) =
d
2
e2l with 0 < k < d. Each unit of effort results in one
additional unit of output with the principal perfectly observing the agents’ types
and the amount of output produced.3
To allow for profit-increasing downsizing, we assume the labor market rigidity
3One can justify co-employment of more and less productive workers by new production tech-
niques which are more easily adopted by some, e.g., the younger workers, but this questions
the productivity of others who before were equally skilled. Many other principal-agent models
use the same or similar convex functions (see, e.g., Richter and Furubotn (2003)).
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of minimum wages and impose nondiscriminatory contract offers for all workers.4
Workers’ outside options like unemployment benefits are denoted by U and are
assumed smaller than the minimum fixed wage, M . The principal is a price taker
on the sales market with product price p. A linear employment contract specifies
the fixed wage F and the same piece rates, r, for all workers. The principal’s profit,
Π, then is
Π = (p− r)(eh + el)− 2 · F . (4.1)
Employees’ earnings, ω, are
ωh = F + reh − k
2
e2h and ωl = F + rel −
d
2
e2l (4.2)
for the highly productive agent h and the less productive agent l, respectively.
The game is played finitely often. In the first x stages, the principal employs both
agents; downsizing is impossible in these stages by assumption. Output is produced,
learned by all parties, and sold. Profits, efforts, and earnings are assumed to be
common knowledge. After the first x stages, the principal can lay off part of her
labor force, i.e., downsize. More specifically, the less productive agent may be
dismissed while the more productive agent remains in the firm. Although game
theoretically it does not matter whether players know ex ante that downsizing is
possible after x stages, behaviorally this might matter (see experimental design and
discussion). In the last y stages, output is produced by the agents still employed.
We now solve the downsizing game by backward induction.
 Effort decisions: From (4.2) one derives the agents’ optimal effort choices as
e∗h = r/k and e∗l = r/d for the highly and less productive agent, respectively.
Agents obviously want to be employed since M > U .5 Inserting the optimal
efforts into the principal’s profit function yields
Π = (p− r) · ( r
k
+
r
d
)− 2 · F . (4.3)
4Collective wage agreements or strict anti-discrimination laws justify these assumptions. We do
not model labor market competition (see Berninghaus et al. (2007, 2009)).
5To avoid further complexity, we refrain from giving agents the option to quit.
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 Contracts before downsizing: Denoting the contract offer before the down-
sizing decision by (F˜ , r˜), the principal maximizes (4.3) subject to the minimum
wage constraint (MWC1) F˜ ≥M , which is obviously binding in optimum.
The optimal piece rate and the resulting effort levels are r˜∗ = p/2, e∗h = p/(2k),
and e∗l = p/(2d).6 Both workers earn more than the outside option with the less
productive worker earning less than the highly productive one:
U < ω˜l = M +
p2
8d
< ω˜h = M +
p2
8k
due to k < d .
The principal’s profit,
Π˜ =
d+ k
4dk
p2 − 2 ·M ,
is positive for
M ≤ B1 := d+ k
8dk
p2 .
 Contracts after downsizing: After laying off the less productive worker, the
principal’s contract offer, denoted by (Fˆ , rˆ), maximizes
(p− rˆ) · rˆ
k
− Fˆ
subject to the minimum wage constraint (MWC2) Fˆ ≥ M . The optimal piece
rate and effort level are r˜∗ = p/2 and e∗h = p/(2k). Only the highly productive
worker earns more than the outside option:
ωˆl = U < ωˆh = M +
p2
8k
.
The principal’s profit,
Πˆ =
p2
4k
−M ,
is positive for M ≤ B2 with B2 := p2/(4k).
 Downsizing is profitable for the principal if
6Non-negativity constraints and second-order conditions are fulfilled.
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Πˆ− Π˜ > 0 or − p
2
4d
+M > 0 .
This holds true for d→∞ or, more generally, for M > B3 with B3 := p2/(4d).
It is easy to show that B3 < B1 < B2 always holds.7 Thus, to guarantee that profits
are nonnegative and downsizing is profitable, it suffices to impose B3 < M < B1 <
B2 for the minimum wage. By varying M between B1 and B3, the downsizing
profitability is influenced. We will do this for our experimental treatments.
4.3 Experimental design
 Basic Design: The experiment implemented the principal-agent model. In the
beginning, three participants interacted: one principal (P–participant), one highly
productive agent (H-participant), and one less productive agent (L-participant).
Eight such triplets of participants formed a session with altogether 24 participants.
We performed two sessions of each treatment.
The experiment consisted of x = 2 rounds without the possibility to downsize
and y = 2 rounds afterwards. We refer to these four rounds as first phase. During
the first phase, participants did not know that a perfect stranger repetition, i.e., a
repetition in which no participant meets the same participants again, of the same
four rounds (second phase) would be played afterwards. They were told, however,
that another experiment would follow and that they would definitively not interact
with the same participants again.
We distinguished between the following treatments: In the announced down-
sizing, high incentive–treatment (AH) all participants knew from the begin-
ning that after the first x = 2 rounds the principal could downsize and that two
more rounds would be played thereafter. Furthermore, the principal’s theoretical
profit gain from downsizing was rather large.
The only difference in the announced downsizing, low incentive–treatment
(AL) was that the profit increase from downsizing was rather small.
In the unannounced downsizing, high incentive–treatment (UH) partic-
ipants were not told ex ante that downsizing would be possible after two rounds,
7The distances between the boundaries increase with increasing d and vanish for d→ k.
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i.e., they played the first two rounds without a hint of the subsequent downsizing
opportunity. The hypothetical profit gain was the same as in AH. The first phase of
this experiment was used as a separate treatment while the data of the repetition
were pooled with treatment AH (see section 4.5). Since our predictions did not
concern the interaction of announcing downsizing and the size of incentives and
thus can be tested by these three treatments, the fourth one with unannounced
downsizing and low incentives has been neglected.
After the first phase, participants in treatments AH and AL were told that one
repetition of all four rounds of their corresponding treatment would be played
(in a perfect stranger design). We denote the first phase of treatment AH with
AH(1stphase), the second phase with AH(2ndphase), and so on. Since participants
in the UH–treatment would anyhow anticipate the downsizing opportunity in the
second phase, we also announced the downsizing option to them in UH(2ndphase).
 Treatment parameters: We constantly set d = 12, k = 2, U = 15, p = 24, in
experimental currency units (ECU).
In treatments AH and UH, we furthermore set M = 24. For the sake of
readability, we denote the timing (before (B) or after downsizing (A)) with an
index on the lower right and give indexes only if indispensable.
Game-theoretically, the optimal contracts before downsizing consist of FB = 24
and rB = 12 in both treatments. Optimal effort levels are e∗h = 6 for the highly
productive agent, h, and e∗l = 1 for the less productive one, l. Payoffs are ωl,B = 30
for worker l, ωh,B = 60 for worker h, and ΠB = 36 for the principal. The principal
should downsize and offer the same contract to the remaining agent. Payoffs are
then ωl,A = 15, ωh,A = 60, and ΠA = 48. Thus, principal P can hypothetically
increase the profit by about 33.3 %. Note that the principal’s absolute gain is
smaller than the less productive agent’s loss, and welfare defined as payoff sums
thus decreases even when assuming the unemployment benefit to be, miraculously,
cost neutral. Efficiency thus rules out downsizing and suggests that agents double
the effort levels to e+l = p/d and e
+
h = p/k, respectively.
8
In treatments AL, we set M = 16. The optimal contract before downsizing
8Here, our study also fundamentally differs from Fischer et al. (2008), where social welfare is
maximized with downsizing.
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consists of FB = 16 and, again, rB = 12. Optimal efforts are unaffected. Payoffs are
lower for the workers (ωl,B = 22 and ωh,B = 52) and higher for the principal (ΠB =
52) due to the lower minimum wage. Nevertheless, the principal should downsize
and offer the same contract to the highly productive agent, who invests the same
effort as before. Payoffs are then ωl,A = 15, ωh,A = 52, and ΠA = 56. This means
that principal P can increase the profit by about 7.7 %. Again, the agent’s loss
more than outweighs the principal’s profit increase so that conservatively estimated
welfare decreases.
We will refer to all of these results for treatments AH, UH, and AL as benchmark
predictions from now on.
 Miscellaneous: All participants received a fixed fee of FF = 90 ECU in each
of the two phases of the experiment. We split this amount into two parts, FF1 and
FF2 (45 ECU for rounds 1 and 2, 45 ECU for rounds 3 and 4), in the first phase of
the UH–treatment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree
(see Fischbacher (2007)).
Contract offers and effort choices were restricted to reasonable intervals.9 Fur-
thermore, employees were prohibited from choosing effort levels that would result
in negative round earnings for the given contract. Principals were asked to make
conjectures about the effort choices of their agents. Their contract offer in combina-
tion with these conjectures about effort choices was not allowed to imply negative
expected payoffs.10 These restrictions could be checked by participants with a cal-
culator integrated into the software. Each participant could use this device up to
two minutes each round to calculate all resulting payoffs from any combination of
F , r, ei, and ej.
Nevertheless principals’ earnings could be negative due to overestimated efforts.
The losses, if occurring, were subtracted from the other rounds’ earnings and the
fixed fee. We informed subjects that aggregate losses had to be paid out of pocket or
by administrative work (other experiments excluded participants whose aggregate
9Principals were restricted to fixed wage offers F with 24 ≤ F ≤ 40 in treatments AH and UH,
and 16 ≤ F ≤ 40 in AL. For piece-rate offers we demanded 0 ≤ r ≤ 20, for efforts 0 ≤ e ≤ 10.
One decimal point was allowed.
10Other experimental studies also use techniques to avoid financial suicide of participants (see,
e.g., Falk et al. (2008)).
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payoff approached zero, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (2007)). We stressed that this
was very unlikely to happen. In fact, only once a moderate overall loss did occur.
Representative instructions are given in Appendix A.3.
Two sessions of each treatment were played. Thus we employed 48 participants
per treatment and 144 participants altogether. They were recruited, using the
software ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). Before the experiment, participants had to an-
swer a few control questions (at their computer terminal) that checked their proper
understanding of the instructions. All sessions were conducted at the computer
laboratory of the Max Planck Institute, Jena, in July 2008. Participants were stu-
dents. Experimental sessions lasted about 100 minutes. Average earnings were e
14.55 (about e 8.70 per hour).
4.4 Hypotheses
Although the benchmarks always predict downsizing, we expect layoffs to occur less
often when the principal’s gain from downsizing is smaller. Many experiments have
shown that other-regarding preferences play a role in human behavior.11 Similarly,
P–participants in our downsizing experiment may face a trade-off between interest
for own and other participants’ payoffs. Since material gains from downsizing are
larger in the AH–treatment, we expect downsizing in this case more often, but not
always. The finding of Charness and Rabin (2002) that efficiency concerns might
be important only supports this conjecture.
Hypothesis I: There is less downsizing in the AL-treatment than in the AH-
treatment. Downsizing occurs in AH as often as in UH. There are cases without
downsizing in all treatments.
For contract offers, motives like inequity aversion, altruism, or fairness (see, e.g.,
Rabin (1993) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)) might induce at least some P–par-
ticipants to offer better terms than predicted. P–participants may try to inspire
higher, efficiency enhancing effort levels by increasing fixed wages and/or the piece-
11See Davis and Holt (1993) or Kagel and Roth (1995) for comprehensive discussions of dictator
and public good experiments and, e.g., Andreoni and Miller (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002),
or Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) on human altruism and social preferences.
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rate offers. In a broader sense, our experiment could also be perceived as a trust
game (see Cox (2004) or Kirstein and Bleich (2006)). Since too low piece-rate offers
harm principal and agents, we do not expect them. In particular, contract offers
significantly above the optimum could be perceived as a kind action of the principal
and trigger reciprocity, i.e., effort levels above the individual benchmark predictions
(Brandts and Charness (2004), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)).
Hypothesis II: Piece-rate offers are at or slightly above their benchmark level.
Fixed wage offers are higher than the minimum fixed wage.
Announcing the downsizing opportunity early could affect the effort levels of
less productive workers. In the AH-treatment, L–participants know that they can
be fired and might exert more effort before this downsizing decision than in UH-
treatment. We expect probation period effects again, i.e., that L–participants who
might be fired and are aware of this should spend more effort before the downsizing
decision than afterwards. It is also interesting how the remaining agents react to
witnessing layoffs. They might perceive the firing of other agents as an unkind
action of their principal and react reciprocally – here by lowering their effort level.
Hypothesis III: a) Effort levels follow the pattern of a probation period effect
for less productive workers anticipating downsizing. Round 1 and 2 effort levels of
L–participants in the UH-treatment are lower than in the AH-treatment.
b) Effort levels of some H–participants decrease after witnessing the firing of
L–participants.
Overall, these considerations should, on average, lead to payoffs slightly above
the benchmark predictions.
Hypothesis IV: Payoffs and welfare slightly exceed their benchmark levels.
4.5 Experimental results
In each session, 8 triplets played the game twice, i.e., the two sessions combined sup-
plied us with 16 triplets of average data before and after downsizing. For treatment
AH, e.g., we used the averages of the two rounds before downsizing as independent
observations (observations: AH(1B), AH(2B), ..., AH(16B)). The averages of the
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two rounds after downsizing were used as mutually independent observations (ob-
servations: AH(1A), AH(2A), ..., AH(16A)) that depend on observations AH(1B) -
AH(16B). Since we used a perfect stranger design, we pooled the data of the first
and second phases of treatments AH and AL. Specifically, we pooled AH(1stphase)
with AH(2ndphase) and AL(1stphase) with AL2(2ndphase), respectively.12 We
denote the pooled data sets by AH(32) and AL(32).
In the repetition of treatment UH, participants were probably not unaware of
the downsizing opportunity. UH(1stphase) thus is a single treatment with 16 ob-
servations before and after downsizing (named UH(16)) and serves as a small-scale
check of differences to treatment AH. The perfect stranger design and essentially the
same procedures and instructions as in AH(2ndphase)13 suggest to pool the data of
UH(2ndphase) with AH(32). We checked this and found it confirmed by the data
before downsizing, and only violated for the piece-rate offer after downsizing14,
a small lack of congruency probably due to the small number of observations in
UH(2ndphase). We decided to pool the data before and after downsizing (denoted
with AH(48)) and only mention the minor differences to AH(32) in footnotes.
4.5.1 Downsizing decisions
Table 4.1 summarizes the absolute and relative frequency of firms that lay off the
less productive worker after the first two rounds. Downsizing occurs in all three
treatments, but significantly differs from the theoretical prediction that all firms
downsize (binomial tests for all three treatments: p < .001).
In treatment AH, 72.9 % of firms (35 of 48 firms) fire their less productive workers
after two rounds and even 78.1 % do this in the AL–treatment (25 of 32 firms),
although in AH theoretical gains from downsizing are with 33.3 % larger than in
AL with 7.7 %. Factual gains are also higher in AH than in AL (see Section 4.5.4
12Checking this procedure via two sample Mann-Whitney U-tests for the most important vari-
ables, we found only one significant difference for low productive workers’ efforts in AL
(p = .043). All other tests yielded much higher p-values, data on request.
13They differed only in a few words in one line. For participants in AH they stated: “again, you
will receive your participation fee” FF . For participants in UH they stated: “again, you will
receive both your participation fees (45 ECU each)” FF1 + FF2 = FF .
14Mann-Whitney U-tests: 32 and 16 observations, respectively: FW (p = .414), rW (p =
.265), eh,W (p = .519), el,W (p = .788), FA (p = .516), rA (p = .028), eh,W (p = .056).
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Downsizing No downsizing
Treatment Abs. freq. Rel. freq Abs. freq. Rel. freq
AH 35 72.9 % 13 27.1 %
AL 25 78.1 % 7 21.9 %
UH 13 81.2 % 3 18.8 %
Table 4.1: All treatments, downsizing decisions
below). The difference in downsizing frequencies between these two treatments is
insignificant, however, according to Fisher’s Exact or χ2-tests.15 The difference
between the fractions of downsizing firms in treatments AH (72.9 %) and UH (81.2
%) is also insignificant.16
In conclusion, hypothesis I predicting that the size of theoretical gains are relevant
for the frequency of downsizing is clearly not in line with our findings.
Result 1: There are only negligible differences in downsizing frequencies between
all three treatments.
4.5.2 Treatment AH
Table 4.2 describes the decisions and resulting payoffs for all participants in AH(48)
before and after the downsizing decision. It distinguishes between a) all 48 observa-
tions (abbreviated and indexed all, if inevitable), b) firms that did downsize (firms
D, 35 obs.), and c) firms that did not downsize (firms ND, 13 obs.). In cases in
which (some) observations are missing, e.g., for the effort el of a fired worker, table
cells are left empty. We will not index the treatment when it is obvious.
As expected, fixed wage offers are slightly larger than the minimum wage of 24
before and after downsizing (ranging from 24.81 to 25.79), but do not differ greatly
between periods or subgroups. The difference between the fixed wages and the
minimum wage is about 5.5 percent and thus about as high as the comparable
15The p-values for Fisher’s Exact tests/standard χ2-tests/χ2-tests with Yates-correction are:
p = .793/.793/.792
16Same tests as before: p = .740/.740/.739. All results stay qualitatively the same when using
AH(32) instead of AH(48). In AH(32), e.g., 71.9 % of the firms chose to downsize instead of
72.9 % in AH(48).
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a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
F 25.22 25.64 25.37 25.79 24.81 25.23
r 8.42 8.06 7.73 7.46 10.27 9.67
eh 4.40 4.17 4.06 3.79 5.32 5.19
el .92 .81 1.23 1.03
Π 23.24 30.09 17.72 28.90 38.12 33.31
ωh 46.04 45.45 44.28 43.84 50.79 49.77
ωl 27.81 18.65 28.04 15.00 27.19 28.47
Table 4.2: Treatment AH, main results
relation in Chapter 2 that solely deals with minimum wages.
Piece-rate offers, on the other hand, are significantly smaller than their bench-
mark level of r = 12.17 This is very surprising, since calculators were in heavy use.18
The average piece rate offered over all firms before downsizing is only rB = 8.42
and remains at about the same low level, rA = 8.06. Distinguishing between firms
D and ND reveals that the former, on average, offer lower piece rates before down-
sizing, rB,D = 7.73, than the others, rB,ND = 10.27. After downsizing, firms D
offer rA,D = 7.46, firms ND rA,ND = 9.67. Due to the much larger variance among
firms D (std. dev.: 4.38 and 1.98), these differences are slightly insignificant on
the 5%-level when performing Mann-Whitney U-tests and robust rank-order tests
(U-tests (rro tests)).19 In summary, hypothesis II is partly confirmed, and partly
rejected.
Result 2.AH: Offered fixed wages slightly exceed the benchmark predictions. Piece-
17One sample t tests for benchmarks levels for a) the group of all firms and b) downsizing firms
deliver the following p-values before (after) downsizing: a) p < .001(.001), b) p < .001(.001).
The test results for a Wilcoxon paired sample test against the benchmark level for c) firms ND
are: c) p = .006(.004)
18For example, principal participants in this treatment used the calculator for an average of 95
seconds in each of the 4+4=8 rounds they played.
19Before downsizing: U-tests (rro tests): p = .087(.060), after downsizing: p = .063(.052). The
only minor difference when using AH(32) is that the difference in piece rates after downsizing
becomes slightly significant. Data on request.
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rate offers are below optimum throughout.
Due to the low piece rates, comparing efforts to benchmarks is not illuminative at
all. Thus, Table 4.3 presents data for relative deviations, named reldev. We define
reldev as the quotient between the absolute deviations (measured as the difference
between the chosen and the optimal effort level) and the optimal effort. We focus
on relative instead of absolute deviations, since the latter have some shortcomings
that can be easily demonstrated by an example. For an offered piece rate r =
15, for example, an absolute deviation of x = 0.15 decreases a less productive
worker’s payoff by about 1 % and increases the principal’s profit by about 12 %.
If r = 6, however, the same absolute deviation is costlier for the worker (9 %) and
more beneficial for the employer (30 %). It seems odd to treat these equal sized
deviations equally, since the latter should be perceived as more generous. Using
the relative deviation circumvents this problem.20 Now, values larger (smaller)
than zero indicate efforts above (below) the level predicted by models with payoff-
maximizing agents.
a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
reldevh .11 .04 .13 .02 .08 .08
reldevl .62 .62 .64 .45
Table 4.3: Treatment AH, effort deviations
From Tables 4.2 and 4.3 it follows that for highly productive workers deviations
are only slightly above 0. We do not observe a sharp decrease in effort levels of
highly productive workers who witness layoffs. In fact, the moderate decrease of
eB,D = 4.06 to eA,D = 3.79 is insignificant (dependent sample t test: p = .273) and
accompanied by lower piece-rate offers.
Less productive agents tend to invest much more effort than is optimal. Relative
deviations lie between .45 and .64 here and are all (almost) significantly different
20We thereby accept the very few undefined cases in which the piece-rate offer was r = 0. When
only one of the two values that were used to compute averages was missing, we used the other
one only.
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from 0.21 Although contract offers do not change much after downsizing among
firms ND, the average effort level of workers before downsizing, eB,ND = 1.23,
is significantly higher than the average after downsizing, eA,ND = 1.03 (Wilcoxon
paired sample test, p = .043).22 This confirms the probation period effect predicted
in hypothesis III. The difference in the relative deviation between firms D and ND,
reldevB,D = .62 and reldevB,ND = .64 (U-test: p = .063), weakly indicates that
workers who tend to be more generous, i.e. who spend comparatively more effort,
are not fired.
Result 3.AH: Highly productive workers behave opportunistically. There is no
evidence that they react to witnessing layoffs. Less productive workers tend to spend
more effort than optimal, especially during probation periods.
P–participants’ average payoffs are lower than the benchmark levels, what is
not surprising considering the low piece rates. There is a significant increase of
about 30 % in the principals’ average payoff from ΠB,all = 23.24 before downsizing
to ΠA,all = 30.09 (dependent sample t test: p = .011). The same pattern holds
when limiting the analysis to firms D where the increase from ΠB,D = 17.72 to
ΠA,D = 28.90 is even larger with 63 %.23 Firms ND, on the other hand, suffer a little
payoff loss from ΠB,ND = 38.12 to ΠA,ND = 33.31.24 Overall, this emphasizes that
not only theoretical, but also factual gains render downsizing profitable. Firms D
earned only ΠB,D = 17.72 on average before downsizing while firms ND earned more
than twice as much with ΠB,ND = 38.12. This difference is significant according
to an U-test (rro test) (p = .001(.002)) and seems to imply that principals’ payoffs
determine the downsizing decision. We will present further evidence supporting
this conjecture at the end of this section.
Due to the low piece rates, payoffs of H–participants are smaller than their bench-
mark of 60 for all groups, but are quite invariant to the firing decision. Less produc-
tive workers, in total, suffer an income loss after downsizing: their average earnings
are ωB = 27.81 before and ωA = 18.65 after downsizing due to the firings by firms
21One sample t tests: p = .009 for reldevB,all, p = .051 for reldevB,D; Wilcoxon paired sample
tests: p < .001 for reldevB,ND, p = .004 for reldevA,ND.
22This result remains when restricting to AH(32) (p = .047). Minor changes of p-values occur
for deviations. Data on request.
23Dependent sample t test: p < .001
24Wilcoxon paired sample test: p = .635
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D where average earnings decrease from ωB,D = 28.04 before downsizing to the
unemployment benefit of 15 afterwards while in firms ND, earnings do not change
much (ωB,ND = 27.19 and ωA,ND = 28.47). Overall, hypothesis IV is rejected.
Result 4.AH: Principals’ payoffs are lower than predicted and increase after down-
sizing. Firms ND earn much more before downsizing than firms D. Less productive
workers suffer an income loss when being fired.
Let us shortly deal with the "cheap talk"-conjectures of agents’ efforts, we asked
the principals to give. We define the principal’s relative conjecture accuracies for
both workers’ efforts as the quotients of optimum effort and conjectured effort and
denote them with relconjh and relconjl, respectively. Values smaller 1 suggest that
principals expect higher efforts than optimal. In our experiment, the averages for
all firms are below 1. In particular, we observe relconjh,B = .87, relconjh,A = .83,
and relconjl,B = .57 which means that principals expect more effort than optimal.
Principals seem to overestimate the less productive workers’ efforts (relconjl,B =
.57) comparatively more than those of high productive ones (relconjh,B = .87).
Consequentially, a one sample t test comparing the difference conjd := relconjh,B−
relconjl,B (average: conjd ≈ .30) with 0 is highly significant (p < .001).
To confirm that a principal’s downsizing decision is predominantly influenced by
her own profit, we perform a simple logistic regression. It uses a forward algorithm
to check which of all explanatory variables before downsizing influence the binary
dependent dummy variable Down taking the value 1 if a firm downsizes and 0
otherwise. This algorithm uses score tests to decide which variable to include
next as well as likelihood ratio test to evaluate whether the inclusion improves the
model’s explanatory power significantly. Formally, our model with j variables can
be described by
Zi = ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β0 +
∑
j
βjxj
with Zi as the latent variable and pi determined by the logistic function.
A selection of relevant tables is given in Appendix C.2. The algorithm stops after
step 1, including only the firm’s payoff Π as explanatory variable.25 The parameter
25We thus need not be concerned about multicollinearity.
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estimates are β0 = 3.245 for the constant and β1 = −.075 for the coefficient of
Π. This means that the probability of firing the less productive employee is about
92.4 % when the principal’s profit is Π = 10, about 63.1% at the theoretical profit
before downsizing, Π = 36, and only about 40.9 % when his profit reaches Π = 48.
Nagelkerke’s R2 for our regression is R2 = .281.26
Result 5.AH: Firms tend to overestimate effort levels, especially those of less
productive workers. Firing decisions are strongly influenced by principals’ profits.
4.5.3 Treatment AL
In treatment AL, we have 32 observations in total, 25 for firms D and 7 for firms
ND. Table 4.4 gives an overview of decisions and payoffs.
a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
F 18.47 17.45 18.50 17.57 18.36 17.00
r 8.96 9.36 8.83 9.61 9.43 8.46
eh 4.26 4.34 4.13 4.40 4.74 4.14
el .87 .88 .84 .80
Π 32.82 36.56 30.20 36.38 42.16 37.21
ωh 40.03 42.35 39.62 43.83 41.52 37.07
ωl 21.66 16.05 21.52 15.00 22.20 19.81
Table 4.4: Treatment AL, main results
Fixed wage offers before downsizing are again higher than their benchmark F =
16, ranging from 18.36 to 18.50 and decline by about 1 ECU after downsizing in all
groups. As in treatment AH, piece rate offers are significantly below the optimum
of r = 12 in all groups.27 The differences between piece-rate offers of firms D and
ND and before and after downsizing are negligible.
26Results are qualitatively the same for AH(32).
27One sample t test for a) the group of all firms before (after) downsizing: p =< .001(.001).
Test results for Wilcoxon paired sample tests for b) only firms D and c) firms ND are: b)
p = .001(.014), c) p =.016(.016)
109
4 Downsizing the labor force
Result 2.AL: Offered fixed wages are above their benchmark. Piece-rate offers are
much below optimum throughout.
Again, H–participants do not react to layoffs of less productive workers. On the
contrary, their effort is higher after downsizing, eA,D = 4.40, than before, eB,D =
4.13 – probably due to slightly higher piece-rates. Relative deviations, presented
in Table 4.5, suggest that H–participants spend a little less effort than optimal.
L–participants spend a little more effort than is optimal and do not indicate a
probation period effect. Relative deviations among all firms are reldevl,B = .26 and
are almost significantly different from 0 (two-sided t test: p = .058).
a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
reldevh −.07 −.08 −.09 −.10 .04 −.03
reldevl .26 .31 .10 .11
Table 4.5: Treatment AL, effort deviations
Result 3.AL: Highly productive workers behave rather opportunistically, spending
less effort than optimal. There is no evidence that they react to witnessing lay-
offs. Less productive workers tend to spend more effort than optimal; there is no
indication of a probation period effect.
Firms’ profits in treatment AL follow a pattern similar to the AH–treatment, i.e.,
they increase after firing the low productive worker. However, when performing a
logistic regression analogous to that of the preceding subsection, the algorithm stops
at the null model, not including any explanatory variable at all (see Appendix C.2
for details). Highly productive workers earn less than their benchmark and about
the same before and after downsizing.
In treatment AL, firms slightly underestimate the effort choices of highly produc-
tive workers (relconjh,B = 1.16 and relconjl,B = 1.27), but they still overestimate
the efforts of less productive workers (relconjl,B = .75). Again, a one sample t
test using the difference conjd (average: conjd ≈ .41) to check whether estimation
accuracies differ, confirms that they, indeed, do (p < .001).
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Result 5.AL: Downsizing firms earn more after layoffs and less than firms ND
before downsizing. Firms tend to underestimate effort levels of highly productive
workers and overestimate those of less productive workers.
4.5.4 Treatments AH and AL
When comparing the results of treatments AH and AL, we mainly concentrate
on aggregate firm level. Since different minimum wages apply, fixed wage offers
are, of course, lower in treatment AL than in treatment AH before downsizing
(FAH,B = 25.22 and FAL,B = 18.47) and after downsizing (FAH,A = 25.64 and
FAL,A = 17.45). Piece-rate offers, by contrast, are quite similar before downsizing:
rAH,B = 8.42 and rAH,B = 8.96. A two-sided Welch-Satterthwaite t test (WS test)
comparing them is insignificant (p = .519). The same is true after downsizing where
piece rates are rAH,A = 8.06 and rAL,A = 9.36, respectively (WS test: p = .147).
In summary, in both treatments fixed wages are a little higher than the feasible
minimum while piece-rates in both treatments are too low.
Let us now take a deeper look at the differences in efforts and effort deviations
for treatments AH and AL to answer the question why the fraction of downsizing
firms in AH is not higher than in AL. Here, it is interesting to distinguish between
subgroups again: While there are only small differences for firms D, the effort levels
of less productive workers in firms ND are el,AH,B = 1.23 in treatment AH, but only
el,AL,B = .84 in AL (U-test (rro test): p = .015 (.010)), although piece-rate offers
do not differ much; they are rAH,B = 10.27 in treatment AH and rAH,B = 9.43 in
AL and this difference is insignificant (U-test: p = .263).
This suggests that L–participants who are not fired, later on, in treatment AH
might be concerned about future layoffs and thus spend relatively more effort than
those in treatment AL to prevent their principals from firing them. This view is
supported by the finding that relative deviations among the same worker group are
reldevl,AH,B = .64 in AH, but only reldevl,AL,B = .10 in AL, i.e., low productive
workers deviate comparatively more from optimum effort and are thereby more
generous in treatment AH. The descriptive finding is confirmed by an U-test (rro
test), since the reported difference is significant with a p-value of p = .037 (.027).
Interestingly, across all firms even high productive workers are slightly more gener-
111
4 Downsizing the labor force
ous in treatment AH with reldevh,AH,B = .11 than in AL with reldevl,AH,B = −.07
(WS test: p = .040).
We think that these results help to understand why firms do not downsize more
often in treatment AH than in AL, especially when additionally considering that
– despite the more generous effort levels – not only theoretical gains, but also
the factual gains from downsizing are larger in AH than in AL. It seems as if
workers intuitively evaluate their weaker position in AH correctly and principals
are appeased by the rather generous effort decisions of low (and high) productive
workers in this treatment.
Payoffs of workers are about the same in both treatments except for the rent
reallocation due to the lower fixed wages.28
Result 6: Treatments AH and AL differ in fixed wages and thus in payoffs: while
principals earn more in AL, agents earn less. Piece-rate offers in both treatments
hardly differ. Before downsizing, especially the less productive workers who are not
fired spend relatively more effort in treatment AH than those in treatment AL.
4.5.5 Treatment(s) UH (and AH)
In contrast to treatment AH, participants in UH were not aware of the downsizing
opportunity. We performed UH as a first small check to get an impression whether
agents’ behavior differs when the firing threat hangs over them like a Sword of
Damocles as in treatment AH. Due to the small sample size, we only list the main
results of UH and state important differences to AH, here. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 with
three firms ND, 13 firms D and 16 firms in total are constructed analogously to the
preceding tables.
Fixed wage offers are above optimum, but do not differ before and after downsiz-
ing. Piece-rate offers are always far below the optimum. Effort levels are relatively
the same across groups of firms and do not differ before and after downsizing. There
is no probation period effect (less productive workers’ effort is almost identical be-
fore, eB,ND = .67, and after downsizing, eA,ND = .68, among firms ND). Deviations
28The only noteworthy difference when using AH(32) instead of AH(48) is that after downsizing
piece rates are now significantly larger in AL than in AH (WS test: p = .032).
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a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
F 26.52 25.71 26.79 25.95 25.33 24.67
r 7.98 8.93 7.98 9.11 8.00 8.17
eh 4.46 4.48 4.37 4.47 4.83 4.50
el .79 .82 .67 .68
Π 22.65 33.31 23.14 35.02 20.53 25.88
ωh 44.74 48.13 44.28 49.24 46.75 43.33
ωl 28.97 17.34 28.95 15.00 29.05 27.47
Table 4.6: Treatment UH, main results
are comparable to treatment AH, except those of less productive workers among
firms ND (see Table 4.7).
a) All b) Only firms D c) Only firms ND
Before After Before After Before After
reldevh .15 .00 .08 −.02 .46 .08
reldevl .55 .75 −.29 −.19
Table 4.7: Treatment UH, effort deviations
Just as in treatment AH, payoffs of all groups are lower than predicted, although
the difference is insignificant for less productive employees. The principals’ average
payoff gain for all firms from before to after downsizing is large, but not significant
on the 5%-level (Wilcoxon paired sample test, p = .093). H–participants earn al-
most the same in all groups. Less productive employees suffer a significant income
loss when being fired and earn about the same before and after downsizing other-
wise.29 Relative conjecture accuracy is similar to treatment AH: principals overes-
timate highly productive workers’ efforts (relconjh,B = .76 and relconjh,A = .86)
as well as the effort of L–participants (relconjl,B = .54), but conjectures are still
29We did not calculate a logistic regression because of the small sample size.
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more accurate for highly productive workers.30
When comparing treatments AH and UH, we first checked all contract offers and
payoffs (a complete list of tests is given in Appendix C.1) and found no significant
differences what could have been expected.
One major difference between AH and UH is the rather large, but insignifi-
cant difference between effort levels of less productive workers (in firms ND) in
treatment AH, eAH,B = 1.23, and in treatment UH, eAH,B = .67 (U-test (rro
test): p = .179(.203)), partly due to lower piece-rate offers. This, however, can-
not account for the large difference between relative deviations among firms ND
(reldevAH,B = .64 vs. reldevUH,B = −.29), that is significant, despite the small
sample size of firms ND and the conservative two-sided application of the test
(U-test (rro test), p = .041(.041)). Apparently, L–participants who anticipate the
downsizing decision (treatment AH) are more generous than those who cannot fore-
see being fired (treatment UH) – at least among the firms that eventually do not
fire them.31 For comparison, among firms D the relative deviations do not differ
much with reldevAH,B = .62 and reldevUH,B = .75, respectively.32 Analogously, the
probation period effect the data suggest for treatment AH in which efforts decrease
from eAH,B = 1.23 to eAH,A = 1.03 cannot be found in treatment UH in which effort
levels hardly differ with eAH,B = .67 and eAH,A = .68. This confirms the respective
part of hypothesis III.a) and we summarize:
Result 7: The main trends in treatment UH are largely comparable to those of
treatment AH, but among firms ND, L–participants are more generous in AH than
in UH, especially before the downsizing decision.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we theoretically and experimentally analyzed downsizing decisions
by low and highly profitable firms in a principal-agent-setting.
Contrary to our conjectured hypotheses, firms did not downsize more often in
30One sample t test, difference conjd (average: conjd ≈ .22) against 0, p < .001.
31Again, all these results stay qualitatively the same for AH(32).
32U-test: p = .790.
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treatments in which theoretical and factual profitability were rather high. This was
captured by treatments AH and AL in which those profitability measures largely
differed, but no significant differences in frequencies of downsizing firms were found.
However, we did find some evidence that within a specific treatment the most
unprofitable firms were those that eventually downsized their labor force.
Our findings also suggested that worker participants in the treatment with theo-
retically higher downsizing incentives were more generous, i.e., they were spending
comparatively more effort than workers in the opposing treatment with rather low
downsizing incentives. This might have been a way by which workers mitigated
their employers and thereby prevented firings.
Additionally, the distinction between treatments AH and UH enabled us to high-
light the behavioral differences resulting from anticipating possible future layoffs.
If downsizing opportunities could not have been anticipated (as in treatment UH),
there was no probation period effect what might explain why sometimes firms in the
real world threaten to lay off (larger shares of) their workforce and withdraw from
this measure later on. Overall, the workers who were not fired in our experimental
treatments were spending less effort in the treatment in which they did not foresee
the downsizing opportunity.
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With this thesis we tried to shed further light on three aspects of labor markets:
minimum wage spillovers, the interplay of employment protection and bullying, and
layoff policies of firms operating highly profitable and less profitable, respectively.
We are confident that our theoretical and experimental insights have significantly
enriched the knowledge about these three aspects of labor markets. We now want to
briefly summarize the main results of each of our three main chapters and suggest
some starting points for future research.
We first asked whether minimum wage spillovers occur, i.e., whether the intro-
duction of a minimum wage not only increases the wages of workers who previously
earned less than this minimum wage, but also of those who earned considerably
more already. A theoretical model was presented that focused on only one of the
couple of causes for minimum wage spillovers discussed in literature, namely on
relative income preferences, and thereby excluded other causes like substitution
effects, for example. The model was not limited to the two utility functions captur-
ing relative income preferences often proposed in literature, but showed for a more
general set of assumptions that minimum wage spillovers follow. The concentration
on relative income preferences allowed us to design an experiment that was capable
to exclude the same causes for minimum wage spillovers as the model did. In the
experiment minimum wage spillovers occurred and a control treatment suggested
that, indeed, relative income preferences caused this spillovers.
With this study, we hope to inspire future work that theoretically and experi-
mentally investigates the interplay of relative income preferences and changes in
institutional frameworks or workers’ abilities. For example, it would be interesting
to analyze a situation in which a specific worker’s skill level changes after some
periods, while the other workers’ abilities stay the same.
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Another straightforward extension would be to modify the deduction rule of the
minimum wage such that it would be introduced slightly below or equal to the wage
of the worker who occupies the middle position in the earnings hierarchy. This might
lead to new theoretical results and differences in participants’ laboratory behavior.
In Chapter 3, we investigated the interplay between employment protection leg-
islation and the bullying of workers. Wasmer (2006) introduced and empirically
tested the idea that firms react to stricter employment protection by trying to
bully their unwanted employees forcing them to quit voluntarily. We connected
his work with the experimental studies on sanctions by interpreting bullying as
a costly sanction imposed by employers. Our main results were that the degree
of employment protection and sanctions had the expected effects on workers’ ef-
fort levels and voluntary resignations seemed, indeed, to be frequently triggered by
bullying/sanctions. However, employers often used sanctions and firings as com-
plements, rather than as substitutes.
Evaluating these main findings, we think that not only the relationship between
bullying and employment protection is an interesting topic for future research, but
also the more general question whether different kinds of disciplinary incentives are
used together or concurrently.
Finally, firms’ firing policies were analyzed in Chapter 4. We experimentally
investigated the hypothesis that firms operating highly profitable are less likely to
fire their unproductive employees than less profitable firms. Our main results were
that, unexpectedly, downsizing was not more frequent in treatments in which firms’
theoretical and factual gains from laying off part of their labor force were highest.
We presented evidence suggesting that workers might have (intuitively) caused their
employers’ behavior by spending comparatively more effort when theoretical and
factual gains were rather large, especially during probation periods and when they
could anticipate the upcoming downsizing decisions.
We are not aware of experimental studies solely focusing on probation period
effects. This topic seems interesting for future research. Our comparisons of behav-
ioral differences between treatments with announced and unannounced downsizing
rely on small samples yet. Further investigations might be fruitful.
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A Experimental instructions
Since we performed the experiments either at the Universität Karlsruhe (TU), Karl-
sruhe, Germany, or at the Max Planck Institute of Economics (MPI), Jena, Ger-
many, the original instructions were written in German. In the following, we thus
give translated instructions for each of the three experiments we described above.
Additionally, formatting is changed to save some space, in one case a summariz-
ing table the participants could use is left out, and instructions are given for only
one treatment and participant (differences to other participants and treatments are
minimal, of course). Instructions in the original formatting and language or for
other participants and treatments can be obtained on request.
A.1 Spillover effects of minimum wages
Given below are instructions for employers in treatment MW.
Instructions:
You are participating in an experiment consisting of two parts. In the following
these two parts will be named “part 1” and “part 2”.
In this experiment, you can earn money, which will be paid out in cash immedi-
ately after the experiment. Your earnings depend on your own decisions and those
of other participants. Every participant makes his decisions on his own at his com-
puter box. Your anonymity will be guaranteed even after the end of the experiment.
Communication between participants is not allowed. Please turn off your mobile
phone and read the following instructions carefully. Please stay silently at your
seat at the end of the experiment. We will call you individually and anonymously
with the help of your box number and pay you off. We will have to exclude you
from the experiment and all payments if you violate these rules.
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In both parts of the experiment you form a group of four with three other par-
ticipants. The composition of the group stays the same in both parts of the ex-
periment. This means that in part 2 of the experiment you form a group with the
same participants as in part 1.
Earnings are calculated in GE (Experimental Currency Unit) during the experi-
ment. At the end of both parts of the experiments, the total earnings are calculated
and converted into Euro at a fixed exchange rate. This exchange rate is 100
GE = 80 Euro-Cent.
Additionally to the earnings of the two parts of the experiments, participants
once receive a fixed participation fee that does not depend on decisions. This
participation fee is: 500 GE.
You are now handed out the instructions for the first part of the experiment.
You will receive the instructions for the second part, after the first part is finished.
Part 1:
You form a group of four with 3 other participants. Three of you are employees
(AN1, AN2, AN3), one is the employer (AG). The role assignment was carried out
randomly in the beginning of the experiment by the drawing of the box numbers.
Your role is that of an employer.
In the following, employers and the employees interact for 5 periods. In each of
these 5 periods, the employer offers wages to the employees who individually decide
whether they want to be employed or not. If an employee is hired, he will produce
a good for the employer. Before explaining the procedure of each of the 5 periods
in detail, it is necessary to give the following information regarding the possibly
produced goods. If, later on, AN1 is hired by his employer, he will – automatically
and without further decisions – produce a good which is immediately sold by the
employer. The fixed selling price of this good is R1 = 100 GE. Similar rules apply for
AN2. If he is hired, he will also automatically produce a good which is sold directly.
The selling price of this good is also fixed and is R2 = 200 GE. Analogically, the
product possibly produced by AN3 is sold for R3 = 300 GE. Each of the 5 periods
mentioned before is subdivided into three stages in the following way:
• Stage I: Wage offers
The employer AG offers a wage to each employee AN, for which he (AG) is
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willing to employ him (AN). The wage offer to ANi is denoted by wi (with
i = 1, 2, 3).
The employer is allowed to offer different wages, i.e., that, for example, the
wage offer to AN1 (w1) does not have to be be identical to the wage offer to
AN3 (w3).
However, the wage offers are not allowed to be lower than 1 and are also not
allowed to be higher than the value of the good ANi produces. Furthermore,
only integers are allowed as wage offers. Overall, each of the three wage offers
has to fulfill: 1 ≤ wi ≤ Ri with wi being an integer.
Altogether a total wage offer profile, (w1, w2, w3), results that describes a
wage offer to each of the three employees.
• Stage II: Employment decision
Based on (w1, w2, w3) each worker ANi is told only the wage offers to the both
other workers, i.e, he does not know his own wage offer at first. Then, he
names the limit ti for his wage wi above (or equal to) which he is willing to
be employed. It has to fulfill: ti ≤ Ri.
An example for AN2: He learns w1 and w3 and then chooses his wage limit
t2.
After this he learns his actual wage offer w2. If his limit t2 is less or equal
to the wage offer w2, he will be hired by the employer (for the wage w2, see
stage III). If his limit t2 is higher than the wage offer w2, he will not be hired
in this period.
• Stage III: Production, selling and earnings
If ANi is not being hired, nothing will be produced and sold and thus he and
the employer will earn 0 GE from this potential hiring relationship. If ANi
is hired, the good will be produced and sold and ANi will earn the offered
wage wi. The employer will earn the difference between the sales price and
the paid wage, Ri − wi. The employer’s total earnings are the sum of the
earnings from the hiring relationships with all workers. An example: If AN1
and AN2 are hired, but AN3 is not, then AN1 will earn w1, AN2 will earn
w2 and AN3 will earn 0. The total earnings for the employer from the hiring
relationships with the three workers follow as: (R1 − w1) + (R2 − w2) + 0.
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In each period, all employees decide unaware of the decisions of the other em-
ployees. This means that, e.g., AN1 does not know if AN2 is hired or not before
his own decision. However, each employee gets to know which employees had been
hired und which not in the later course of each period.
After these three stages I to III the first periods ends. Then, another 4 periods
are taking place with the same rules. The earnings of the 5 periods are summed up.
After these 5 periods the second part of the experiment follows. You will receive
new instructions for this part. Before we start the experiment, you have to answer
some control questions at your computer box.
Part 2:
Just like in the first part of the experiment you form the same group of four with
the same participants. Your role has also not changed. In the second part, another
5 periods take place that again consist of three stages I to III.
Before the first of the following 5 periods, additionally, a lower bound m will be
set once and for all. This lower bound is set for each of the 5 following periods. The
exact value of m will be given on your computer screen. This lower bound than
applies to all wages, i.e., the employer AG has to offer a wage of at least m to each
worker ANi. Overall, each of the three wage offers now has to fulfill: m ≤ wi ≤ Ri.
Besides this the same rules for wage offers, employment decisions and earnings as
in part 1 apply. The employees, however, have to name a limit at least as high
as the lower bound m now, i.e.: ti ≥ m. Your total earnings are the sum of your
earnings in parts 1 and 2 of the experiment plus the participation fee.
A.2 Employment protection and bullying
Given below are the instructions for employers in the treatment with weak employ-
ment protection and sanctions.
Instructions:
General rules:
You are participating in a decision experiment in which you can earn money. Please
stop communicating with other participants from now on and turn off your mobile
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phone. Read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question, please
raise your hand, and we will answer your question at your computer box. We will
have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments if you violate these rules.
The instructions are identical for all participants except for the subsequent role
assignment. Your anonymity will be guaranteed. This means that no other partic-
ipant is going to learn your identity during or after the experiment.
In this experiment, 12 employees and 8 employers interact. The role assignment
was carried out randomly in the beginning of the experiment. Every participant
keeps his role during the whole experiment. You are an employer.
The whole experiment lasts for 10 periods.
The earnings of each participant depend on his own decisions and those of other
participants and are calculated in GE (Money Units) during the experiment. The
employees once receive a participation fee of 50 GE at the beginning of the ex-
periment. The employers receive an endowment in each period (see the following
paragraphs). At the end of both parts of the experiments, the total earnings are
calculated and converted into Euro at a fixed exchange rate. This exchange rate
is 1 GE = e .1.
The first period:
The timing of the first period can be divided into 6 stages – stage I, II, III, IV, V
and VI – as follows:
I: At the beginning of the first period, every employer receives a basic endow-
ment (GR) of 12 GE. Then, every employer individually decides, whether
he wants to hire an employee. This means that every employer can either
hire 0 or 1 employee(s). Without knowledge of the employers’ decisions, ev-
ery employee individually decides, whether he wants to be hired or not. The
employers who want to hire and the employees who want to be hired are then
matched randomly.
If there are more employees who want to be hired than vacancies, some em-
ployees will not get a job. If there are more vacancies than employees who
want to be hired, all employees will get a job, but some employers will not
get an employee.
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A hired employee produces a specific good for the employer. The fixed wage
(F ) the employer has to pay is set to 12 GE. All employees who either were
not hired or did not want to be employed receive a payment (Z) of 7 GE.
For them the ongoing period ends after this payment.
All employers without an employee do not receive revenues from production.
Thus, these employers only receive their basic endowment in this ongoing
period.
The following stages (stages II -VI) apply to each pair of employer and hired
employee.
II: The hired employee chooses his effort level (e) for the production of the
good. Depending on this choice costs K(e) arise. Overall, there are five
effort levels. The respective costs of effort are given in Table A.1.
e K(e)
e1 .0 GE
e2 .25 GE
e3 .75 GE
e4 1.5 GE
e5 2.5 GE
Table A.1: Costs of effort
III: The effort level influences the output quantity Q of the good and, thereby,
the employer’s profit. Overall 2, 3, 4 or 5 units of the good can be pro-
duced. The output quantity also depends on chance. The probability for a
larger quantity increases with rising effort levels. The relationship between
effort level and produced quantity is given in Table A.2.
For the first row, i.e., for effort level e1, the table can be explained as follows:
If e1 is chosen, the quantity Q=2 is going to be realized with a probability of
50 percent, the quantity Q=3 with a probability of 30 percent, the quantity
Q=4 with a probability of 15 percent and the quantity Q=5 with a probabil-
ity of 5 percent. The other rows follow analogously.
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In each period the randomness of the production affects all workers simi-
larly, i.e, the same level of effort leads to the same output quantity, which is,
however, determined by chance through the mechanism described above. An
example: If a worker who has chosen e1 in the first period, produces three
units of the good, then every other worker who chooses effort level e1, too,
also produces 3 units.
Output quantity Q
2 3 4 5
e1 .50 .30 .15 .05
e2 .40 .30 .20 .10
e3 .25 .25 .25 .25
e4 .10 .20 .30 .40
e5 .05 .15 .30 .50
Table A.2: Probabilities of output quantities for chosen levels of effort
IV: The employer learns which quantity of the good is produced in his firm, but
not which effort level his employee has chosen. Additionally, the average
output quantity (Q) over all matches of employer and hired employee is
told to every employer (including those who do not hire an employee in this
period). Then, every employer sells his produced goods at a price (p) of 5
GE a piece.
V: After learning the output quantity of his employee and the average output
quantity, the employer can invest up to 2 GE into punishing his employee.
He can choose every punishment level S between 0 GE (no punishment)
and 2 GE (highest possible punishment) with the restriction that only one
position after the decimal point is allowed. One unit of S decreases the em-
ployee’s earnings threefold. For example, a level of punishment of 0.4 GE
induces costs of 0.4 GE for the employer and costs of 1.2 GE for the em-
ployee.
In summary, the employer’s profit G and the earnings A of an engaged em-
ployee follow as:
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Employer: G = GR− F + p ·Q− S, so
G = 12− 12 + 5 ·Q− S GE .
Employee: A = F −K(e)− 3 · S, so
A = 12−K(e)− 3 · S GE .
VI: Now the employer decides if he wants to re-hire the employee. If he fires the
employee, the next period will start in stage I for both of them again, i.e.,
with the decisions about hiring and working, respectively.
If he wants to re-hire the employee, the employee will have to decide whether
he wants to continue to work for this employer. If he does not want to be
re-hired, the next period will start in Stage I again for both of them.
The random matching algorithm in stage I automatically prohibits that em-
ployers and employees, who already formed a match in the previous period,
are matched again.
If neither the employer nor the employee has ended the employment contract,
the next period will start in stage II for both of them, i.e., with the effort
choice by the employee.
Periods 2 to 10:
Basically, periods 2 - 10 are run like period 1. The only exception arises in stage VI.
Here, the employers who have hired the same employee for at least two consecutive
periods cannot fire this employee anymore. This means that an employer can fire
his employee only in the first period of a particular match. From the second period
of a match on this is not possible anymore. However, the employees are still allowed
to quit their job. The last period automatically ends after stage V.
Final remarks:
The earnings of all 10 periods are summed up (and added to the participation
fee for the employees). The earned GE will then be converted into Euro with the
fixed exchange of e .1 per GE. The amount of Euro calculated this way is paid off
individually and anonymously in cash.
Before we start the experiment, you have to answer some control questions at
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your computer box. If you are not able to answer a question, please lift your hand.
We will then answer your question at your computer box.
Comment: We then additionally provided a list of all variables that is left out here
due to space requirements.
A.3 Downsizing the labor force
Given below are the instructions for the L-employee, treatment AH.
Instructions:
 Experiment 1:
1. General instructions:
Please stop communicating with other participants from now on and turn off your
mobile phone. Read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question,
please raise your hand, and the supervisors will answer your question at your com-
puter box. We will have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments if you
violate these rules. The instructions are identical for all participants except for the
subsequent role assignment. Your anonymity will be guaranteed. This means that
no other participant is going to learn your identity during or after the experiment.
To begin with, you are taking part in an experiment consisting of 4 periods. After
this you will be given new instructions for another experiment!
In the first experiment, three participants will interact. Two of them will take the
roles of employees, one will take the role of an employer. One of the employees is
of type H (H-employee), the other of type L (L-employee). There is only one
type of employer. The role assignment is carried out randomly in the beginning
of the experiment. Each participant keeps his role during the whole experiment.
You are an L-employee.
The earnings of every participant depend on his or her own decisions and those of
the other participants. Earnings are calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency
Unit) during the experiment. At the end of both experiments, they will be converted
into Euro at a fixed exchange rate. This exchange rate is 30 ECU = 1 Euro.
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Additionally, participants receive a fixed participation fee that does not depend on
decisions, but will be offset against payoffs if necessary. This participation fee
is: 90 ECU.
2. Periods 1 and 2:
2.1 General rules:
Each triplet of participants, consisting of an employer, an H-employee, and an L-
employee, interacts for 4 periods. Each of the two periods 1 and 2 is basically
constructed as follows:
1. The employer offers one contract that applies to both employees. It consists
of two components: a fixed wage W with 24 ≤ W ≤ 40 and a piece rate r
(with 0 ≤ r ≤ 20) that must be paid for each unit of output. Furthermore,
the employer has to make conjectures about the employees’ effort levels (see
2.). Up to 1 decimal place is allowed for each of the inputs named above.
2. Knowing the offered contract, each employee independently chooses an effort
level, i.e., the H-employee chooses eH , the L-employee chooses eL. Restrictions
are: 0 ≤ eH ≤ 10 and 0 ≤ eL ≤ 10. Again, up to 1 decimal place is allowed.
One unit of effort leads to exactly one unit of output the employer is selling.
The gross output Q thus equals the sum of chosen efforts.
This ends the interactions of a period. Payoffs result as follows:
• Employer: (24− r) · (eH + eL)− 2 ·W .
• H-employee: W + r · eH − 1 · (eH)2 .
• L-employee: W + r · eL − 6 · (eL)2 .
After each period every participant gets to know effort levels, gross output, and
payoffs of all participants.
2.2 Calculator:
Additionally, the software provides a calculator to each participant. You can use
this calculator for two minutes in every period, after which you have to make your
decision at the latest. The calculator allows every participant
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• to calculate the employer’s payoff for various levels of W and r and various
effort levels eH and eL, and
• to calculate the employees’ payoffs for various levels of W and r and various
effort levels eH and eL.
Note that as an employer you are only able to make conjectures about effort levels
since you do not know the employees’ decisions yet. As an employee, however, you
know the decisions of the employer. They are preset in the calculator. You will not
learn the employer’s conjectures.
2.3 Additional restrictions:
As an additional restriction for the employees, you are limited to choose effort
levels – eH or eL – that guarantee that payoffs are larger than or equal to zero in
each period. You can check this restriction with the help of the calculator.
As an additional restriction for the employer, you are limited to offers W and
r that, in addition to the conjectures about effort levels eH and eL, also given by
yourself, guarantee that expected payoffs are larger than or equal to zero in each
period. You can check this restriction with the help of the calculator.
These restrictions imply that period payoffs smaller than zero are only possible for
employers, e.g. if effort levels are below conjectured efforts. However, the employer
is able to restrict this risk by choosing W and r appropriately; payoffs larger zero
should be the norm. Payoffs of employers and employees are summed up over the
first two periods that are played as described above.
3. Periods 3 and 4:
Before the third period, each employee may choose between two alternatives:
I. to keep the L-employee or
II. to lay off the L-employee.
The H-employee will always be kept.
If the employer hires the L-employee again (case I), periods 3 and 4 are played
analogously to periods 1 and 2.
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If the employer lays off the L-employee (case II), the L-employee will receive a
payment of 15 ECU from the experimenters (not from the employer) in each of
the periods 3 and 4. Consequently, the L-employee does not make any decisions
and does not learn the other participants’ payoffs in periods 3 and 4. In each of
the periods of this case (II), the employer offers a new contract to the H-employee
only. The same bounds for contracts and effort levels apply. The payoff of the H-
employee is calculated as before. Of course, the employer now earns (24−r)·eH−W .
Restrictions are unchanged; calculators are provided again.
Payoffs of periods 3 and 4 are added to those of periods 1 and 2 and to the partic-
ipation fee, are converted into Euro, and are paid out anonymously and in cash at
the end of both experiments. If the employer’s payoff from periods 1 to 4 is smaller
than zero, it will be subtracted from the participation fee. If the rest is smaller
than zero, it will be offset against the payoffs from the other experiment. If there is
still a debt, this has to be paid for at the end of both experiments – either in cash
or by administrative work. Please note again as an employer that this situation can
be avoided almost completely by choosing W and r appropriately; payoffs larger
zero should be the norm. The employees’ payoffs are always larger than or equal
to zero.
In the following, last experiment, you will not interact with the same participants
as in this experiment again. Before we start the experiment, you have to answer
some control questions.
 Experiment 2:
We will now repeat the same experiment one more time, i.e., all 4 periods are
played again. This means that, again, you will receive your participation fee and
additional payments, depending on your decisions. Payoffs of all periods are added,
converted, and paid out as before. Furthermore, you keep the same role as in the
previous experiment, but it is guaranteed that no one will be matched with the
same participants again.
Please stay silently at your seat at the end of the experiment until we call you
individually and anonymously with the help of your box number and pay you off.
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B.1 Wage ordering
We want to discuss here under which circumstances the intuitive wage profile
(A.6.1) w∗L < w∗M < w∗H holds. This clearly is not possible without relying on
more specific assumptions about reservation utilities and concrete utility functions.
We start by introducing a second reservation utility assumption: (A.1.a) rL <
rM < rH . It states that the reservation utilities’ ranking mirrors the ranking of
productivity differences. We think this assumption is less strict than it might look
at first glance, since it specifically does not require reservation utilities to be less
divergent than marginal revenues. It does, however, require comparability of agents’
utility functions. Alternatively, one can re-interpret the reservation utilities as pie
shares participants commonly demand in ultimatum games adjusted for relative
income preferences. Of course, this demands similar utility functions like ACU and
RCU where utility directly depends on own and others’ wages (see the following
paragraphs). FFZ2006 use the heuristic of about 30 to 40 percent of the total pie
size to predict firms’ offers. Offers below this are most often rejected. Since pies
are unequal in our game, one could generalize this by expecting reservation utilities
to be larger for players who bargain over larger pies.
However, (A.1.a) alone does not fully determine the wage profile. We also need
some kind of similarity in preferences which will be clearer with an example. For
expositional purposes, assume only a low and a medium productive player interact
(i, j ∈ {L,M}; i 6= j). Their RCU functions shall be given by
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uL = w
1−αL
L ·
(
wL
wM
)αL
(B.1)
and
uM = w
1−αM
M ·
(
wM
wL
)αM
(B.2)
We first equate uL to rL and uM to rM = rL + d (with d > 0) since this should
hold in equilibrium. Now suppose we want to check whether the principal can set
the wages to wL = wM . The second factors of uL in (B.1) and uM in (B.2) then
vanish. We can now solve both equations for rL and equate them. Demanding
equal wages for M and L then requires
w1−αLL = w
1−αM
L − d . (B.3)
With similar RCU functions Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) estimated α for
different income groups. They did not find significant differences in mean values of
α with α ranging from .31 to .43. Though this may be different on individual level
and the estimations were not explicitly based on different skill levels, we use this
best heuristic available to us and assume α to be quite similar for L andM . Then, it
is immediately obvious that (B.3) can never hold for all d significantly larger than
zero. This implies that the principal cannot set wL equal to wM . Furthermore,
wL > wM is also impossible, since this would further increase the left, and further
decrease the right side of equation (B.3).
An even stronger support for the result that wL = wM cannot hold, is given
by the ACU function parameter estimates reported by Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002). The authors found that α was increasing for higher income levels, which,
if transferred to an ACU analogon of (B.3) leads to a further increase of the right
side of the equation.
The reader might also argue that the terms in brackets on the right sides of (B.1)
and (B.2) should be modified by a more sophisticated reference standard than equal
wages. With xL and xM as such converters, (B.3) becomes
w1−αLL x
αL
L = w
1−αM
L x
αM
M − d . (B.4)
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With our productivity differences at least 0 < xM < 1 < xL should hold, what
further increases the left and decreases the right side (although one might now
consequentially expect d to decrease or even vanish).
To sum things up: With this expanded set of assumptions, concrete RCU (or
ACU) functions suggest that the equilibrium wage profile likely mirrors the pro-
ductivity differences, i.e., w∗L < w∗M < w∗H holds.
B.2 Comparative statics
The first-order conditions (FOC) of the Lagrangian function L(wM , wH , λM , λH ;m)
are denoted as follows: FOC no. 1: ∂L/∂wM = 0; no. 2: ∂L/∂wH = 0; no. 3:
∂L/∂λM = 0; no. 4: ∂L/∂λH = 0.
They implicitly define four equations F p(wM , wH , λ1, λ2; m) with p being the
same number as in the corresponding FOC. This, in turn, describes all four endoge-
nous variables depending on the exogenous minimum wage m only: w∗∗M = f 1(m),
w∗∗H = f
2(m), λ∗∗M = f 3(m), λ∗∗H = f 4(m). Differentiating again regrouping, and
some defining then leads to:

∂F 1
∂wM
:= A
∂F 1
∂wH
:= B
∂F 1
∂λM
:= C
∂F 1
∂λH
:= D
∂F 2
∂wM
:= E
∂F 2
∂wH
:= F
∂F 2
∂λM
:= G
∂F 2
∂λH
:= H
∂F 3
∂wM
= C
∂F 3
∂wH
= G
∂F 3
∂λM
= 0
∂F 3
∂λH
= 0
∂F 4
∂wM
= D
∂F 4
∂wH
= H
∂F 4
∂λM
= 0
∂F 4
∂λH
= 0


dwM
dm
dwH
dm
dλM
dm
dλH
dm

=

−∂F
1
∂m
:= I
−∂F
2
∂m
:= J
−∂F
3
∂m
:= K
−∂F
4
∂m
:= L

or in simpler vector form: M ·N = O.
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With Cramer’s Rule, the desired comparative static results are
dw∗∗M
dm
=
|M1|
|M |
and
dw∗∗H
dm
=
|M2|
|M | ,
where |Mi| denotes the determinant of vector M with the i-th column replaced by
vector O.
Due to the fact that the four lower right cell entries all equal zero, all second-order
derivatives (in A, B, E, and F ), vanish and some further simplifications yield
dw∗∗M
dm
=
G · L−H ·K
D ·G− C ·H and
dw∗∗H
dm
=
D ·K − L · C
D ·G− C ·H ,
which directly gives (2.5) and (2.6). q.e.d.
B.3 Total differential, utility of worker L
For the RCU functions defined by (2.8) the two comparative static derivatives (after
some cancellations) are:
dw∗∗M
dm
=
βMβH + αM
1− βMαH ·
wM
wL
and
dw∗∗H
dm
=
αMαH + βH
1− βMαH ·
wH
wL
.
Substituting this and all other terms into (2.7) and further cancellations lead to:
duL
dm
≥ 0⇔ 1− αL(αM + βMβH)− βL(αMαH + βH)− αHβM
1− βMαH :=
N
D
≥ 0 . (B.5)
Repeating the same steps for the ACU functions defined by (2.9) leads to exactly
the same intermediate result. Since the denominator of (B.5) is larger than zero for
either βM 6= 1 or αH 6= 1 (which we implicitly assume to avoid further complexities),
the numerator N determines the sign of (B.5). Substituting βL = 1 − αL, βM =
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1− αM , βH = 1− αH gives:
N = 1−(1−αM)αH−αLαM−αL(1−αM)(1−αH)−(1−αL)(1−αH)−(1−αL)αMαH ,
which is equal to 0.
Furthermore, this equation immediately tells us that N > 0 holds if any 1−αi−βi
is larger than 0. q.e.d.
The approach to directly investigate the sign of (2.7) does not lead to an unify-
ing categorization for RCU and ACU functions. Simple calculations only yield that
as long as the derivative ∂ui/∂wi is larger than the absolute value of ∂ui/∂wj +
∂ui/∂wk, the total differential is larger than zero, but this is only a sufficient con-
dition that solely the ACU necessarily functions fulfill (with ∂ui/∂wi = 1 and
∂ui/∂wj+∂ui/∂wk < 1). But even adding factors xi,j into the brackets in (2.8) does
not change results for RCU functions. For example, the converters xi,j = Rj/Ri
would constitute productivity differences as agents’ new aspirations level. However,
every set of converters (not only the example named above) leads to (B.5) again.
149
C Statistical addenda – Downsizing
the labor force
C.1 List of tests for differences between treatments
AH and UH
All test results for contract offers and payoffs are given. All tests are performed as
independent two sample test. Sample sizes are 48, 35, and 13 for all firms, only
firms D, and only firms ND in treatment AH and 16, 13, and 3 for treatment UH.
In Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 below, we abbreviate the performed tests as follows:
Mann-Whitney U-tests (U), U-tests and robust rank-order tests (U/rro).
a) All firms
Before After
F .102 (.115) (U/rro) .486 (U)
r .577 (.565) (U/rro) .510 (U)
Π .997 (U) .444 (U)
ωh .664 (U) .526 (U)
ωl .307 (U) .489 (U)
Table C.1: Treatment UH, all firms, main results
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b) Only firms D
Before After
F .223 (.255) (U/rro) .681 (U)
r .950 (U) .209 (.192) (U/rro)
Π .555 (.567) (U/rro) .320 (.292) (U/rro)
ωh .977 (U) .238 (.219) (U/rro)
ωl .385 (U)
Table C.2: Treatment UH, only firms D, main results
c) Only firms ND
Before After
F .489 (U) .500 (U)
r .680 (.709) (U/rro) .536 (U)
Π .818 (.814) (U/rro) 1.000 (U)
ωh .704 (.710) (U/rro) .439 (U)
ωl .637 (U) .800 (U)
Table C.3: Treatment UH, only firms ND, main results
C.2 Logistic regression results, treatments AH and
AL
Given below are translated, relevant output tables for the logistic regression of the
dependent dummy variable Down defined in subsection 4.5.2 for treatment AH
(Tables C.4 - C.7) and treatment AL (Table C.8). The tests were performed using
the statistic software SPSS 16. Due to the few undefined values of reldevh, the final
regression for treatment AH was performed for only of 46 of 48 values. The results
differ negligibly when using all 48 observations or only Π.
We used a forward algorithm to check whether to include any of the 17 explana-
tory variables we observed before downsizing. These variables were the fixed wage,
the piece rate, both efforts, the three payoffs, the absolute and relative effort devi-
ations as well as the effort conjectures, and their absolute and relative deviations
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from optimum effort. This algorithm uses score tests to decide which variable to
include next as well as likelihood ratio test to evaluate whether the inclusion im-
proves the model’s explanatory power significantly. The algorithm stops after step
1, including only the firm’s payoff Π as explanatory variable. Table C.7 gives the
results of the likelihood ratio omnibus test for this first step compared to the null
model without explanatory variables. The inclusion of Π contributes significantly
(p = .002). The effect of the principal’s profit is significant (Wald test: p = .017,
see Table C.4).
For step 0 of treatment AH, where predictions suggest that downsizing took
place, 33 out of 46 observations are predicted correctly, a ratio of 71.7%. This
classification table is omitted due to space restrictions. After step 1, the model
predicts 78.3 % of observations correctly, which is an improvement over the null
model.
Variables in the equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1 Π -.075 .032 5.666 1 .017 .928
Constant 3.245 1.150 7.957 1 .005 25.663
Table C.4: Treatment AH, logistic regression: Relevant variables
Classification Table
Predicted Percentage
Down (1=yes) of correct
Observed .00 1.00 predictions
Step 1 Down (1=yes) .00 5 8 38.5
1.00 2 31 93.9
Overall 78.3
The cut value is .500
Table C.5: Treatment AH, logistic regression: Classification Table
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Variables not in the equation
Value df Sig.
Step 1 Variables F .277 1 .599
r .076 1 .783
conjh .000 1 .992
conjl .071 1 .790
eh .476 1 .490
eh .396 1 .529
ωh .027 1 .870
ωl .435 1 .510
absdevh 2.769 1 .096
absdevl .355 1 .551
absconjh .672 1 .412
absconjl .006 1 .938
reldevh .549 1 .459
reldevl .326 1 .568
relconjh .019 1 .889
relconjh .003 1 .955
Table C.6: Treatment AH, logistic regression: Other variables
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 10.021 1 .002
Block 10.021 1 .002
Model 10.021 1 .002
Table C.7: Treatment AH, logistic regression: Omnibus Tests
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Variables not in the equation
Value df Sig.
Step 0 Variables F .010 1 .919
r .167 1 .683
conjh 2.760 1 .097
conjl .974 1 .324
eh .615 1 .433
el .060 1 .806
Π 1.706 1 .192
ωh .101 1 .751
ωl .170 1 .680
absdevh .681 1 .409
absdevl .257 1 .612
absconjh 1.408 1 .235
absconjl .761 1 .383
reldevh 1.449 1 .229
reldevl .441 1 .507
relconjh 2.906 1 .088
relconjl .171 1 .680
Table C.8: Treatment AL, logistic regression
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